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Introduction 
In this thesis I set out to argue for the germ of a new metaphysic of time and 
temporality. So far as I am aware the assumptions made and the premises adopted, 
though perhaps not entirely uncontroversial, are at least defensible. They are in line 
with an approach to metaphysics that takes the discipline seriously as a study of being 
and not merely as the study of semantics. Broadly speaking my approach to 
metaphysics is in line with the notion of metaphysics as a discipline outlined in The 
Possibility of Metaphysics by Jonathan Lowe. That is, I take metaphysics to be the 
project of delineating what there could be (c.f. Lowe 1998: p. 9), and offering 
arguments as to what there is. 
Thus, my study here concerns itself not merely with logical relations but with 
the metaphysical nature of temporality. For example, in chapter four I draw the 
conditional conclusion that, given the nature of our experience of temporality, the B 
theory of time requires us to adopt an account of temporal experience that is not 
sufficient to explain the way we perceive time and, hence, that this entails that we 
should reject the B theory of time. I say that this argument is conditional since it is 
clearly possible that our experience of temporality could be relevantly different. Were 
this the case (for example, were we to not perceive temporal passage) then the non-
logical terms introduced into my arguments (i.e. the nature of temporal experience) in 
conjunction with the laws of logic, would not be sufficient to motivate the rejection of 
B theoretic analyses of time. However, since I maintain that our metaphysics, the 
conjunction of logical laws and non-logical terms, rules out B theoretic analyses of 
time and temporality it follows that all such theories are false. 
In adopting the approach to metaphysics, and to time, that I do there are some 
further premises assumed. I assume that our metaphysics is privileged in the sense 
that it is prior to our science. In other words, I assume that if we have metaphysical 
reasons to revise the metaphysical commitments of an accepted physical theory, then 
we are entitled to make the revisions to our physical theory, provided that the 
metaphysical reasons are adjudged to be sufficient to warrant such a revision in the 
physical theory. The significance of this assumption becomes clear in my rejection of 
the contemporary interpretation of the special theory of relativity. 
With these assumptions in hand I attempt to argue in favour of a new theory of 
time, Temporal Minimalism. In the first chapter I offer a recapitulation of 
McTaggart's argument to the conclusion that time is unreal. This provides an 
important foundation for what follows inasmuch as it is not clear that the "paradox" 
revealed by McTaggart is always treated as a metaphysical problem - as it should be. 
Rather, it seems that in much of the literature McTaggart's arguments are revised into 
a semantic thesis about the nature of tensed sentence tokens and their truth conditions. 
In this first chapter, then, I argue that McTaggart's "paradox" is best thought of, not 
as a genuine metaphysical problem, but as a signpost to two distinct ways that time 
could be. 
In chapter two I argue that what is commonly referred to as "B theory" has 
taken on a number of other ontological commitments. Few, if any of these, are 
essential to the endorsement of a B theoretic account of time and temporality; but all 
are used as motivational in the arguments in favour of B theoretic accounts and 
against A theoretic accounts of temporality. Having established the existence of this 
revised form of B theory in the literature, I set out to show that the vanous 
commitments do not form the coherent whole that is commonly supposed. 
Throughout chapter two I concentrate largely on semantic theory and the 
relationship between tensed and tenseless accounts of truth conditions and the nature 
of time. I argue that the new B theory of language can be rescued from the criticisms 
made of it by tensed theorists provided the B theorist of language is prepared to 
endorse certain modal claims and certain views of dates as definite descriptions of 
their contents. Ultimately, however, I believe that the debate has taken a wrong tum. 
It is my claim that the theory of tense that one adopts is entirely independent from the 
ontology, A or B theoretic, that one endorses. 
In chapter three I argue that the conjunction of B theory and theories of space-
time is misplaced. I argue, in the first instance, that theories of space-time are 
undesirable given our current scientific theories and, second, that the conjunction of B 
theory and space-time is a metaphysical impossibility. With these two arguments 
concluded it should be clear that the B theory of time (taken to include an 
endorsement of space-time) is much less powerful than is commonly supposed. Much 
of the motivation for accepting a B theory has been removed and the cogency of 
adopting B theory as the "view from science" has also been denied. I also probe the 
definition and formulation of the B theoretic position. 
. . 
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In chapter four I argue that it is intrinsic to the nature of temporal experience 
that it cannot be accounted for by a B theoretic ontology of temporality. The argument 
here hinges on the claim that standard B theoretic "secondary quality" accounts of 
temporal experience entail an "explanatory gap", and that the best attempts to close 
that gap, not only fail, but assume that which they set out to prove - namely that a B 
theoretic account of temporal experience is possible. 
In chapter five I argue that it is the etemalist conception of time that is mind 
dependent - that such treatments of time supervene upon mind dependent conception 
of time as essentially space-like - and that the mind dependency of such views of time 
is evident throughout the development of time concepts. In addition I offer the mind 
dependence of etemalism as a potential solution to the problem of why theories of 
space-time have been so successful if they are, as I claim, non veridical. Thus, 
chapters two to five should be seen as composing a negative thesis. 
In chapters six and seven I attempt to develop a positive thesis, a strain of 
presentism that can satisfactorily deal with the numerous technical problems that 
beset our current best theories of presentism. In chapter six I layout what I perceive 
to be the most serious problems with contemporary accounts of presentism as well as 
what I perceive to be the defects with the models suggested by Smith and Craig. It is 
with these criticisms in mind that I tum, in chapter seven, to an explication of 
Temporal minimalism. Temporal minimalism provides a hybrid solution to 
McTaggart's paradox; a hybrid between presentism and a C theoretic analysis of time. 
It is a strain of presentism that has sufficient resources to meet the problems raised in 
chapter six, and, as a dynamic theory of time, sufficient resources to account for the 
nature of temporal experience. 
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In chapter one I: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Chapter One 
Layout McTaggart's terminology and arguments in detail (1.1); 
Show that McTaggart's arguments do not uncover a paradox, but that they show 
the constraints placed upon any theory o/time (1.2); 
Argue that A-theoretic responses to the paradox should not be pursued (1.3); 
Argue that the current species o/hybrid theories should not be endorsed (1.4); 
1.1 McTaggart's paradox 
In The Unreality of Time John Ellis McTaggart argues that time is unreal. 
Although McTaggart's conclusions are not accepted his argument has left an indelible 
impression upon the philosophy of time. An explication of the "paradox" will be 
fruitful since it is not clear to me that the nature of his arguments has been appreciated 
by all. Quite simply I believe the thrust of McTaggart's arguments concerning the 
nature of time to have been ignored, or missed, with philosophers preferring to 
comment on semantic arguments concerning tense. 
1.1.1 The A series 
McTaggart begins by differentiating three distinct senes. The first, the A 
series, may be defined as, 'the series of positions running from the far past through 
the near past to the present, and then from the present to the near future and the far 
future' (McTaggart 1908: pAS8).1 This series, then, is intended to capture the 
transitory nature of time, for it is through the continual alteration of this series that we 
may say that there is change and time. Specifically this A series change consists in an 
entity first being future, then present and then past. The Battle of Hastings, for 
example, has changed insomuch as it was future, it was present, and it is past. 
Because of this change in A qualities we are entitled to say that there has been a real 
change in the metaphysical qualities of the Battle of Hastings from future to present to 
I I refer to the "A series", rather than "A-series", in keeping with McTaggart's original tabulation. I 
also refer to temporal "qualities," again following McTaggart. 
1 
past. The transience of the A series (the continual change in what is past, present and 
future) seems laudable inasmuch as it appears to capture how we think about time as 
intimately related to change in what there is. 
There are obvious overtones here of an event ontology, since it would appear 
that events are the prime candidates for this kind of change. But it does seem that 
whether one views events, substance or some other metaphysical category as 
ontologically primitive one will still want to say that there is, at least as implied by 
natural language, a reason to treat certain states or entities as past, certain states or 
entities as present and others still as future. 2 If this is true, if entities are past, present 
and future, then it makes sense to ask in virtue of what it is that this is true: what it is 
that makes entities past present or future? If one endorses an A theory then one will 
believe that it is temporal properties of these kinds that make entities so and that it is 
these temporal properties that constitute temporality. 
Although there are good reasons for rej ecting the claim that there are genuine 
A theoretic qualities (1.3), for now let us suppose that McTaggart was correct, and 
that an entity is past just in case it has the quality of pastness, present if it possesses 
the quality presentness and future if it has the quality futurity. 
1.1.2 The B series 
In distinction to this ever changing A senes, we also speak of entities as 
standing in a set of permanent relations; the relations of earlier than, simultaneous 
with, and later than.3 McTaggart defines these relations as constitutive of the B series. 
Thus, if x is ever later than y then it is always later than y, if x is simultaneous with y 
then it is always simultaneous with y and if x is earlier than y then it is always earlier 
than y. If one is a B theorist one will believe that it is these relations that are necessary 
for time to be real. However, these relations do not prima facie capture the sense in 
which we think of change. Returning to the example of the Battle of Hastings it is not 
altogether clear that the Battle of Hastings being earlier than McTaggart writing The 
Unreality of Time provides us with an account of change. In being comprised of 
2 In view of this claim I will use the term "entity" to refer to occupants of positions in time. In doing so 
I hope to avoid prejudging whether such occupants ought correctly be thought of as events or 
otherwise. 
3 McTaggart himself refers to only earlier than and later than; I include the simultaneity relation since it 
is a useful relation for the B theorist. 
2 
pennanent relations the B series seems to lack the transience that was held up as 
desirable in the A series. Whereas on the A theoretic account an entity becomes 
present and past, on the B theoretic account entities simply stand in the pennanent 
relations of earlier than simultaneous with and later than. This is, however, only a 
prima facie objection and is one that stands in need of further scrutinty. 
1.1.3 The C series 
The third series McTaggart mentions, and one oft neglected in the literature, is 
the C series. I suspect that the reason that the C series is nonnally left out of 
discussions of McTaggart and time, is that it does not tell us anything about what time 
is. As McTaggart says, 
But this other series - let us call it the C series - is not temporal, for it involves no 
change, but only an order. Events have an order. They are, let us say, in the order M, N, 
0, P or 0, N, M, P or in any other possible order. But that they have this order no more 
implies that there is any change than the order of the letters of the alphabet, or the Peers 
on the Parliament Roll, implies change. (p.462) 
For now, we ought to note that a series of entities existing as the C series exists 
is a series that has no time. There may be an ordering relation among the entities, 
such as that of the alphabetisation of the names on the Parliamentary Roll, but an 
ordering relation, as in the case of the Parliamentary Roll, does not entail temporality 
unless that particular ordering relation is itself a temporal relation. Certainly, there is 
no obvious reason to suppose that a simple ordering relation, such as the list of names 
on the Parliamentary Roll, is sufficient for temporality. If this were the case then it 
seems that we should have to say that such lists themselves were temporal, that the 
Parliamentary Roll changes (in the sense intended when we think of time) in virtue of 
being composed in accordance with an ordering relation.4 
Of course a C series is not without direction; any C series will have at least two 
directions from less inclusive to more inclusive and from more inclusive to less , 
inclusive. Returning to the case of the Parliamentary Roll we have the two directions 
4 Though the names on the list will change over time and there is a sense in which the list, once 
ordered, demonstrates alphabetic variation across its length. 
3 
from A to Z and from Z to A. Broad (1938c: pp. 519-526 and pp. 534-575) analyses 
McTaggart's concept of the C series. Much of what Broad has to say about the C 
series concerns apparent perception of temporality within the C series, if time is 
unreal: put another way, how it is that we believe there to be time if, in fact, we exist 
in a C series (pp. 551-575)? Since I do not accept McTaggart's conclusion, that time 
is unreal, much of this is irrelevant to us here.5 All that we need to take from our brief 
examination of the C series is that it is a non temporal series.6 
1.1.4 Paradox 
With the three series in mind, what is McTaggart's "paradox"? In describing 
the C series as an ordered, but as yet non temporal series, it is necessary for a 
proponent of real time to state how we get from the non temporal C series to the 
temporal B series. Both the Band C series are constituted by permanent relations, but, 
as was noted above, there appears not to be anything obviously temporal about an 
ordered series. If the Band C series are identical then there would appear to be no 
time, there is simply an ordered relation.7 According to McTaggart, in order for time 
to be real the B series must be a very particular type of series. It is a series that may be 
formed from the conjunction of the ordered relations of the C series and the temporal 
qualities of the A series. However, McTaggart argues that the A series itself proves to 
be incoherent and, since the B series is to be formed from the conjunction of the 
ordered relations of the C series and the temporal qualities of the A series, it must be 
the case that the B series and, hence time, is unreal. 
McTaggart argues: 
Positions in time, as time appears to us prima facie, are distinguished in two ways. Each 
position is Earlier than some, and Later than some, of the other positions. And each 
position is either Past, Present, or Future. The distinctions of the former class are 
permanent, while those of the latter are not. If M is ever earlier than M, it is always 
5 Though if one were to suppose that time is unreal then one may wish to ~xplore thi~ notio~ further. 
6 There is a striking similarity between the way McTaggart (1909) conceIves of reahty as timeless, and 
his view of the C series (see Broad 1938c). 
7 Of course if all ordered relations were temporal then this would not be the case, but since we know of 
ordered relations that are not temporal it is necessary to state how it is that the B series is temporal 
where the C series is not 
4 
earlier. But an event, which is now present, was future and will be past. (McTaggart 
1908: p4S8) 
Of course, if an entity is present then it cannot be past or future, neither can a 
future entity be present or past, nor a past entity present or future; these qualities are 
mutually exclusive. But if an entity is past at some time, then it is also present at 
another and future at yet another. Hence an entity is past, present and future, a clear 
contradiction. If the A series is unreal then that which discriminates the B series, as 
temporal, from the C series, as mere ordered relations, is denied to us and the two 
appear to collapse into one and the same thing. Further, if the Band C series are one 
and the same thing, then there is no time as the C series is not temporal. The most 
obvious objection to McTaggart's arguments is that entities do not hold each of these 
incompatible temporal properties at the same time. However, as we shall now see, this 
is of little use since it forces us into an infinite regress. 
Consider, for example, McTaggart's writing of The Unreality of Time as 
present, my writing this paper as future and the Battle of Hastings as past. If the C 
series does not itself change then it is not true that the Battle of Hastings is past, then 
present and then future; rather the Battle of Hastings will simply be in the C series. 
And if the C series exists simpliciter then it cannot be the case that each of these 
temporal qualities can apply to entities consecutively for the obvious reason that this 
appears to entail a change in the C series where the C series is defined as that which 
does not change. 
The most instinctive move to make is to argue that there is a further series, call 
this the D series, in which the state of affairs where the Battle of Hastings exists as 
past, the writing The Unreality of Time exists as present and my writing of this paper 
is future, exists as a single entity. In addition to this the D series includes entities - or 
D times - where the Battle of Hastings is present, and both the writing of The 
Unreality of Time and my writing this paper are future, where the Battle of Hastings 
and the writing of The Unreality of Time are past, and my writing this paper is 
present. These will all exist, as well as a whole host of other temporal entities, each of 
which will posses A series qualities. 
The problem with this move is that while it is able to account for the existence 
of each of the A series qualities without contradiction, so far it fails to provide any 
kind of metaphysical change of the sort that was mentioned above as being genuine 
5 
change, the change of the A series. Each of the D times simply exists. There is no 
change in which one of these states is genuinely past, present or future. For example, 
the D time in which the Battle of Hastings is past, the writing of The Unreality of 
Time is present and my writing this paper is future, simply exists unchangingly, in a 
series of pennanent relations to other D times, such as the D time where the Battle of 
Hastings is past, the writing of The Unreality of Time is past, and my writing this 
paper is present. In order to provide some genuine metaphysical account of this 
change we would have to stipulate further that which of these D times is instantiated 
is dependent upon which of them is, itself, present. But, if we are to reconcile this to 
the existence of the C series, then we must say that all of these various D times exist, 
simpliciter, and then we must find some way of avoiding saying that one of these D 
times is past, present and future - which we are committed to unless we further 
specify a higher time series in which each D time is first future, then present and then 
past. 8 It is easy to see, then, that this attempt to move away from the paradox by 
specifying temporal passage in a higher time series leads us into an infinite regress. 
For every level at which one postulates a time series it is necessary to have a further 
series into which to build an account of genuine metaphysical passage and so on. 
As McTaggart goes on to argue, 
[T]his explanation involves a vicious circle. For it assumes the existence of 
time in order to account for the way in which moments are past, present and future. 
Time then must be pre-supposed to account for the A-series. But we have already seen 
that the A-series has to be assumed to account for time. (McTaggart 1908: p.468) 
I think that we might sum up McTaggart's claim thus: 
MI: The A series is essential to time 
M2: The A series is composed of the qualities past, present and future 
M3: The qualities of pastness, presentness and futurity are mutually exclusive 
M4: Every entity has the quality of pastness, presentness and futurity due to being in 
the A series, if time is real 
M5: Time is unreal 
8 For shorter, though less detailed, expositions of the paradox see variously, though not exclusively, 
Horwich (1988: p.18); Dummett (1960: p.498), Lowe (1987a: pp 62-63) and Geach (1979: p. 90) 
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1.2 AorC 
However, McTaggart is wrong; time is real. The first thing to say about the 
"paradox" is that even if all of the premises that are offered were essential and the 
arguments led to the conclusion that time is unreal, then it might still not be possible 
to accept that conclusion. There is an important sense in which time is so fundamental 
an experience and concept that to declare it unreal may actually border on the 
impossible - at least to believe the conclusion to be true might be impossible.9 
In any case McTaggart's argument does not force us to accept that time is 
unreal. What it does appear to force us to do is to give up either the A series or the C 
series. In 1.1.4 it was noted that if the C series was to be reconciled to an ever 
changing A series then it would become necessary to specify the existence of a higher 
time series to account for temporal change. It was this need to postulate an ever higher 
time series that forced us to admit that there is a paradox at the heart of our 
descriptions of time, since there is no series in which we can coherently capture the 
passage of time alongside a changeless description of what there is. 
But, if this is true, if it is the conjunction of the A and C series that gives rise 
to the paradox, then the formulation of the paradox at the end of 1.1.4 is incorrect. 
Instead we ought to state it thus: 
M1 *: The A series is essential to time 
M2*: The A series is composed of the qualities past, present and future 
M3*: The qualities ofpastness, presentness and futurity are mutually exclusive 
M4*: Every entity has the quality of past ness, presentness and futurity due to being in 
the A series, if time is real. Either that or the C series does not exist 
M5*: Time is unreal 
But plainly M5* does not follow: instead it ought to be replaced with M5** 
M5**: Time is unreal or the C series does not exist 
9 One might, for example, strike an analogy with Hume's claims concerning causation. 
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This would appear to be the correct reading of McTaggart's original argument and 
this suggests that McTaggart's arguments do not form a paradox, but that they point 
to the fact that time must be perspicuously described as composed of ordered relations 
(B theory), be unreal (though whether we could accept such a conclusion is a 
debatable point) or the A series is real and the C series must be unreal. 10 Our analysis 
must then turn to an examination of theories that purport reality to be composed of 
ordered relations and theories that prefer A theoretic descriptions. 11 
1.2.1 A problem of tense? 
It has been argued, in various places, e.g. Mellor (1981: pp. 5, 92-98), that 
rather than proving time unreal, McTaggart's real success, or at least the real success 
of his argument, is in proving that tense is unreal. Proponents of such views (Mellor 
and Le Poidevin 1987: p. 535) suggest that McTaggart fails to show that time is 
unreal but that he succeeds in showing tense to be unreal. The problem of tense will 
be dealt with below in chapter two. For now it is simply my intention to argue that 
there is a genuine issue at stake here and one that we cannot afford to conflate with a 
problem of tense. This is not to say that Mellor and Le Poidevin do so, merely that we 
must be careful how we proceed. If, for the sake of argument, we suppose that the C 
series exists then we cannot conjoin that C series to any objective account of 
becoming. Any attempt to do so leaves us with a contradiction, our metaphysical 
problem - McTaggart's "paradox". A metaphysic that includes an account of 
metaphysical becoming cannot be conjoined to an account that entails the existence of 
more than one time. This is, at any rate, the apparent conclusion we should reach from 
a careful examination of McTaggart's arguments. Thus, there is a metaphysical matter 
at issue here, something that may, or may not, be over and above a discussion of 
tense, but there is no paradox. 
10 (C.f. Craig 2000a: p. 180). 
II Although as it turns out we shall have to explore another type of theory to stand in stead of A 
theoretic accounts. The view I have in mind is presentism. 
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1.2.3 A signpost not a paradox 
The metaphysical matter in hand does not, as I suggest above, entail that there 
is a paradox. In addition to the reworking of the conclusion to McTaggart's "paradox" 
to the conclusion of M5**, there are a number of objections that one can make to 
McTaggart. One could deny, as Horwich (1988: pp. 18-20) does, that the kind of 
change envisaged as essential by McTaggart is a non essential feature of time, 
preferring instead to think of time as mere variation (Russellian change) or as physical 
change in a given entity, or entities. Both of these options come with an attendant 
metaphysics. In any case, given the discussion above showing that McTaggart's 
arguments force us into viewing time as composed of either ordered relation, or as 
somehow A theoretic, it seems inappropriate to continue to suggest that he uncovered 
a paradox, unless of course it can be shown that both of these options are themselves 
paradoxical or that we must accept the union of A and C theoretic accounts as he 
conceived of them. Thus, we now tum to sketching a more detailed account of the A 
and B theoretic solutions to the paradox. 
1.2.4 A theory 
A pure A series account would appear to offer us the advantage of according 
with our natural language descriptions of tense (desirable, if not essential) and with 
our perceptions of temporality. It achieves the first of these by taking literally the 
claim that if an entity, say the Battle of Hastings, is past then it is so in virtue of 
having the quality of past ness (similarly for the other temporal predicates). Thus, what 
exists now is the Battle of Hastings (with the quality of pastness), my writing of this 
paper (with the quality of presentness) and the year 3000 (with the quality of futurity). 
The second virtue of the A theoretic account, that it accords with our perception of 
temporality, is achieved by having what exists literally change. Hence, the reason that 
I perceive first my flicking of a light switch and then the turning on of the light is that 
when I press the light switch that event is present. It has the quality of being present 
and it is that quality that permits the mediation of the sensation to my mind. Whatever 
peculiar powers we are to attribute to this moving present among them must be the 
ability to mediate sensations to the mind. But it seems reasonable to suggest upon first 
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analysis that we perceive there to be change because there is change in the temporal 
qualities borne by entities. 
This kind of view is held by Jonathan Lowe, who argues that McTaggart's 
denial of the reality of time hinges on a misinterpretation of indexical statements. 
The mistake consists III forgetting the uneliminably indexical nature of A -series 
expressions, at least while they are being used as opposed to being mentioned: 
philosophers writing on time are constrained to use these expressions in the same 
context-dependent way in which ordinary humanity is - they, too, cannot escape their 
own temporal perspective, however much they may be tempted to suppose that they 
can view things sub specie aeternitatis. (Lowe 1987a: p.67) 
Lowe's own view of time as passage is one of 'routes' through space-time positions 
(p. 69), where each 'route' is understood as 'a sequence of spatio-temporal 
perspectives' (op. cit). Note, therefore, that for Lowe, there is an important distinction 
between the present, the locus of any perspective, and the past and future. 12 It is 
obvious, given the arguments above, that someone wishing to maintain a "Lowe-
style" metaphysics of time must give up ontological commitment to the C series. For 
if we can conceive of reality as C theoretic, or as composed from the unchanging 
relations of the B series, then we cannot also conceive of it changing, as it must for 
the A theoretic description to be true. Thus, a "Lowe-style" metaphysics cannot be 
conjoined to the existence of the C series. 
1.2.5 B theory 
Rather than agree with McTaggart and stipulate that it is the addition of the A 
series to the C series that gives rise to temporality, the B theorist argues that the 
ordering relations that stand between entities in time are, themselves, constitutive of 
temporality. This type of view is due to Russell originally, and can be stated thus: 
Change is the difference, in respect of truth or falsehood, between a proposition 
concerning an entity and a time T and a proposition concerning the same entity and 
12 Gale (1969) also seems to hold a pure A theory - though he believes that there must be gradations in 
temporal properties in order to account for entities being more past, more future etc. In any case one 
must still deny the existence of the C series. 
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another time T', provided that the two propositions differ only by the fact that T occurs 
in the one where T' occurs in the other. (Russell 1903 Principles of Mathematics: sect. 
442) 
Change, then, is not to be thought of as a physical change in what there is, i.e. a 
change in the location or composition of an entity or entities, nor is it the alteration of 
A theoretic qualities. Instead, change is variation in temporal location. For now all I 
wish to do is to dispel the pre theoretic intuition noted in 1.2 that seems to rule out B 
theoretic approaches as a priori false. We may separate this pre theoretic objection 
out into two distinct types of resistance: first that space is unlike time and hence talk 
of variation is inappropriate when talking about time, and, second, that the B theoretic 
account does not account for a change in the sum total of facts about reality that is 
necessary for there to be genuine change. 13 
The spatial objection can be dealt with quite simply, at least initially. The pre 
theoretic intuition is brought out and detailed by McTaggart (1927: ch XXXIII, 
sections. 315-316)14, where he points us toward the idea that a poker being hot at t1 
and cold at t2 is insufficient for the poker itself to have undergone change. Rather, all 
that exists is a poker at t1 in one state and a poker at t2 in another. This no more 
provides us with a genuine account of change than does a poker being hot at one end 
and cold at another. In the latter spatial case we do not think of this as entailing 
change, at least not change as we conceive of temporal change as being, so we ought 
not to think of variation as sufficient for genuine temporal change in the temporal 
case. As Sider (2001) puts it: 
No one says that the relative locations of the Greenwich meridian and the United 
Kingdom change, and no one says that a poker that is hot at one end but cold at 
another is thereby changing. But on the Russellian theory, change is the 
instantiation of different properties at different times, and is thus analogous to 
these cases of the instantiation of different properties at different places. (p.214) 
However, there are ways in which the B theorist can respond. In the first instance talk 
of variation in the spatial and temporal cases may be simply analogical. It remains to 
13 c.f. Sider (2001: pp. 212-216). 
14 See also Sider (2001: p. 213), Lombard (1986: pp. 108-9), Mellor (1981: pp. 103-4, 110-11). 
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be seen whether or not the B theorist can account for all of the necessary features of 
temporality and temporal passage, but the presence of an analogy with the spatial case 
of variation does not entail that temporal variation will be unable to prove distinct 
from spatial variation. It may tum out that there are distinctions in type between 
spatial and temporal variation. Whereas in the spatial mode "variation" is mere 
variation across space, temporal variation may tum out to be manifestly different in 
virtue of being constrained by entropic increase (or some other constraint unique to 
time) - a condition that is not obviously applicable to spatial variation. 
Second to this line of response, it seems likely that in order for the B theorist 
to provide an adequate account of temporality, and the distinctness of temporal and 
spatial variation, that time and temporal variation will tum out to be onto logically 
basic in some sense. IS As a result, the spatial analogue with temporal variation (which 
can certainly be found in language, e.g. the "length" of time an event might take) 
ought not to be taken to imply that time is space; rather, that although both time and 
space are extended they have fundamentally different characteristics. At the very least 
our experience of temporal and spatial extension and variation is sufficient for us to 
delineate successfully between the two. Thus, the notion that temporal variation is 
insufficient for change can be repudiated, at least for the time being, for it is not at all 
clear that temporal and spatial variation need to be at all alike. 
The second, though related, objection to the B theoretic account was that 
genuine change requires an account of facts whereby the sum total of facts at time t1 
is different from the sum total of facts at t2; a poker being hot at t1 and cold at t2 
clearly fails to provide this. There is no change in the sum total of facts on the B 
theoretic account and, as such, the pre theoretic intuition that the sum total of facts at 
time t 1 must differ from those at t2 must be violated if the B theory is to be true. 
But it is quite simply unclear as to how serious an objection to the B theory 
this really is. If the B theories wishes to preserve some kind of account whereby the 
truth of tensed locutions changes then they will, presumably, admit that sentences 
change in truth value, such that "the poker is now hot", spoken at t1, is true. But 
spoken at t2 "the poker is now hot" is false. The B theorist will, then, need to draw 
some kind of distinction between ordinary sentence tokens, utterances and the like 
which do change their truth value, and propositions; whereby propositions such as 
15 Equally, it seems that a corollary of this view will be that spatial variation will turn out to be 
onto logically basic, irreducible into more basic metaphysical components. 
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"the poker is hot at t1 ", if true, are always true. The critic of the B theory supposes 
that the sum total of facts will change and then points to failure of the B theory to 
account for this as a problem. But it is not clear why the B theorist should accept the 
premise, namely that the sum total of facts will change when to endorse this appears 
to be something which is obviously in contradiction to their own view. Nor is it clear 
that it is true that the sum total of facts do change. Hence, it seems that the B theorist 
can, at least in principle, meet these opening objections. 
On the B theoretic account time will tum out to be extended, though either in 
a manner that is of itself distinct to spatial extension, or through the instantiation of 
temporal relations that are suitably distinct from their spatial counterparts. It is 
unclear, at this stage, precisely how the B theorist should explicate the distinction 
between space and time. Ultimately, the distinction appears to become blurred by 
technical considerations from relativity (chapter three), but for now it is sufficient to 
note that a B theoretic account is prima facie possible. 
1.3 Why not to pursue pure A theory 
The type of response mooted by the A theorist, and discussed in brief in 1.2.4, 
will not be pursued to any serious extent within this paper. That is not to say that such 
theories are technically unviable. It may tum out that such positions are viable and 
even represent desirable options for a metaphysic of time. But for a number of reasons 
detailed below they appear initially unpromising. Although I think that pure A 
theoretic metaphysics of time are inadequate to the task in hand, I lack the space to 
argue more extensively for my position. The problems raised, specifically that of 1.3.4 
seem to me to provide sufficient grounds to not give further consideration to A 
theoretic accounts here. 
1.3.1 Degrees of past and future 
Central to the claims of the A theorist is that there are at least three temporal, 
ontological categories, past, present and future. These categories are such that if an 
entity is, or has, anyone of these qualities, it lacks the others. It is also true to say of 
any entity located in time that it is more, or less, future or past with respect to other 
entities. Hence, in 1066, when the battle of Hastings was present, it was true that 
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McTaggart writing The Unreality of Time was a future entity, but it was also the case 
that my writing this paper was more future than the production of McTaggart's. 
Reciprocally, it is now the case that the battle of Hastings in 1066 is more past than 
the production of The Unreality of Time. 
It is not immediately clear precisely how one would cash this out in terms of A 
theoretic qualities. One might be tempted to say that those entities that are more past 
have a greater quality of pastness, those that are less past have slightly less pastness. 
In other words, how past something is, is dependent upon the quantity of pastness that 
it has. Intuitively, though, this means of characterising temporality seems wrong. An 
entity is not past because it has more pastness. If an entity is more past than another it 
is so precisely because it is more past, not because it has more past. 16 The A theorist 
might demur on this point and offer a relational account of temporal passage, such 
that the battle of Hastings is, now, more past than McTaggart's writing of The 
Unreality of Time, because the battle of Hastings stands in a relation to the present 
that is "more past" than the relationship McTaggart's writing of his article stands in to 
the present. Likewise, in 1066 my writing this paper was more in the future than the 
writing of The Unreality of Time because of the temporal relation it stands in. 
But then the A theoretic account of time must describe precisely what the 
present is on this relational account and, if such a notion proves intelligible (1.3.2), go 
on to say something about how the present moves from 1066 all the way through 
1908 up to the present day. Without this motion of the present it will prove impossible 
to construct a coherent metaphysical account of temporal relations whereby entities 
stand in particular relations to the present. We would have a theory whose key tenet is 
the claim that temporality is constructed from the relation that entities stand to the 
present, and no account of the present. 
It is relatively obvious to see what kind of things the temporal relations past 
and future will be; they will be akin to two distinct directions and those things that lie 
in one direction will be future and those that lie in the other will be past. But it seems 
unclear what the present will be on this account and I suspect that in this case simply 
moving to say that the present is a metaphysically irreducible concept will prove 
deeply unsatisfactory since we need to know in virtue of what an entity is present in 
order to understand correctly how it is that entities can stand in a relation to it. 
16 One might strike an analogy with colour. One leaf is not "more green" than another because it has 
more green, it is "more green" because it is more green. 
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1.3.2 Qualities in motion 
The point was made above that essential to both a property and relational 
account of A theoretic temporality is the question of what is predicated by tensed 
locutions. Clearly they must predicate something for it is an intrinsic feature of the A 
theory that they do so. The two options considered above were properties and 
relations, though it seems to me that what follows could equally be said about modes 
or qualities of a different sort. The problem noted above was that accounting for 
degrees of temporality by recourse to a degree of temporal quality will turn out to 
entail a revision to how we think of things as being past - their having pastness - or, 
on the relational account, that without a clear understanding of what is intended by the 
term "present" we should not proceed with the A theory on the relational account. But 
I should like to press this latter point further here. Whatever is delineated by 
"present", whether we opt for a relation, property, mode or some other account, must 
be something that occupies a succession of different times such that we can create 
something like the temporal perspectives mentioned in 1.2. 
But there is no obvious means by which times "become". Put another way, we 
appear to lack an account of how one time is future, becomes present and then goes 
on to recede ever further into the past. The analogy at hand is that of a spotlight 
tracing a path along a particular region of temporality, moving from the direction of 
the past to the direction of the future. A series of points will, successively, have the 
property of being lit. Likewise a succession of points in time will have the property of 
being present. But what is it that moves the spotlight along its course? Although the 
point is made by analogy one need not take it literally; one need not think of the 
moving spotlight view as literal in order to understand the thrust of the question. 
There must be something that drives presentness forward along its path. It seems clear 
that the A theorist owes us some account of this mechanism though none has been 
forthcoming. 17 
17 Given Lowe's remarks (pp. 93-4) concerning the nature of temporal predicates, it appears unlikely 
that he would accept this criticism of tensed theories of time, though, so far as I am aware, no account 
of the motion of the present has been forthcoming. 
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1.3.3 Change to times through time 
One may further object to A theoretic accounts of temporality that they talk of 
change to times constituting a change in time. Temporal passage, what we perceive as 
physical changes in everyday objects, is, in fact, the product of qualitative change in 
times themselves. Thus, instead of me going through the motions of typing this paper, 
what is taking place, according to the A theorist, is that various future states are 
becoming present (however this turns out to take place), such that my typing of these 
words appears to take place. In fact all that is happening is that various, previously 
future, states are "becoming". Of course, in following on from McTaggart's initial 
formulation of the A and B series my objection to time as changes to times is, in 
essence, a criticism of McTaggart's formulation of the A series. But the fault then lies 
only partially with McTaggart, for it was not he who developed the A series he 
sketches into a metaphysical account of time. 
If, as I claim, A theoretic accounts of temporality rely on changes to time 
constituting changes in time, then we would appear to have something of a problem, 
for the A theoretic account draws much of its strength from the claim that it is the 
more intuitively and pre theoretically obvious account of time and temporality. The A 
theorist appears to have something of a complex position on their hands here 
however, where a change to times is what we think of as change in time. The problem 
is not, as it stands, an insurmountable one for the A theorist (though see sections 1.4.2 
- 1.4.4 for a more detailed analysis of the problem of change to time constituting a 
change in time). But in having to claim that their position is less in line with our 
intuitions than we initially supposed in 1.1.2 raises considerable issues for a theory 
which depends, at least in part, for its motivation upon its simplicity and fit with how 
we pre theoretically think of reality. 
Of course, the A theorist might reply that I have not told the right kind of story 
about the A series. In fact temporal becoming is exactly as we think of it - a product 
of genuine change in physical entities, such as the spinning of the spokes in a wheel. 
But then there appears to be some complication. How is it that the physical motion of 
entities in this physical realm realises states that have been previously future and then 
reconciles them into past entities? The A theorist might claim that we can make use of 
modal resources to assist them. If we think of change as change in time, as opposed to 
the changes to time rejected above, then we might suppose that some possible world 
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PI is past in virtue of standing in some relation to the actual world, or in virtue of 
having some quality or other. 
However, then we must say how it is that a change in the actual alters the 
relation in which the actual stands to the possible. More importantly, one has to 
explain precisely how it is that a particular possible world is now past as a result of a 
happening in the actual. How is it that it has lost a particular temporal quality or 
relation? Although it is quite obvious how possible worlds might lose modal 
properties, their acquisition and loss of temporal properties seems to be a rather 
different matter. Nor have we said anything instructive concerning the mechanism 
whereby these qualities vary as was requested in 1.3.2, how we move the spotlight 
from one world to another. At the very least a description of this mechanism should 
be forthcoming before A theory can be developed into an intelligible account. 
1.3.4 Not being "future-present" 
An obvious corollary to the A theoretic account is the fact that no entity may 
be "future present" - no entity can be present in the future. Such accounts are ruled 
out both by commonsensical observation that no entity may be past, present and 
future since that which is predicated is mutually exclusive, but also by specific 
arguments. Drawing on an analogy with spatial indexicals, Lowe (1998: pp. 93-4) 
argues that it makes no more sense to say of an entity that it is present in the future, 
than it does to say in a spatial context that an entity is here-over-there. If an entity is 
over-there, then it is not also here. Both "here" and "now" are indexical terms and 
since, Lowe argues, the truth of "tensed" (whether spatially or temporally) token 
reflexive utterances is to be determined by tensed token reflexive truth conditions, the 
truth of a sentence using a temporal indexical, "now", will be dependent upon certain 
tensed token reflexive truth conditions. 
Yet according to the A theoretic account those things that are past, present and 
future are all real and, if these times are real, some of these are occupied by people, 
albeit future and past people. But these people, these agents, do not, now, have a 
temporal perspective. That is to say, they do not have the experience of being "now". 
Of course, they will do so in the future, but in order to take Lowe's claim seriously we 
cannot say that such people experience their "now" in the future, merely that they H'ill 
experience their "now". But why is it that they do not experience being future? If they 
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are, from the correct temporal perspective at the current time, people who exist as 
future entities then why do they not have future experiences? They are perfectly real, 
they undergo changes in their temporal qualities yet they undergo no experiences and 
apparently lack any real agency. If Lowe's analogy with the temporal indexical is 
perspicuous then future people should have future experiences just as people "over 
there" have "over there" experiences. The fact that I am not yet located over there 
with them, or not yet located in the future with them, to know what those experiences 
are ought not to rule out the possibility of them having such experiences. If someone 
is located at a spatial distance from me they will have an experience of being at a 
particular point in space, even though they are not located "here" according to me. 
It will not do to object that people who are "over there" do not have "over 
there" experiences, but "here" experiences whilst being "over there" and thus that 
people who are future have "now" experiences in the future. This is due to the fact 
that people who are future undergo objective changes to their temporal qualities, 
whereas no such change in qualities exists in the spatial case. For example, if the A 
theory is true, then at the time of the battle of Hastings I was a future person and, 
since that moment in time I have altered in respect of my temporal properties. 
Since there are no (discounting cases of deja vu and alleged psychic prediction 
as non veridical) actual future experiences of which we are aware, despite presumably 
being the subjects of some of these futures ourselves, it would seem apposite to deny 
a pure A theoretic account of time and temporality that seemingly entails the 
existence of future experiences that we lack. So whilst Lowe may be right that the 
truth conditions of tensed tokens are to be given in terms of tensed token reflexive 
truth conditions, I do not see that this entails an A theoretic account of time. 
It is important to emphasise that though these problems are probably 
insufficient to rule out pure A theoretic accounts of time without further examination 
of these problems and others, it is unclear to me why, in light of these problems, one 
would want to endorse a position with problems that seem to be so basic to its very 
nature. In the meantime it seems necessary to detail presentism as, pending criticisms 
of the hybrid AlB theories of time, this seems the most logical solution to 
McTaggart's paradox that makes use of genuine changed as opposed to ordered 
temporal relation. 
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1.3.5 Presentism 
Presentism, as defined and defended by, Prior (1968), Hinchliff (1996, 2000), 
Markosian (2004), Craig (2000a, 2000b, 2003), Crisp (2004a, 2004b), Ludlow (1999, 
2004) and Bigelow (1996),18 is the view that only the present exists. Now, obviously 
this is a tensed view of time because the presentist takes it to be true that whilst only 
the present exists - our most liberal temporal quantifiers range only over those entities 
that are present - it is also true that other states of affairs will come to be. 
lt should be clear from our forgoing discussion that the concept of change is 
integral to our deliberations here and as such it is fitting that one or two points are 
made clear about what is meant by "change" in this case. The type of change 
envisaged by the presentist is not a "coming to be" of some future state of affairs. 
This is obvious because the presentist denies the existence of those things past and 
future. Nor does the presentist accept McTaggart's claim that change is the 
acquisition and loss of temporal qualities, where entities are arranged into a series. 
For the presentist there is only one time that exists and hence times other than the 
present cannot bear the temporal qualities necessary to formulate an A series. Any 
change that does occur is going to be a physical change in the constitution and/or 
composition and/or location of entities located in space and/or any other 
"metaphysical" changes that occur - such as changes in God or the non-physical. 19 
There are technical difficulties that beset presentism (chapter six) but for now 
I should just like to remark that there is nothing obviously incoherent about the notion 
that tenses, on the presentist account, do not predicate any temporal qualities of 
entities. For example, if I say that "it will rain in Durham", the presentist cannot say 
that I am taking the event of "raining in Durham" and predicating futurity of it - for 
the future does not exist. Intuitively one may balk at this but I do not think that there 
is any reason to do so. As Lowe (1998: p. 94) notes, we have a perfectly good 
understanding of negativity - of denial - even though it is impossible to give a non-
circular definition of negativity. There is no such thing which it is to be "not p", rather 
something is "not p" in virtue of not being p. In the same wayan entity is future if it 
18 For less favourable reviews see Le Poidevin (1991: p. 31), Lowe (1998: pp. 94-5), Smith (2002: p. 
123), Mellor (1981: p. 30) and chapter six of this work. It. should be ~oted that in some of these cases 
"temporal solipsism" is used to refer to what I am here calhng presentIsm. 
19 An example of the latter might be an immaterial mind. 
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turns out that it will occur and an entity is past if it has occurred. In saying such we 
are not committing to the existence of temporal qualities.2o 
It should also be obvious that presentism is beset by none of the difficulties 
mentioned with regard to pure A theoretic accounts of time. An entity is "more 
future" than another if it will require a greater number of changes to realise, given the 
current laws of nature, and "more past" than another if a greater number of changes 
have had to be realised in order to reach the present from that state than they would 
from another (1.3.1). The causal mechanism by which new times "become" (1.3.2) is 
simply the ordinary every day change that we see around us. A change in what there 
is, how it is composed by its parts or where it is located, is sufficient to provide an 
account of a change of time, since a change in what there is changes what exists and, 
hence, moves us from one time to another. Neither is it the case that presentism is 
beset by the apparent incongruity that a change in time is constituted by a change in 
the constitution of times (1.3.3). Presentism, by denying the existence of times other 
than the present, by denying the existence of the C series, is not prone to this type of 
criticism. There are no "times" to undergo the change in temporal qualities that 
constitutes temporal passage for the pure A theorist. Nor is the presentist vulnerable to 
the kind of objection raised in 1.3.4, where I claimed that if the pure A theory is 
correct, then we ought to have situations whereby future people have future 
expenences. 
Indeed, as a tensed theory of time that is not beset by any of the disadvantages 
of the A theoretic accounts, presentism appears to be the most appealing way to 
proceed if we are to proceed with a tensed account of time at all. Although there are, 
as I am at continued pains to point out, many problems with presentism - many of 
which we will come across in chapter six - the types of problems that occur for the 
presentist are technical, and do not require us either to give up our most intuitive 
understanding of temporal passage (which appears to be required for us to deny the 
point made in 1.3.3 that temporal passage revolves around a change in temporal 
qualities). Nor does it have the problem of being unsupported by experience (as pure 
A theoretic accounts are, 1.3.4). Thus, presentism appears to be the best genuinely 
tensed option with which to reply to McTaggart's original arguments. 
20 Hence the presentist may advocate tensed token reflexive truth conditions for sentences. In .any case, 
we do not need tenses to predicate temporal qualities in order for tensed utterances to be meamngful. 
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1.4 Hybrid AlB theories 
If we were to find a hybrid position that incorporates both a dynamic, A 
theoretic model of becoming, as well as an element of the permanent B theoretic 
relations, then we should have a theory of time that fits well with our intuitions. 
Sadly, as I shall show below, there are significant problems with the hybrid theories 
of time available. The problems mentioned are sufficient to lead me to the conclusion 
that our choice of a correct metaphysics of time, as indicated by M5**, is between a 
dynamic, presentist, or static, B theoretic metaphysics of time. Although in pursuing a 
solution to the problems that beset presentism I argue in chapter seven that we can 
construct something similar to a hybrid theory. 
1.4.1 McCall21 
McCall argues that reality is divided into past, present and future not by 
entities bearing temporal qualities, or standing in particular relations to one another, 
but by the topological structure of time. According to McCall, the future is composed 
of infinitely many real possible worlds, construed in the Lewisian sense, whereby 
each future may be thought of as a branch of reality and is a real Minkowski space-
time. The past may be differentiated from the future in virtue of there being only one 
space-time branch - or trunk - whilst the present is the point at which the past meets 
the future. Temporal passage is constituted by the continual actualisation of some 
future branch which causes the foliation of its contemporaneous branches to leave 
only a single branch. This ensures that the present is continuously moving further into 
the future. The past is constituted by a single branch, the future by infinitely many and 
the present is the point at which the two meet. However, in making an objective 
distinction between past, present and future McCall commits himself to a position that 
either fails to meet the constraints placed upon a theory of time by McTaggart's 
arguments or a distinct empirical problem. 
There is a metaphysical/topological distinction to be drawn in our analysis of 
McCall's work as follows. In his model, McCall claims that for an entity M to be past 
21 There are also challenges to McCall's position raised by N erlich (1996), though see McCall (1996) 
for a reply. 
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is for M to lie in the single actualised trunk, but not at the point at which the trunk 
meets the branches. So M is past if it is in the part of the tree that is actualised but not 
at the point the trunk of the past meets the branches of the future. However, this is an 
empirical claim as to the location of M within a space-time structure. For the 
metaphysician M is past if, at some past time, M was present and was future, 
presumably in virtue of some change in M's nature. All that McCall can say is that if 
M is past then it is actualised, but the past state of affairs at the time of actualisation 
does not exist. In other words, although all the events and processes that constitute the 
actualisation of M exist - all of the appropriate physical goings on are in the past 
trunk of the space-time - the event of the unactualised potential future's dropping out 
of existence does not exist. For that to exist would require that the time be conceived 
of in some other fashion whereby past events exist as events with the quality of 
pastness. But if McCall is to countenance this latter metaphysical claim then he must 
also accept the existence of at least three temporal A series: one in which M is in the 
future branches, one in which M is present and another in which M is in the trunk and 
hence the past - although each of these A series will determine past, present and 
future metaphysically as opposed to empirically in virtue of their having different 
temporal qualities or relations. To argue such is to invite the infinite regress we saw 
earlier and is an obviously metaphysical problem. 
McCall can of course reply that he does not conceive of time in this fashion; 
that the notions of temporal quality mentioned above as the time of the metaphysician 
are not necessary, and that his position can get by perfectly well without it. But if he 
were to argue such then there is a topological problem that can be raised, for it 
appears that McCall must commit himself to the existence of an infinite chain of 
temporal series. McCall argues that the change from future to present to past is 
constituted by a series of topological variations in reality, that temporal flow is 
constituted by the foliation of branches of space-time. If we then conceive of this tree 
of space-times then we must recognise that the tree is itself undergoing changes. But 
an entity can surely only undergo changes in time. It will not do to say that these 
changes to time constitute the passage of time precisely because these changes are 
happening to time. It cannot be that changes happening to time happen in time, for in 
this case time itself is to be viewed as the subject of some change and hence need 
some time to occur. If a change in reality cannot happen without time, without the 
actualisation of some future branch, then it seems paradoxical to suggest that some 
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change can happen to another entity, time, without there being the actualisation of 
some previously future state of affairs. 
If McCall denies the existence of entities and events with temporal qualities or 
relations (those that led to the metaphysical problems above), then it seems that he 
must countenance the existence of some higher dimension of time, much like the 
branching model he recommends for lower time. He must do so in order to explain 
how the changes can occur to time. However, if there are not many future branches in 
the higher time series then the future must be deterministic. If there is only one higher 
time future, then there is only one lower time future that can be realised and, hence, 
McCall cannot endorse this option. In other words, if higher time contains only one 
future then it will contain only the future state of affairs where M is actualised, which 
contradicts the idea that there is genuine possibility amongst the lower time branches. 
But this higher time, also being dynamic, will be subject to the same changes 
to it, as opposed to within it, that were shown to entail the existence of higher time 
when we considered our lower time. Thus higher time too must be embedded within a 
higher time series. If this time series is construed metaphysically we find ourselves 
with a simple restatement of McTaggart's arguments, back with the metaphysical 
problem. And if we understand time to be the foliation of future branches of space-
time, then we will simply find another tree and then another and so on ad infinitum, 
our topological problem. Hence, unless there is some other way out of these problems, 
McCall's metaphysics entails the unreality of time. 
1.4.2 Tooley 
Tooley claims that objective temporal passage is constituted by the continual 
accretion of reality, and whilst those things that are past and present have determinate 
truths about them as truths at a time, claims about future events are true or false 
simpliciter. All that we need to say on Tooley's account is that those things past and 
present have been actualised and are actual as of this time, but those things future are 
unactualised as of this time, are actual simpliciter, and are actual as of some future 
time. Note that arguing as such Tooley is immune to the criticism that his position 
entails an topological hyper time, since time is not to be thought of as topological in 
the way McCall suggests. 
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However, the semantic distinctions drawn above play the roles of placeholders 
for temporal properties. Rather than saying that an event is future we will say that an 
event is unactualised as of this time. Instead of having the incompatible properties of 
presentness, pastness and futurity we now find ourselves with the incompatible 
properties of actual as o/this time and not actual as o/this time. We have to recognise 
Tooley's claim that "actual as of a time" is an inherently indexical notion and thus 
, , 
he hopes to avoid McTaggart's arguments, for we cannot say of his position that an 
event is actual of this time and not actual of this time, which appears to block the 
formulation of the paradox. But where McCall was accused of avoiding the 
metaphysical contradiction only by entailing a further contradiction in the infinitude 
of temporal series, Tooley is faced with the problem raised in 1.3.4, though in a 
slightly revised fashion. 
When we say that an entity is past, under Tooley's schema, we are claiming 
that the event or entity exists, is actualised, and is past, whilst the present is to be 
seen, as the dividing line between past and future. Thus, at anyone instant in time it is 
true to say that a certain set of events are future, a certain set present and a further set 
past. In other words when M is past, when t2 is realised, it was actualised as of time 
tl, but is not being actualised at time t2. There is a sense that when we say that M is 
past at t2, what we mean is that when M is present (tl), M is at the dividing line 
between the actualised and the non-actualised and M that is actualised. But what we 
commit ourselves to on Tooley's model is the claim that in the present (t2), M is in 
the past. That is, M stands in a particular relation to t2; but the M in question is not M 
in the past. When M was present (tl), M was at the dividing line between the actual 
and the non actual. But when M is past under Tooley's model, then, M is simply 
actualised and is not to be found at that dividing line between the actual and the non-
actual. If the state of affairs that pertained when M was present does not pertain in the 
past - i.e. if M is not at the dividing line between the actual and the non-actual - then 
the past does not exist, rather M exists in the present but with some quality of being 
actual. What Tooley is arguing is that M stands in a past relation, or has the quality of 
pastness, in relation to the present. But then it is not clear that there are any past 
things on Tooley's model at all, for the past - the state of affairs where M is present, 
where M is at the dividing line between the actual and the non actual, no longer exists 
because t2 is now present. 
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Of course Tooley could object that I am misrepresenting his position, that in 
fact the past is composed of those states of affairs whereby only those things that had 
been actualised are actual. Or, since Tooley commits to the existence of only tenseless 
facts, we could try to explain this by saying that those things that are in the past are, 
tenselessly, earlier than the present and that the attempts to bring tense in here is 
entirely unwarranted. But in that case it seems that Tooley too commits to the 
existence, and actualisation, of every event in conjunction with their bearing both the 
qualities of being actual and not being actual. Suppose that when M is present 0 is 
still non actual as of the present time and when 0 is actual as of the present time M is 
past. M must also exist as present in the past, otherwise it no longer exists as a past 
thing, rather it exists as a thing in the present with a particular relation to O. That 
relation cannot be the relation pastness for the relation pastness entails that the state of 
affairs whereby M is being actualised, exists, when in fact all that exists when M is 
past is that M has been actualised. 
1.4.2.1 Tooley's problem of becoming22 
There is another criticism that we can make of Tooley's position. With regards 
to future tensed statements Tooley makes the observation that, 
there does not appear to be any viable alternative to an approach that makes use of 
tenseless, existential quantification. (p.175) 
We must then reconcile this claim to the fact that event E being at the future at time t 
can be translated as 
Event E is later than time t, and t is an instantaneous state of affairs, t is actual as of 
time t, and no state of affairs that is later than t is actual as of time t. (p.196) 
Thus it appears we are to reconcile the view that time is dynamic, that only those 
things actual as of time t are actual, to the view that tenseless quantification is more 
1 ' d' ti t between true at a time and true 22 It should be noted that the coherence of Too e~ s IS nc ~aklander (2001) and \1cCall (2001) 
simpliciter has not been accepted by all. Notabl~, S~th \2001)j th r of those that I reproduce 
have all raised what I believe to be perfectly sohd ObjectIOns a ong e Illes 
here, though see Tooley (2001) for his response. 
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anal ytically basic than its tensed counterpart. As Oaklander (200 I) asks, 'is not the 
very concept of a "total, dynamic world" a contradiction in tenns?' (p.IO) Surely if it 
is the case that there are, simpliciter, tenseless facts about the future and, simpliciter, 
tenseless truths about the future, then it will not do to say that reality is genuinely 
dynamic? Tooley's (2001) response to this is to argue as follows. 
(l) There is a coherent, temporally indexed notion of being actual, and, given 
that notion, what is actual as of one time necessarily differs from what is 
actual as of any other time. 
(2) There is also a coherent, absolute notion of being actual simpliciter, and, 
given that notion it is incoherent to talk about what is actual simpliciter as 
of a time, let alone to say that what is actual simpliciter as of one time may 
differ from what is actual simpliciter as of some other time. 
(3) Any state of affairs that is actual as of some time t is actual simpliciter. 
(4) Claims (1), (2), and (3) are mutually consistent. (p.40) 
But (l), (2), and (3) are not mutually consistent, at least not if we take them 
"onto logically seriously." Tooley is right when he says, (1) and (2), that there are two 
independently coherent notions, one of a temporally indexed notion of being actual, 
the other of being actual simpliciter. It is, after all, these kinds of intuitions that we 
instinctively try to preserve when we attempt to reconcile A and B theoretic 
determinations. However, the two views cannot be coherently held of the same 
reality. If what is actual is, as (1) suggests, to be temporally indexed, then what is, in 
fact, actual, is actual as of a particular time. This view requires of us to take temporal 
becoming seriously and to admit that there is a genuine ontological distinction 
between the present and the future. If, on the other hand, we take (2) ontologically 
seriously, then there is an existent reality simpliciter; for in this case there is an 
unchanging reality, all of which is actualized. No doubt Tooley will stick to his guns 
on this point, but I find it impossible to see how one can reconcile the two seemingly 
disparate views. 
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1.4.3 Bourne style problems 
Even if the hybrid theorist can counter the arguments laid out in 1.-+.1 -
1.4.2.1, Craig Bourne (2002) has raised a technical problem, a problem for hybrid 
models. Bourne argues that although we can never doubt that those things that are 
around us are present in the sense that they are the objects of our experience, there is 
some other manner in which the models detailed by Tooley and McCall, in which this 
use of the term "present" fails to capture what it is to be present in the highly 
technical manner specified by each theory. In Bourne's words we need to distinguish 
between the 'referential' use of the term present, the way we use it to refer to the 
objects of our everyday experience, and the 'indexical' use of the term in the hybrid 
AlB theories. I shall follow Bourne's convention and in the case of the former we 
shall use 'present' in the case of the latter' *present* . ' 
Drawing on material in the possible worlds literature Bourne asks how we are 
to know that we are *present* as opposed to merely present, for in the same way that 
we think ourselves to inhabit the actual world, as Lewis (1986: p.93) shows we may 
really be living in a possible world. So when we think of ourselves as inhabiting the 
*present* world the fact of the matter is that we could be in the merely present world. 
As Bourne (2002) notes, this may not be a fatal objection to either Tooley or McCall's 
theory, but it is certainly a feature that is in need of an explanation (p.366). For both 
presentism, and pure B theory can provide an explanation. In the case of presentism, 
the present is simply co-extensive with the *present*, thus any time that one believes 
that one is present, one must be *present*. Of course for the B theory there simply is 
no such thing as to be *present* and so there is no need to introduce the notion in the 
first place, the only B theoretic relations being earlier than, later than and 
simultaneous with. On such an account each merely present moment has ontological 
parity with every other moment, hence obviating the problem altogether. Given the 
ability of the competing models to provide an answer to the problem it does seem that 
the hybrid theories ought to be able to provide some kind of account of this 
distinction. 
It is worthy of note here, that this is reminiscent of the problem raised for the 
A theorist in 1.3.4. There is, however, a subtle difference between the two. According 
to Bourne we find a problem with the hybrid accounts because we should have some 
way of differentiating the *present* from the present, at least it seems reasonable to 
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suppose so. My criticism of the A theoretic account was that, according to the single 
temporal perspective account laid out in l.2.4, there ought to be experiences that are 
not merely *present* or present, but * future * . It is the lack of these experiences that 
poses a problem for the A theorist rather than the technical difficulty in distinguishing 
between the *present* and the present, for on the single temporal perspective account 
advocated by the A theorist the two will, presumably, be co-extensional. 
1.5 Conclusion 
In Chapter one I have argued that McTaggart's paradox needs to be taken 
seriously, though only as marking the constraints placed on any theory of time. The 
initial conclusion drawn was that either the A theoretic or C theoretic accounts of 
reality must be false. Certainly there is no real paradox to be deal with. Our analysis 
of pure A theoretic accounts led us to the conclusion that they do not offer a 
promising avenue of investigation since it seems that they require us to overhaul our 
pre theoretical concepts at the outset and are beset by a number of complications. We 
also saw that hybrid theories seem to be contradictory, which is perhaps unsurprising 
in light of the conclusion reached in M5**. The two options open for exploration 
then, are B theories and presentism. I do not take the claim that time is unreal to be an 
option worth exploring whilst there are other options open to us. In what follows I 
shall try to present an even handed analysis of both presentism and the B theory. 
Notably, although it has been established that an A theoretic account cannot be 
conjoined to a C theoretic account, it is not so clear that presentism cannot be 
conjoined to the existence of a C series. The conclusion that I find most plausible is, 
in fact, a hybrid presentismlC theory. 
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Chapter Two 
In chapter two I: 
• Suggest that B theory has become a conjunction of various components, the complete 
set of which I call the Timeless theory of time. I set out to argue against each of the 
four components (2.1),' 
• Argue that the Old Tenseless theory of time fails (2.2),' 
• Argue that the New Tenseless theory of time is problematic, but that this needn't 
prevent the adoption of a B theoretic ontology (though it undennines some of the 
motives for such an adoption) and that there are moves that one can make to solve at 
least some of the problems for the New theorist (2.3); 
• Argue that the traditional debate between the tensed and tenseless theorist is 
misplaced and that semantic matters are uninformative for our metaphysical 
deliberations in this context (2.4). 
2.1 The Timeless Theory of Time 
The B theory referred to in chapter one has, over time, developed beyond the 
permanent relations of the B series. Coupled to an ontology in which temporality is 
cashed out in terms of the relations earlier than, simultaneous with and later than, are 
a number of positions that go together to form a distinct theory, or theoretical whole. 
Contemporary B theories of time, often assume, or give the appearance of assuming, a 
relation between B theories, tenseless theories, theories of space-time and theories of 
etemalism. Henceforth, when referring to the theoretical whole I shall refer to the 
TTTl, and where I am merely referring to the existence of permanent temporal 
relations I shall talk of the B series, or B theory.2 Now whilst the TTT certainly 
appears to form a strong theoretical whole, the various components are not necessarily 
connected. It is perfectly possible to maintain a B theory, a theory that takes time to 
be composed of the temporal relations of the B series, without also advocating a 
I Sider (2001) calls a similar conjunction 'manifold theory' (p.77). I do not follow Sider as I do not 
concur with his claim that contemporary B theory is composed of two elements, 'etemalism - ... and 
the thesis of the reducibility of tense'. (pp.76-77) since this appears to neglect the earlier / later relation 
implicit in the B-theory, nor does it include space-time. 
2 I am working on the assumption that B theoretic relations are to be conceived of in a manner broadly 
similar to spatial relations. However, Brogaard (2000) has argued that a temporal parts analysis can be 
conjoined to a presentist model and, if this kind of reasoning proves viable, there would seem to be 
nothing preventing the coupling of B theoretic relations to presentism. However, this is not an option I 
shall consider further since to the best of my knowledge this particular conjunction is not one defended 
anywhere in the literature. 
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tenseless account of language or cashing this ontology out in tenns of theories of 
space-time. A B theorist may find it rather more difficult to opt out of a fonn of 
etemalism since otherwise it would appear impossible to fonnulate the temporal 
relations of the B series. The advocate of the Tenseless Theory of time is not 
committed to any of the other component parts of the TTT, nor is the etemalist. It is 
quite possible for the etemalist to deny that the B relations exist and thus that only the 
C series exists.3 For ease of reference we can tabulate these distinctions thus: 
Theory Feature Author4 
B-theory Earlier I later relation McTaggart (1908) 
Tenseless Theory of time Reduction of tense Mellor (1981) 
Space-time Acceptance of time as a Minkowski (1923) 
dimension or of time as a 
component of a four-
dimensional manifold 
Etemalism The existence of all times Quine (1960) 
It should be noted that the distinction between absolute and relative time has 
been left out of this list, as has any mention of endurance and perdurance. The neglect 
of the fonner is quite simple. One could maintain a TTT absolute time just as easily as 
a TTT relative time. Presentism is unlikely to favour either relative or absolute time, 
denying as it does the existence of times other than the present. It would seem 
difficult for absolute time to exist if there is only one time in existence, in the same 
way that it would appear difficult for time to be relational if there are no times 
between which temporal relations are to stand. 
My reason for refraining from consideration of the endurance/perdurance 
debate is that it has become clear that endurance and perdurance accounts of 
diachronic identity are no longer restricted to conjunction with their obvious 
bedfellows - the tensed and tenseless theories of time respectively. There are, of 
course, those who do seek to retain a conjunction of perdurance with tenselessness 
3 Although as I stated in the conclusion of chapter one it is not clear to me why one would want to 
pursue such a line in light of the other options open to us. 
In each case the author given is one who defines the position. Many authors hold more than one of 
these positions in conjunction. I do not know of any author who holds one of these positions 
independently of all of the others. 
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and endurance with tensed theory. Balashov (2000, 2001) has argued that only a 
particular view of perdurance (which he calls four-dimensionalism) can account for 
the difference in the appearance of objects in different frames, thus, according to 
Balashov, this necessitates a space-time view and, presumably, TTT. Contrariwise, 
Lowe (1998) has argued that the tensed theory is to be conjoined to endurance. But 
Berit Brogaard (2000) has presented a thesis combining Presentism and perdurance 
(tense and perdurance) and Josh Parsons (2000) has allied etemalism and endurance 
(tenselessness and endurance).In light of these recent advances it would not appear 
apposite to proclaim the perdurance / endurance distinction decisive, or even of any 
clear import, in any quest for a metaphysic of time and as such I do not include it in 
my list of features essential to the TTT. 5 
My characterisation of TTT should not be mistaken for a straw man in 
contemporary philosophy. Sider (2001), among others mentioned below supports all 
four facets of TTT. He argues that events in time stand in the relation of earlier than 
and later than (p.21), endorses a tenseless understanding of semantics (p.21 and p.25), 
a theory of space-time (pp. 79-92) and etemalism (p.25). 6 And this is unsurprising. It 
is when the various components are conjoined as the TTT that we see a truly elegant 
picture begin to emerge, one that has led to some bold proclamations from TTT 
theorists. From Williams (1951) 
· .. The theory of the manifold is the very paradigm of philosophic understanding. This 
is so with respect to its content, since it grasps with a strong but delicate logic the most 
crucial and richest of facts (pp.4 71-4 72) 
From Quine (1953) 
The only tenable attitude towards quantifiers and other notations of modem logic is to 
construe them always, in all contexts, as timeless. 
5 On a related issue, McCall and Lowe (2003) have even argued that the distinction between 3D and 4D 
descriptions of reality is illusory if one accepts a space-time thesis (see also McCall (2000». See, 
Nerlich (2004) for a reply to McCall and Lowe. 
6 We might also include Russell and Quine on the list of those who have endorsed TIT. 
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... The four-dimensional view of space-time is part and parcel of the use of modern 
formal logic, and in particular the use of quantification theory, in application to 
temporal affairs . 
.. .1 do not see how, failing to appreciate the tenselessness of quantification over 
temporal entities, one could reasonably take modern logic very seriously (pp.442-443). 
The cohesive picture of reality presented by the TTT is the picture that we 
naturally desire as the end product of our philosophical deliberations. 7 
Specifically, three motives are available to the proponent of the TTT: first, the 
cohesive picture that I have just mentioned; second, that the TTT is supported by the 
scientific evidence, and third that the only viable alternative, presentism, is false. My 
arguments against the TTT revolve around refuting each of these motivations and 
attempting to show that any eternalist theory of time requires us to adopt an account 
of the phenomenology of temporal experience that is, at best, unconvincing. Thus, I 
argue that semantic considerations should be treated as umelated to our metaphysical 
enquiry into the nature of time (chapter two); that the TTT is not favoured by the 
evidence from science (chapter three); that it requires a highly dubious account of the 
nature of temporal experience (chapter four) and that the apparent cohesion of the 
picture given by the TTT can be explained without accepting that the TTT is true, 
once one recognises a natural psychological trait of human beings to imagine time in a 
particular way (chapter five). 
Hence the arguments in chapter two are arguments against the motives for 
accepting the TTT, as are some of those presented in chapter three and chapter five. 
But it is in chapter three that I also begin to suggest that the very idea of the TTT is 
incoherent. This is a claim supported by the arguments in chapter four, which are 
designed to show the incompatibility of theories of eternalism with the 
phenomenology of our temporal experience. 
7 Dummett (1978) captures this when he says, 'I personally feel very strongly inclined to believe that 
there must be a complete description of reality' (p.356). 
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2.2 The Old Tenseless Tbeory8 
We begin our analysis of the arguments alleged to favour the TTT with a 
consideration of the philosophy of language. My purpose here is two-fold; firstly to 
illustrate that the New Tenseless theory of time might be viable as a semantic account 
if one is prepared to utilise certain resources and, second, to show that there is no 
necessary relationship between one's theory of semantics and one's metaphysics, 
though it is certainly easy to see why the converse is commonly supposed to be true. 
This being so, it will be to other, metaphysical, matters that we will have to turn our 
attention. 
The core thesis underpinning the so-called Old Tenseless theory of time is the 
claim that all tensed sentences can be translated by their tenseless counterparts 
without loss of meaning. Were this to be possible then one might suppose that the 
transitory nature of being, supposedly captured by tense (as we saw in chapter one), is 
not to be found in reality, since one can translate all tensed sentences that purport to 
reflect that transitory nature, into tenseless sentences, without loss of meaning. The 
philosophers who may be credited with the foundation and development of this school 
of thought are Russell and Quine although there are many others who contributed to 
its formulation.9 Russell and Quine differ in their motives for accepting the Old 
Tenseless theory. For Russell (1951), acceptance of the theory stems from the analysis 
of egocentric particulars, an analysis which yields the conclusion that there is no 
8 I refer to it as the Old Tenseless Theory, rather than the Old B theory, in order to preserve the 
distinction in the readers mind between a tenseless theory of time and a B theory of time. I shall 
preserve this distinction for the remainder of the chapter in the interests of keeping the distinction I 
intend to draw between ontology and semantics clear. 
9 Craig (2000a) also credits Frege (e.g.1971) with a profound role in the development of the Old 
Tenseless theory of Time. Whilst I think that Frege may indeed be of a similar mind to Quine and 
Russell, Thoughts is not hugely forthcoming about the distinction between tensed and tense less 
propositions. Indeed in the only passage that deals explicitly with the role of the present tense Frege 
says; 
The present tense is used in two ways: first, in order to indicate a time; second, in order to 
eliminate any temporal restriction, where timelessness or eternity is part of the thought -
consider for instance the laws of mathematics. Which of the two cases occurs is not 
expressed but must be divined. If a time-indication is conveyed by the present tense one 
must know when the sentence was uttered in order to grasp the thought correctly. 
Therefore the time of utterance is part of the thought. (p. 10) 
Craig (2000a) takes this to imply that, 'it is by our grasping the tense less propositional content of a 
sentence as uttered in a context' (p.34) we truly understand what is meant. And while he may be 
correct, it does seem that Frege's contribution to the development of a tense less reduction of tense is 
perhaps a little small to elicit from Craig the description of Frege as a 'great fountainhead of the date-
sentence version of the Old B-theory· (p.29). 
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distinction between I-here and I-now. If one accepts the synonymy of the tenns (1-
here and I-now) and Russell's claim that use of the tenn 'present' merely indicates a 
belief concerning some state of affairs, then it is easy to see why one should wish to 
maintain a tenseless theory. 
If I say "Finland is being invaded", ... The "present" that is involved is not the 
"present" in the psychological sense, i.e. something "presented". It is the 
"present" in the physical sense, i.e. something which, in physical time, is 
contemporaneous with the psychological "present". "Present" and "past" are 
primarily psychological terms, in the sense of involving different causal relations 
between the speaker and that of which he speaks; their other uses are all 
defineable in terms of this primary use. (p. 113). 
The only difference between uses of the tenns 'was' and 'is' lies in their causation, 
either direct or indirect in the mind of the speaker (ibid). Thus, for Russell, there can 
be no ontological distinction between the past and the present, as such a distinction 
would entail an ontological difference in the use of the tenns 'was' and 'is'. His view 
obviously leads to the conclusion that there exist, tenselessly, states of affairs that 
make propositions true. According to Russell this is entirely appropriate. 'One of the 
objects to be aimed at in using symbols is that they should be free of the ambiguities 
of ordinary language' (Russell 1951 : p.256). Hence, 'in order to express explicitly the 
whole of what is meant, it is necessary to add the date, and then the statement is no 
longer "variable'" (p. 257). 
Quine'S motives are similar, though not identical to Russell's. Quine insists 
that we should best think of sentences, or statements, as being true or false (Quine 
1970: p.14) and it is only if we can think of a sentence as being definitely true (or 
false) that it is unambiguous in meaning. However, as Quine notes, 'the declarative 
sentence "I am ill" is intrinsically neither true nor false' (Quine 1941: p.5). In order 
for the sentence to be intrinsically true or false, and for us to partake in the wonders 
of modem logic, we must assist our natural language by means of logical translation. 
Thus, 'Henry Jones of Lee St., Tulsa, is ill' (1941: p.6), must be translated into' 
"Henry Jones of Lee St., Tulsa, is [tenselessly] ill on July 28, 1940'" (op.cit). 
What is common to both accounts is that tensed sentences must be completely 
reduced to their tenseless counterparts by means of a translation of the fonner by the 
34 
latter and, if such a translation is to be successful, the translation must be one that 
preserves the entire meaning of the original tensed sentence. It will not do to preserve 
only part of the meaning of a tensed sentence in a tenseless translation since in failing 
to wholly translate a tensed sentence into its tenseless counterpart the Old Tenseless 
theorist is forced to admit that such translation is impossible. If such a translation is 
impossible, it is not clear that the transitory nature of being, allegedly reflected by 
tense, has been accounted for in wholly tenseless terms. If this were to prove the case 
then the Tenseless theorist would be forced to admit that there is some feature of the 
language that defies translation into a tenseless language and hence we might suppose 
that the tense of language captures some feature of reality that cannot be described in 
tenseless terms. 
The Old tenseless theory of Time is not a viable option precisely because it 
cannot capture the whole of the meaning of a tensed sentence as we shall now see. 
2.2.1 The Problem with the Old tenseless theory 
A tenseless token cannot provide the information that anyone state of affairs is 
present and, hence, cannot completely translate a tensed token. This failure is 
demonstrated by the impossibility of timely action if one attempts to act in a timely 
fashion on the basis of tenseless information. Consider the following example from 
Gale. 
Joe is a scout for a machine gun company. He is strategically stationed so that he 
can survey the battleground, and when the enemy approaches within 100 yards of 
their position he must infonn the company so that they can open fire. In order to 
conserve ammunition and not give their position away, they fire only when the 
enemy is within a range of 100 yards. (1962: p.55) 
The question is whether or not Joe can accurately inform his comrades that they need 
to open fire without making use of an implicitly tensed sentence. Gale's response is to 
say that Joe cannot be of use to his comrades unless he utters a tensed sentence. Ifhe 
says that, "the enemy are [tenselessly] within 100 yards", his comrades do not know 
whether or not to open fire. If he says, "the enemy are [tenselessly] within 100 yards 
35 
at time t", then, again, unless the soldiers know that it is now time t, they will not 
know to open fire. 
Of course, Joe is of use to his comrades. When he tells them that the enemy is 
[tensed] within 100 yards they do know to open fire. If they do know to open fire then 
it must be the case that Joe has communicated to them some piece of information 
which is not encapsulated in the tenseless sentence, "the enemy are [tenselessly] 
within 100 yards." Hence it must be the case that the tensed sentence, "the enemy is 
[tensed] within 100 yards" cannot be wholly translated by "the enemy is [tenseless] 
within 100 yards. This being so the Old Tense1ess theory is false; it is not possible to 
translate all tensed tokens and so it must be the case that tense reflects some feature of 
reality, such a feature as temporal becoming. 
Mayo (1963) and Thalberg (1963) object to Gale's analysis. Mayo objects on 
the grounds that Joe could communicate to his comrades just so long as they 
understand the grammar of the term 'now'. 'The function of 'now' is to refer to a 
particular utterance of a token of itself, an utterance which is different every time' 
(1963: pp. 296-297). Thus, when Joe says that the enemy are 'now within 100 yards', 
what he could say, on the tenseless account, is something like, 'the enemy being 
within 100 yards is simultaneous with the utterance of the enemy being within 100 
yards being ... '. According to Mayo this is fine; the enemy being within 100 yards is 
simultaneous with the utterance of just as much of the incompletable sentence as is 
actually completable simultaneous with the enemy being within 100 yards. 10 
Thalberg objects on what appear to be similar grounds. Whoever utters the 
tensed token under discussion says that, 
The enemy approaches within 100 yards on October 17, 1960, at 4.00 p.m. 
E.S.T.', and understands that it describes a present occurrence, i.e., an occurrence 
contemporaneous with the listener's reception of the statement. Yet, contrary to 
the argument of Nowell-Smith and Gale, this information is communicated by 
Joe's tenseless statement in the absence of contextual indications of the time at 
which Joe made his statement. (1963: p. 309) 
But Gale's point is surely that what is communicated between Joe and his machine 
gun allies is, implicitly, tensed. In Mayo's reduction we are missing a piece of 
10 c.f. (Mayo 1963: p.296) 
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infonnation. We know that the enemy are within 100 yards and that this is 
simultaneous with an utterance to the same effect. But we do not know that this 
utterance is now and hence there cannot be any action useful to us; in this case firing 
upon the enemy. The same point can be made against Thalberg. Although the 
sentence used in his example may only be the tenseless, "The enemy approaches 
within 100 yards on October 17, 1960, at 4.00 p.m. E.S.T.", the infonnation that 
needs to be imparted is that, "The enemy approaches within 100 yards on October 17, 
1960, at 4.00 p.m. E.S.T." and it is now October 17, 1960, at 4.00 p.m. E.S.T. 
Without the extra infonnation, the infonnation that some state of affairs is now, we 
cannot translate the tensed expression accurately. And since now is a tensed 
expression this would appear to create an impossible task for the tenseless theorist. 
Further, one might remark against both Thalberg and Mayo that they have 
mistaken the obviously tensed aspect of their tenseless translation. The observation 
that tensed tokens are self referential with respect to tense, is precisely to smuggle 
tense into a tenseless token. For if the machine gunners are not aware of the fact that 
it is now the time at which the token is self-referential, then there is insufficient 
motivation for them to become active. Thus both of these attempts to resist the 
arguments from the tensed theorist fail. 
Similarly the Old token reflexive account where, 'It's raining now' can be 
translated by 'Rain is simultaneous with this utterance', fails. In this case as in those 
detailed above, it is still not wholly clear that the statement, 'Rain is simultaneous 
with this utterance', translates completely without at least some ambiguity. There is 
still some further infonnation that has not been encapsulated by the tenseless 
translation. In this case as with those above, the additional infonnation is that 'this' 
utterance is now. Precisely what 'now' might mean is clearly a matter for dispute (as 
we shall see below), but even if 'now' merely indicates certain attitudes and beliefs 
that certain sentences incline us to take on, it is clear that there is infonnation 
conveyed by the tensed statement that is not conveyed by its tenseless counterpart. 
2.2.2 The New Tenseless Theory of Time 
The untranslatability of tensed sentences has not been lost on the New Tenseless 
theorists. Instead of claiming that tensed sentences can be translated by their tenseless 
counterparts, proponents of the New theory are prepared to accept the ineliminability 
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of tense from both discourse and belief. However, they are not prepared to add to this 
that we ought to take this feature of language "onto logically seriously". As Oaklander 
(1991) has it: 
According to the new tenseless theory of time, our need to think and talk in 
tensed terms is perfectly consistent with its being the case that time is tenseless. 
Tensed discourse is indeed necessary for timely action, but tensed facts are not, 
since the truth conditions of tensed sentences can be expressed in a tenseless 
metalanguage that describes unchanging temporal relations among events. (p.27) 
Thus, tense is reduced from an ontological feature of the world to a feature of 
language and belief. Returning momentarily to the case of Joe, our machinegun scout, 
it should be clear that the Old theory was unable to provide Joe with the means to 
galvanise his comrades into action. The term now was taken to impart no more 
information than did "simultaneous with", which was clearly false. In the revised 
theory there are certain beliefs and attitudes which, although it may be possible for us 
to give a tenseless account of the truth conditions for, it is not possible for us to 
translate. Thus, whilst tense may not be eliminable, it may not be a feature of reality 
either. It may be merely a feature of language and belief. 
Although there are certain tensed beliefs and attitudes, no matter how 
complicated either these (or tensed locutions) become, all that is needed to determine 
their truth or falsity are truth conditions that may be stated tenselessly (c.f. Mellor 
1981: p. 45). For example, the truth value of any two tensed statements concerning 
the same entity, say the battle of Hastings, may vary. It may appear to one person in 
1066 that the battle is present whereas another in 1067 may report the battle to be 
past. But what makes both tensed statements true is the tenseless occurrence of the 
battle of Hastings in 1066 in conjunction with the relevant B theoretic relation. Since 
we can say, irrespective of one's temporal perspective on events, that tensed tokens 
are true in virtue of the unchanging temporal location of an entity such as the battle of 
Hastings and the B relation in which the tokener stands to it, it appears that one can 
give a tenseless account of the truth conditions that must be satisfied in order for a 
tensed locution to be true. Again, to quote Oaklander (1991), 
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[o]n the token reflexive account that Mellor propounds, the temporal relation 
between the date at which one says, thinks, or writes down a tensed sentence and 
the event or thing that it is about, provides an objective basis for the truth value 
of a tensed sentence. (p. 27) 
As something of an aside, the appeal of the tenseless theory is undeniable, for we are 
grounding the apparently transient nature of tensed statements upon secure and 
unchanging foundations of a B theoretic, tenselessly described, ontology. With 
regards to the spatial analogue of tense, spatial tense, Mellor notes, '[n]o one believes 
that there are really spatially tensed facts such as London being sixty miles away from 
here' (p.64). In the case of spatial tense, we are persuaded that sentences about space 
are true and that we can give spatially tenseless token reflexive truth conditions for 
any token. That, "London is 60 miles away" is true, when spoken in Cambridge, is 
guaranteed by the spatially tenseless fact that London is 60 miles from Cambridge. 
If we can capture the conditions under which tensed tokens are true, and we 
can state them in a tenseless metalanguage, then it appears that the tensed aspect of 
tensed tokens does not reflect a genuine feature of reality. For example, in the spatial 
case our ability to give a spatially tenseless account of the truth conditions for 
spatially tensed sentences seems apt as space is not objectively tensed. We might also 
suppose, then, that if time were objectively tensed that we should give the truth 
conditions for temporally tensed sentences using tensed terms. So our ability to give a 
tenseless account of the truth conditions for a tensed sentence might be taken to imply 
is that time, like space, is not objectively tensed. 
2.3 The tensed reply to the New Tenseless theory of time (and how to beat it) 
There are three problems that have been raised for the New Tenseless theory 
of time. Thus, before we look further at the relationship between semantics and reality 
we must see if these problems can be solved. If they cannot then the New Tenseless 
theory of time will not prove a viable option. My coming to the aid of the tenseless 
theory here may seem a little puzzling since the position I am defending is, ultimately 
a dynamic theory of time. However, in the interests of parity we must be careful to 
explore and defend (as appropriate) all theories. It strikes me that at least some of the 
criticisms made of the New Tenseless theory can be met. 
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First (2.3.1), we have the difficulty of giving an explanation of why the truth 
conditions of a tensed sentence are equivalent to their tenseless counterparts if their 
meaning is not identical, i.e. if a token, S, "it is now 1980" is true, then a token, T, "S 
occurs in 1980", will give the truth conditions of S. How is it, then, that their truth 
conditions can be the same, e.g. both Sand T are true iff S occurs in 1980? Second 
(2.3.2), consider two identical tokens that entail one another and have identical truth 
conditions. If the transitivity of logical relations is to be preserved, then we ought to 
be able to say that where two logically entailing tokens are true, so the truth 
conditions logically entail one another, where it appears that they do not in the New 
theory. Third (2.3.3), we must find some way of preserving truths at times at which 
there are no tokens. In 2.4 we will return to the relationship between ontology and 
semantics where I argue that it is not possible to determine whether or not time is 
dynamic within the context of a wholly semantic debate. Thus it will be to a 
metaphysical exploration of the matters in hand that we shall have to tum. 
2.3.1 Meaning and Truth-conditionsll 
Recall, then, that the difference between the Old and New tenseless theories of 
time is the shift from the untenable claim that it is possible to give a tenseless 
translation of any tensed token, to the claim that for any tensed token it is possible to 
give a tenseless account of its truth conditions. Smith (1993: pp. 69-71) and Craig 
(1999: p. 5) argue against this latter claim as follows. For any token S 
(1) It is now 1980 
S has the same truth conditions as T 
(2) S occurs in 1980 
since both are true iff S occurs in 1980. Smith argues that if T is, in fact, stating the 
truth conditions of S, and T is a tenseless token (which obviously it is), then T has the 
same truth conditions as S. Furthermore, T captures the meaning of S and thus 
II The arguments rehearsed in favour of the tense less theory in 2.3.1.1 are similar, in part, to those of 
Le Poidevin (1998: pp 28-9). 
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purports to give a tenseless translation of S. Thus, the New theory falls foul of the 
same problems as the Old. For if the New tenseless theory purports to give us a 
translation of all tensed sentences then it can be proven false (recall the example of 
our machine gun scout Joe and discussions in 2.2.1). 
2.3.1.1 How to respond: truth conditions 
In the first instance it appears open to the tenseless theorist to deny that, where 
a tenseless token states the conditions under which a tensed token is true, the tenseless 
token also provides a translation of the tensed token. Smith (1993: p. 14) is working 
on the assumption that this is so, in line with the impression given by Mellor (1981: 
pp. 74-76) of the New tenseless theory. But theories are open to revision and it would 
seem that the tenseless theory may be in need of such a revision (C.f. Oaklander 2003: 
p. 281, and section 2.3.1.3 below). The question, of course, is whether or not it is 
coherent to give such an account of truth conditions, an account where metalinguistic 
tenseless tokens of a tensed natural language capture the conditions under which a 
tensed token is true without also providing a tenseless translation of the tensed natural 
language. On a reading where the tenseless metalanguage provides both truth 
conditions and a translation, 
TC For any two tokens A and B, where A translates B without loss of meaning, A 
provides the truth conditions for B 
the tenseless theory of time is obviously false because, as was pointed out in 2.2.1, 
tenseless tokens cannot provide complete translations for their tensed counterparts. It 
would appear then that to adopt TC as a full account of the truth conditions of a 
sentence is to prejudge the case against the New tenseless theorist. If we replace TC 
with TC*, a more lenient statement of the truth conditions which must be provided by 
the tenseless theorist, then the problem disappears. 
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TC* For any two tokens A and B, where A states the conditions under which B is 
true, A provides the truth conditions for B 12 
Under TC* it is obvious that a tenseless token, T, of "S occurs in 1980", states the 
conditions under which a tensed token, S, of "it is now 1980", is true, without 
entailing that the meanings of Sand T are identical. To give a spatial example, one 
might say that the truth conditions for "Durham is here" are given by "we are located 
within the spatial confines of a geographical region of England that is approximately 
fifteen miles due south of Newcastle", rather than by "Durham is here." Under such 
an analysis it is still clear that the two tokens differ in meaning despite having the 
same truth conditions. 
2.3.1.2 A "tensed" addition to the New tenseless theory 
But perhaps the arguments above are too swift. Assuming a B theoretic 
ontology for a moment, consider the New tenseless theorists' argument once again. 
Token S, "it is now 1980" is true iff "it is now 1980" as is token T, "s occurs in 
1980". Now, it is possible to argue that Sand T do not mean the same thing and hence 
do not engender the problems raised with the Old theory of time in 2.2.2, even though 
the two tokens have the same truth conditions. The New tenseless theorist accepts that 
the use of tense in natural languages serves to convey some further information that 
cannot be conveyed by tenseless language, but also wants to argue that this linguistic 
phenomena tells us nothing about the nature of time. It merely illustrates the nature of 
our attitudes and beliefs. 
This would appear to suggest that we have missed something in stating the 
truth conditions for S. For S to be true is for S to exist at 1980 and, if there is a 
tokener J who tokens such a tensed token, for J to hold the irreducibly tensed belief 
that it is now 1980. 13 Ifwe fail to state this further element of the truth conditions then 
12 Given Smith's (1993: p. 5) statement of truth conditions as, 'the truth conditions of [sentence] SI and 
[sentence] S2' does not refer to a relation between S 1 and S2 but to the states of affairs that make S 1 and 
S2 true', I see no reason that TC* would be objected to by Smith. In any case, the adoption of a 
formulation of truth conditions that rules out either theory in virtue of that formulation should be 
scrutinised extremely carefully as it does prejudge the case against the theory of time on semantic 
frounds. 
3 Even if J is unaware of the fact that it is now 1980, J must still believe that whatever time it is, that 
time is now. Of course in conditions were there are no tokeners the problem raised disappears, though 
this appears to walk the tenseless theorist into the problems raised in 2.3.3. 
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we have not gIven a full account of the truth conditions, for we have failed to 
acknowledge the New Tenseless theorists' claim that tense reports a feature of belief 
or language. After all, tense is an internal feature of our attitudes and beliefs and so it 
is not unreasonable to suppose that the conditions in which tensed sentences are true 
must include an account of an agent with those attitudes and beliefs. Thus in contexts 
where tokeners exist one must also accept that they believe the time in question to be 
present. In other words, only if, in 1980, J exists [tenselessly] and has certain A 
theoretic beliefs will we have fully captured the truth conditions of a tensed sentence, 
where such a tokener exists. 14 
But now consider Smith's (1993: p.5) translation thesis, composed of three 
necessary (1-3) and one jointly necessary and sufficient (4) conditions. For any two 
sentences Sl and S2, S2 fully translates Sl if, in context C: 
(1) Sl and S2 as used in C have the same truth conditions 
(2) Sl and S2 as used in C are confirmed or disconfirmed to the same degree by 
the same observations 
(3) Sl and S2 as used in C are logically equivalent, that is, entail each other 
(4) Sl and S2 as used in C refer in the same way(s) to the same item(s) and ascribe 
to said item(s) the same monadic or polyadic property or properties 
Smith wants to claim that the translation thesis results in the meaning of the tensed 
and tenseless tokens, S and T, being the same because they have the same truth 
conditions. But the proper New tenseless theory of time statement of the truth 
conditions of, S, "it is now 1980", would be (5) 
(5) S is true iff S occurs in 1980 and if, simultaneous with S any temporal agent J 
believes S to be present 
Now it is clear that (5) could serve to state both the truth conditions of S and its 
meaning, but it is not tenseless. For the condition makes use of an explicitly tensed 
14 Supposing, of course, that there exists such an agent at the time when the tensed token is tokened. If 
there is no such agent then it may be sufficient to recast the formulation along counterfactual lines, so 
the tensed token is true because if there had been an agent of the sort J, then they would have had the 
appropriate tensed beliefs. 
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component. This does not prevent a move to the claim that reality is tenseless, since 
as far as the New tenseless theorist of time is concerned all that the tensed component 
of the truth condition does is state an irreducibly tensed belief of a temporal agent. It 
certainly does not reflect a genuine feature of reality. Of course, by making such a 
move one is denied recourse to the claim that the tenseless metalanguage in which one 
states truth conditions reveals the nature of reality, since the truth conditions make 
implicit use of a tensed component. But it is still clear that such a metalinguistic 
account of the truth conditions supervenes upon a B theoretic ontology. We can still 
conclude that the tenseless account of truth conditions is compatible with the TTT, but 
it is less clear that the tenseless account can be used to motivate the TTT - at least if 
my arguments are right. 
Despite the fact that this account seems viable it will probably not seem 
terribly palatable to the tenseless theorist. The desired move is, after all, to glean some 
support for a B theoretic ontology from our ability to provide an account of truth 
conditions in a tenseless metalanguage. In the move I have just presented no such 
support can be gleaned precisely because a tensed aspect is retained in the stating of 
the truth conditions. But perhaps this does not constitute a problem for the tenseless 
theorist. Perhaps they do not have to accept my claim that in stating the truth 
conditions for tensed sentences they must include reference to the beliefs (or possible 
beliefs) of an agent. If that can be achieved then they can simply make the claim 
suggested in 2.3.1.1, and adopt TC* rather than TC, although it is not obvious to me 
how this is to be achieved. 
2.3.2 Entailment relations between truth conditions 
A more pressing concern for the advocate of the tenseless theory is that for any 
two tokens R and S of "it is now 1980", although Rand S are mutually logically 
entailing, their truth conditions are not. Hence, 
(6) "It is now 1980" (=R) = R occurs in 1980 
(7) "It is now 1980" (=S) = S occurs in 1980 
and R entails S. 
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But if R logically entails S, then the truth conditions of R should logically entail the 
truth conditions of S. Unfortunately there is no entailment relation between the two 
tenseless sentences on the right hand side of the conditional. If we break the 
conditional down into component parts where A = 'R occurs in 1980' and B = 'S 
occurs in 1980' things become more obvious. 
i) 
ii) 
iii) 
R= S -Aand , 
S R = B, are true, but 
A=B 
turns out to be false! 
2.3.2.1 Against solutions provided 
Paul (1997) attempts to provide a solution to the problem by suggesting that 
we modify the non-indexical notion of logical implication in order to arrive at an 
indexical notion of implication that is acceptable. Her suggestion is that, 
For sentences (which contain indexicals) A and B, A logically implies B ifJfor 
any context of evaluation C, where A is true with respect to C, B is true with 
respect to C (p. 63) 
However, the price of this way out seems too high (see Craig 1999: pp. 268-9), 
particularly since it appears that we may have to deny the transitivity of logical 
implication. 
For on her account, the truth conditions of the sentence types (1) [my 6] and (3) 
[my 7] are stated as follows 
It is now 1980 == the time of (1)'s context of evaluation is 1980 
1980 is present == the time of (3)'s context of evaluation is 1980 
But it is evident that while (1) entails (3), their respective truth conditions do 
not entail each other. Only if the truth conditions of (1 ) and (3) are significantly 
present-tensed could they even sensibly be said to be mutually entailing -
which would sink the tenseless theory - but, if they are tense less, then it makes 
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no sense to say that they entail one another, since (1) and (3) can be evaluated 
relative to any time one chooses. ... How will she avoid the absurdity that 
while (1) implies (3), and (3) implies the sentence stating its truth condition, 
nonetheless, (1) does not imply that sentence? Will she deny the transitivity of 
logical implication? (pp. 268-9) 
Similar remarks can, I think, be made against Le Poidevin (1998). Le Poidevin 
suggests that although the truth conditions for (6) do not entail (7), it is still the case 
that any statement of (7) that is simultaneous with (6), where (6) is true, will also be 
true. Hence, (7) can only be true if it occurs in 1980. Since it is true, it does occur in 
1980, and since (6) is simultaneous with it, (6) also occurs in 1980, (6) is also true 
(c.f. Le Poidevin 1998: pp. 30-31). But, although Le Poidevin is correct inasmuch as 
the right hand sides of (6) and (7) are both true when one of them is true, and both 
false when one is false, the transitivity of logical implication has not been preserved 
since the truth conditions of (6) do not entail the truth conditions of (7). Thus we still 
find ourselves in the situation where, (i) and (ii) hold, but (iii) does not. 
2.3.2.2 Spatial and temporal indexicals 
Consider the following spatial analogue: 
(8) 'Durham is here' (=X) - X occurs in Durham 
(9) 'Durham is here' (=Y) - Y occurs in Durham 
Although the right hand sides of (8) and (9) will both be true in the very same 
conditions, where they occur in Durham, X's occurring in Durham does not imply V's 
occurring in Durham which it should if we are to preserve the transitivity of logical 
implication. One, unpalatable, option open to the Tenseless theorist of time, then, is to 
give up on the claim that a tenseless account of truth conditions can be provided -
either spatially or temporally. Hence, although time is like space, and all that obtains 
are tenseless facts, it is not possible to give a semantic account which is tenseless. 
One might suppose this to be so since although (8) and (9) are about space it appears 
that we cannot make it such that a "spatially tenseless" metalanguage can preserve the 
transitivity of logical implication. But since space is spatially tenseless (that is, there 
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is nothing to distinguish ontologically between one region and another) it cannot be 
the case that this failure to preserve a spatially tenseless metalinguistic account of 
truth conditions entails that space "becomes" any more than time does. This would 
clearly still be compatible with the TTT, though it could no longer be seen to motivate 
it. 
Although reasonable, I suggest that this move should be unpalatable to the 
tenseless theorist of time for the same reason that I suggested that the inclusion of a 
tensed aspect into the truth conditions for tensed tokens will prove unpalatable. In 
arguing that the truth conditions for tensed tokens can be given by tenseless truth 
conditions, the tenseless theorist is trying to derive some motivational support for the 
claim that reality is B theoretic. If reality is B theoretic then it would surely follow 
that the conditions under which tensed tokens are true or false would reflect this B 
theoretic nature in some way. But if the truth conditions of indexicals about space, 
which is itself B theoretic, cannot be given by spatially tenseless truth conditions then, 
although it is still the case that whatever semantic account (tensed or tenseless) we 
give of time may be coherent, we can derive no motivational force for claims that the 
nature of truth conditions reveals the nature of reality. Thus one of the motivating 
factors for the B theorist would be removed. 
2.3.2.3 Entailment 
To satisfy the A theorists objection we must find some means by which the 
truth conditions for the left hand side of (6) and (7) are such that the transitivity of 
logical implication is preserved. The solution for the New tenseless theorist then, is to 
say that the dates on the right hand side of the bi-conditional are names for the sum 
total of the contents of the year that they name, such that "R occurs in 1980" does 
imply "s occurs in 1980" precisely because both R and S are a part of 1980. Hence, 
by naming the particular period of time that includes R as 1980, one also includes the 
period of time that includes S and so, ifR is true, then so is S. Moreover, not only will 
both be true, but R will also entail S (and vice versa). To see this consider the 
following where C names all of the component parts of 1980 not including tokens R 
and S such that, 1980 = R, Sand C. In such a case, it would be true that 
i*) S == R /\ C 
.+7 
because SA R A C are equal to 1980. 
ii*) R = SAC 
Is also true since Sand R are both constituent parts of C. Hence, 
iii*) S = R 
It would not be possible for R or S to be true without entailing all of the constituent 
parts of 1980 exist. Since Rand S are true in 1980 this entails that all of 1980 exists 
including Rand S. Moreover, R entails S (and vice versa) since in naming 1980 one 
names R, Sand C. 
The obvious spatial analogue, 
(8) 'Durham is here' (=X) - X occurs in Durham 
(9) 'Durham is here' (=Y) Y occurs in Durham 
appears problematic. For the right hand side of (8) to entail the right hand side of (9), 
it would appear that a part of Durham would have to be the tokens X and Y. In the 
spatial case this is obviously false. But the notion of a B theoretic ontology treating 
sentence tokens as composite parts of 1980 itself is not so absurd as it may first 
appear. After all, sentence tokens are the sort of thing that will exist, in at least some 
sense, at various times within 1980. Since 1980 is fixed and permanent according to a 
B theoretic ontology it would perhaps be apt that such tokens be treated as parts. 
Logical implication remains transitive then, since in this case, if R is true, then 
so is S, since both form a part of the same entity, i.e. 1980. In choosing to name that 
period of time 1980, and then further stipulating that R occurs simultaneously with 
some part of 1980, indeed that it is a part of 1980, one also implies that S occurs 
simultaneously with some part of that entity 1980 and hence that R entails S. Whether 
one should be prepared to accept such a model may have to remain moot. What is 
clear is that although such a move may be viable it is highly controversial. 
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2.3.3 Truths at times at which there are no tokens 
Smith (1993: pp. 72-86) develops an argument against the New tenseless 
theory of time where he claims that the theory cannot provide adequate truth 
conditions for tensed sentences at times when there are no tokens. He has in mind 
tensed tokens such as 
(10) It is true that the era devoid of linguistic utterances was present 
The obvious translation 
(11) It [is] true, earlier than this utterance, that the era devoid of linguistic 
utterances [is] earlier than this utterance 
is ruled out, on the grounds that it cannot account for the "being present" of the era in 
which there were no linguistic utterances, as the tenseless account of presence is 
"simultaneous with" coupled to a particular token or utterance. Since (11) makes no 
reference to the simultaneity of an utterance with the era in which there are no 
utterances, it fails to capture the truth conditions of (10) because it fails to say that it 
was present; (11) would be true even in the unlikely circumstances that the situation 
described in (10) contrived to be earlier than a token of (11) without ever having been 
present. Whether or not such a situation is in fact possible misses the point of the 
objection; there is a feature, (10), that needs to be accounted for in the truth conditions 
in (11), that has not been captured. Hence, a move to (12) would appear to be in order: 
(12) It is true that, there [is] an era, earlier than this utterance, that IS 
simultaneous with an utterance that there are no linguistic utterances 
Of course, (12) is obviously false since it implies that it is true of a time both 
that there are utterances and that there are not. To my mind this is the most serious of 
all the objections to the tenseless theory. It is with that fact in mind that I offer a 
solution to the problems raised in (10)-( 12). Although I do not ultimately believe that 
the B theorist needs to be concerned with claims against the tenseless theory. what I 
offer is, nonetheless, a way that the tenseless theorists could preserve their theory. 
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2.3.3.1 Possible tokens 
The move, or at least a move, to solve the problem is to move to a possible 
utterance, and to claim that possibilia exist in time. 15 Thus 
(13) It is true that, there [is] an era, earlier than this utterance, that is 
simultaneous with a possible utterance of the fact that there are no actual 
utterances 
Although (13) appears highly controversial, it is not internally inconsistent as (12) is, 
provided, of course, that a "possible utterance" is not conceived of as an utterance that 
needs to be spoken by an actual person. A possible utterance would simply have to be 
something that could be said, not something that could be said if there are actual 
people to say it. It would presumably be a possible token spoken by a possible 
tokener. This rules out there ever being a time in which there are no possible 
utterances since utterances are metaphysically possible entities. Although this may not 
be pre theoretically obvious, it is not internally inconsistent; nor is it obviously false. 
This position does seem to be nonsensical against the backdrop of the standard 
possible world account of modality. Against the account of modality provided by 
Williamson (1998, 1999), however, my claims seem rather less extraordinary. 
Williamson (1999: p. 181) argues that existence is not really contingent. Certainly 
'existence', in the sense that we ordinarily construe it, is contingent: a table might not 
have been a physical entity, it might not have had substantival existence - what 
Williamson's calls S existence. But there is a further sense in which existence is not 
contingent; 
to exist is to be something. Call that the logical sense of exist ('L-exist'), since 
it is definable given identity and the unrestricted quantifier. Trivially, 
everything L-exists; not everything S-exists because events do not' (p. 194) 
15 This is not the same as saying that, "in the closest possible world, W, where there are tokeners at this 
earlier time such tokens are simultaneous with the occurrence of the era in which there are no actual , 
utterances in this world". 
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Likewise, a table might not have S existed, it might have only L existed. On 
Williamson's account of modality it is possible for a table to either Sexist - to exist 
as a table in space - or to simply L exist, and it is evident that whilst an actual table 
exists in space, a merely possible table does not. It need only occupy possible space 
(pp. 194-5). Williamson does not suggest that possibilia exist outside time, nor is 
there any reason to make such a supposition. Thus, (13) is perfectly sensible. 
What would be required of possible entities, on this account, is that they stand 
in actual temporal relations to actual entities. We would need to be able to say that, 
the possible entity, say my possibly drinking my tea, exists at the same time as other 
actual entities, my actually not drinking my tea. But this seems perfectly consistent. 
There is, after all, a sense in which we say that, at the time I chose not to drink my tea 
it was possible that I should have chosen to drink my tea. Thus there seems to be 
natural language motivation for the view. Moreover, it would seem that if we are 
prepared to countenance modality in the strong sense suggested by Williamson, then 
to say that a possible drinking of tea occurs at an actual time, is simply to take the L-
exist sense of existence seriously and to say that such things exist at actual times. At 
merely possible times the only things that will exist are possible entities, but at actual 
times there seems to be nothing preventing possible entities from existing alongside 
actual entities. 
Obviously, accepting Williamson's account of modality is a bold move to 
make simply to save the tenseless theory of time; probably too bold. I am certainly not 
claiming that the tenseless theorist of time should accept the account of modality that 
Williamson offers in order to save the tenseless theory. Rather, I would suggest that if 
the tenseless theorist of time finds Williamson's own arguments as to the cashing out 
of unrestricted quantification persuasive, then they have the tools in hand to deal with 
some of the more difficult problems thrown up by the likes of Smith. In any case, 
what I do hope to have shown is that the problems raised for the New theory can be 
met if one feels it necessary to do so. 
2.4 Truth conditions 
Despite the fact that I think that it may be possible to give the truth conditions 
of tensed sentences using tenseless truth conditions, I do not think that it is possible to 
move from a tensed or tenseless semantics to the conclusion that reality is tensed, or 
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tenseless, respectively. It was assumed in 2.3 that we have a clear handle on what is 
meant by the truth conditions for a sentence, but in 2.4.1 I will argue that the concept 
is not as clearly defined as it needs to be for us to proceed. It follows from the silence 
of the semantic theories on this matter that, even if the tenseless theory of time turns 
out to be true, i.e. if we should cash out our semantics tenselessly, this does not entail 
a B theoretic ontology and the TTT. Nor, in contradistinction, does a tensed theory of 
time entail a presentist ontology. 16 
2.4.1 What do we mean by "truth conditions" 
There are, as identified by Oaklander (2003: p. 273), at least four distinct 
understandings of what is meant by the truth conditions of a tensed sentence. Indeed, 
if we include Oaklander's own view, the count may even rise to five. The views to be 
considered are those belonging to Le Poidevin (1999), Ludlow (1999), Craig (1996) 
and Smith (1993). Obviously, any differences in the definitions of these conditions 
have the potential to change whether or not tensed sentences can be given tenseless 
truth conditions. Here I suggest that Le Poidevin's account is the one that captures 
what it is, at minimum, to be a truth condition. Rather than seeing his position as 
opposed to those of Ludlow et aI., my own view is that the others mentioned whish to 
add a further constraint onto what it is for a truth condition to be a truth condition. 
What is Le Poidevin's position on truth conditions? 
The truth-conditions of some proposition p are whatever must obtain for p to be 
true. The truth-makers of a token belief that p, in contrast, are the facts which 
make the truth-conditions of p obtain on a particular occasion. (p. 149) 
For Le Poi devin, the truth conditions for a sentence are the necessary conditions, 
rather than the sufficient conditions, that must be in place in order for a sentence to be 
true (C.f. Oaklander (2003: p. 274). Now although the other views considered here do 
not explicitly appear to be of the same type, indeed Smith's (1993) view seems 
diametrically opposed, there is an undercurrent to each of these views that makes 
16 Or any other A theoretic ontology. However, given the forgoing remarks in 1.3 it should be clear 
why I do not think that dynamic theories other than presentism will suffice to give us a metaphysics of 
time. 
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them compatible. Consider the competing statements of what is meant by "truth 
conditions": from Ludlow (1999: p.7), 
If the semantics of a natural language takes the form of aT-theory, and hence the 
semantics of a sentence is given by theorems like (3), then the right-hand side of 
the theorem - the portion following "if and only if' - states the literal truth 
conditions of the sentence of the left-hand side. 
(3) "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. 
In this case, the truth conditions are that snow is white. 
From Craig (1996: p.22), 
The giving of truth conditions is a semantic exercise; specifying grounds for a 
statement's truth concerns ontology. One can layout semantic conditions which 
will permit one to determine for a sentence whether that sentence is true or false 
without saying anything about the ontological facts which make that sentence 
true. 
And from Smith (1993: p. 5) 
"the truth conditions of [sentence] SI and [sentence] S/' does not refer to a 
relation between SI and S2 but to the states of affairs that make SI and S2 true. 
It seems to me that although the semantic fonnulations of what it is to be a truth 
condition for a tensed sentence differ, each of the views represented above is 
dependent upon the fact that a sentence is true just in case the conditions required for 
it to be true are in existence. Now, it appears that Smith's account requires that the 
truth conditions of a tensed sentence are the sufficient conditions for its truth, and that 
as such the inability of the tenseless theory of time to give the truth conditions for a 
tensed sentence without making recourse to some tensed notion entails that the 
sufficient conditions for the truth of a tensed token are, themselves, tensed states of 
affairs. However, even Smith will surely admit that part of the truth conditions, 
presumably a necessary condition of a tensed sentence are the tenseless truth 
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conditions. So for any tensed token S of "it is now 1980", ifit is 1980 then S is true iff 
S occurs in 1980. But then Smith and Le Poidevin do not necessarily contradict one 
another, rather Smith wishes to add a further constraint to the make up of truth 
conditions: they must include not only the tenseless truth conditions, but also some 
sufficient conditions, in the form of some tensed aspect. 
Likewise, the views of Craig and Ludlow seem to be subsumed by this 
approach. Both would agree, presumably, that in the case of a tensed token S, Swill 
be true iff it occurs in 1980. They will then add to that the further stipulation, the 
sufficient condition, that the truth conditions of S are such that it needs to include 
some ineliminably tensed component. Smith, Craig and Ludlow conclude that this is 
sufficient evidence to motivate the tensed theory of time. 
Of course, truth conditions are standardly taken to be both necessary and 
sufficient. All that I am suggesting is that the approaches to truth conditions taken by 
the above seems to suggest that there may be an implicit distinction being made 
between the two by the authors in question. Ultimately whether this is so or not is 
probably beside the point since I argue that whether or not tense is ineliminable from 
discourse and belief does not really impinge on matters of metaphysics at all (see 
2.4.3). 
2.4.2 On Oaklander's way out 
Having noted the variety of ways in which one may understand the truth 
conditions of a tensed sentence (detailed in 2.4.1), Oaklander argues that the new 
tenseless theory of time may be replaced by the newer tenseless theory of time. I7 In 
order to do so, and to meet some of the various challenges mentioned in 2.2, 
Oaklander argues for the intelligibility of a four category distinction of meaning. The 
categories he delineates are intentional meaning I , that which is intended by a speaker 
(pp. 274-5), ontological meaning2, that to which a token refers (p. 275), meaning3 as 
identical with truth conditions I8 and linguistic meanin~, or, 'the linguistic rules that 
17 Though Oaklander refers to new, and newer, B theory - rather than tenseless the~ry. . 
18 the appropriate [i.e. B theoretic] temporal relation between an A sentence or beheftoken and what It 
is about are the necessary and sufficient conditions for what is asserted by the token to be true. (p .. 275) 
'What is stated by a sentence token N of 'It is now 1980' is true if and only if N is simultaneous WIth or 
occurs at or during 1980' (pp. 275-6) 
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govern their [sentences, beliefs etc.] correct usage' (p. 276). There is clearly a close 
relation between meaning2 and meanin~, as Oaklander notes, 
the meanin~ of a tensed sentence is a semantic function or rule whose argument 
is the context of utterance and whose value is that sentence's truth conditions or 
truth maker in that context. In other words, the linguistic meanin~ or character of 
a tensed sentence tells us how the context determines the sentence's truth 
conditions (p. 277) 
With this four-fold distinction in place, Oaklander argues that this furnishes us with 
two distinct types of language, a language necessary for communication and a 
language suited to a correct description of temporal reality - the former being 
ineliminably tensed and having meanin~, the latter being tenseless and, hence, having 
meaning2' This bifurcation in terms of what is meant by the "meaning" of a tensed 
sentence, e.g. meant2 and meant4, entails that the tenseless theorist can argue that 
whilst tenseless truth conditions can never capture the meanin~ of a tensed sentence 
(recall Joe and the machine gun company) that is no reason to suppose, in light of the 
difficulties allegedly raised for tensed discourse by McTaggart's paradox, that a 
tenseless language cannot capture the ontological meaning2 of temporality and thus 
preserve the central notion of the new B theory of language; namely, that reality is 
correctly described tenselessly and is B theoretic. 
However, in Oaklander's model there is, as he acknowledges, nothing to act as 
a truth maker for a tensed sentence. Any tensed belief/sentence or other token is, 
metaphysically speaking, false. This follows because there is no such thing as a tensed 
fact to act as the meaning2 of a tensed locution. What strikes me as puzzling is that 
Oaklander is prepared to admit this much and yet still entertains his theory. Plainly, 
the fact that any tensed proposition is false and merely of pragmatic use, is sufficient 
grounds on which to reject Oaklander's move. A past tensed proposition such as "the 
battle of Hastings has existed" is true. To argue otherwise is utterly absurd - as many 
foes of presentism have argued. 19 To find a tenseless theorist arguing for it makes it 
no less implausible. 
19 See 6.1 
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2.4.3 Is the tense of truth conditions revealing? 
Smith (1993), Ludlow (1999) and Craig (2000a) each infer from the 
irreducibility of tense in natural language (in Craig's case in conjunction with other 
factors) to the conclusion that reality must admit the objectivity of tense. Mellor 
(1981) and Oaklander (1990) argue that our ability to give a tenseless account of the 
truth conditions for tensed tokens is a point in favour ofB theory, whilst Lowe's view 
seems to be that our ability to give a tensed account of the truth conditions for tensed 
tokens is a point in favour of A theory, and Dyke (2003) argues that if either an A or 
B theoretic ontology is correct then so is a tensed or tenseless accounts of semantics 
respectively. Hence, let us carve up the philosophical terrain. 
It seems to be defensible to suppose that the nature of our ontology, either A 
or B theoretic, in some way influence our choice between a tensed and tenseless 
account of the truth conditions for tensed tokens. If one supposes that reality is A 
theoretic then this might be seen as a point in favour of the tensed account. If one 
supposes that reality is B theoretic then this might be seen as a point in favour of the 
tenseless account. Equally, it seems to be reasonable (if not correct) to suppose that if 
a perspicuous statement of the truth conditions for a tensed token is itself tensed, then 
reality may be A theoretic, and that if a perspicuous statement of the truth conditions 
for a tensed token is tenseless then reality may be B theoretic since we would assume 
that the tense of the truth conditions would reflect some feature of reality. 
Whether or not any of these positions is currently a straw man is beside the 
point here since each is prima facie logically coherent. What I want to show is that 
this is a mere appearance of a relationship were no such relation between ontology 
and semantics exists, at least not in our accounts of time and tense. In what follows I 
argue that it is simply unclear whether the tensed or tenseless component of the 
metalanguage in which the truth conditions are to be stated should be seen as 
supervening upon, or reflecting, reality. In other words, I suggest that the tensed or 
tenseless nature of the truth conditions for tensed sentences could, on either side, be 
due to some feature of reality onto which our linguistic structure has fastened itself, or 
could, in fact, be due to some mind dependent feature of reality. 
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2.4.3.1 Tenseless language and ontology 
Let us begin then with the tenseless account of time and how one might 
suppose that it is possible to move from a tenseless semantics to a B theoretic 
ontology. New tenseless theorists argue that the truth conditions for tensed tokens in 
natural languages can be given in terms of tenseless token reflexive conditions. Thus, 
according to such theories, the truth of 
(1) It is now 1980 
Can be given by, 
(2) (1) is simultaneous with 1980 
The line of thought from tenselessness to B theory might crudely be stated as follows: 
since tenseless truth conditions remain the same, irrespective of the temporal 
perspective taken on events, it follows that reality itself must be tenseless. Of course, 
it is still possible that reality might not be B theoretic, but given that the conditions 
under which a tensed token is true can be described in entirely tenseless terms it is not 
clear why the dynamic nature of this reality is not mentioned where we state the 
conditions under which tensed tokens are true. 
The New B theory of time, as championed by Mellor (1981), would accept 
that (l)'s "being now" is sufficient to differentiate it from (2), but would also argue 
that whatever "being now" actually turns out to be will simply be akin to some feature 
of ourselves - our beliefs and attitudes - however this is to be cashed out. Thus, the 
kind of view supported by Mellor et al. is a tenseless ontology - an ontology where 
whatever tensed tokens do, they do not accurately report some genuine change in 
what there is or any A theoretic property. The claim that the tense ascribed to the truth 
conditions of a tensed token can be "read off' to tell us whether our ontology ought to 
be dynamic or static is an over statement of the tenseless theorists argument, but it 
does seem reasonable to gamer support for a B theoretic ontology from a semantic 
analysis. Thus we move from the tenseless statement of the truth conditions of (1) to 
the claim that our ontology is, or should be, tenseless, because the description of the 
conditions under which (1) is true can be given in tenseless temlS. 
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Now, what prevents the B theorist from moving directly from a tenseless 
semantics to a B theoretic reality is that it is not clear that these truth conditions can 
accurately be said to reflect the nature of time. In a case where we give a tenseless 
account for the truth conditions of a tensed token, e.g. it is now 1980, those conditions 
will be: 
'it is now 1980' is true ifit is uttered [tenselessly] in 1980 
'it will be 1980' is true ifit is uttered [tense1ess1y] earlier than 1980, and 
'it was 1980' is true ifit is uttered [tenselessly] later than 1980. 
But from our purely semantic analysis what are we to glean? Are we to suppose that 
our ability to give a tenseless account of the conditions under which the above tokens 
are true entails that reality is tenseless? Palpably not. For it is possible that such a 
semantic account be conjoined to an A theoretic or presentist analysis; where one 
accepts that the truth conditions for tensed sentences may be stated tenselessly, but 
then denies that this tells us anything meaningful concerning the nature of reality. One 
may suppose, instead, that the linguistic earlier / later distinction itself supervenes 
upon a truly dynamic reality. One in which, although it is right and proper to state the 
conditions for 'it was 1980' as 'true if uttered [tenselessly] later than 1980', the 
component 'later' is in fact merely reflecting a feature of our semantics. It might, for 
example, be the case that it is a syntactic feature of our natura11anguage that its truth 
conditions can be stated tenselessly even though reality itself is dynamic. Of course 
the tenseless theorist might deny this, and state that if the truth conditions for tensed 
tokens can be stated in a tenseless metalanguage then this does entail B theory. But it 
is unclear why this would be so. At the very least the tenseless theorist owes us an 
account of why it is that the tense of the truth conditions should be taken to do 
anything more than reflect a syntactic feature of our natural language. 
But to push the point home such a syntactic feature of our natural language 
may be explicable in terms of our "spatialising" time in some way. If, as I claim in 
chapter five, we think of time as being somehow like space for a variety of 
psychological reasons, then it would be unsurprising for us to develop language in 
such a way that, much like language about space, we can give temporally tenseless 
truth conditions. In such a case, though, where we adopt a syntax in which we can 
state truth conditions tenselessly, is it clear that this is due to the nature of reality 
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rather than our conceptions of it? I would suggest that it is not and that it is possible 
that our ability to give a tenseless account of the truth conditions of tensed sentences 
may merely supervene upon our most fundamental conceptions of how time is. 
Once it is noted that the tense of the metalanguage cannot be assumed to 
reflect the nature of reality - but may in fact supervene upon it - it is less clear that 
our ability to state the truth conditions for a tensed semantics in a tenseless 
metalanguage is a point in favour of the B theory at all, nor is it clear that if one 
adopts a B theoretic ontology then one should adopt a tenseless account of truth 
conditions. If there is no clear reason to suppose that our ability to state truth 
conditions in tenseless terms indicates anything more than a syntactic feature of the 
language itself, then one cannot move to argue that the tenseless statement of the truth 
conditions reveals the nature of reality. There is simply no justification for doing so 
when the tenseless nature of the truth conditions may be due to syntactic - or even 
psychological (see chapter five) - reasons. And although it remains tempting to argue 
that the adoption of a B theoretic ontology entails the adoption of a tenseless account 
of truth conditions, this too remains uncertain. 
In order to show this we might consider a spatial case. It is perfectly clear that 
there is no ontological privileging of any part of space. This being so it would seem 
perfectly cogent to suppose that we should state the truth conditions of spatially 
tensed statements such as 'Elizabeth is two metres to my right' in spatially tenseless 
language; such as 'Elizabeth is two metres due North from my front door'. But, as 
Lowe (1987a) has shown, it is perfectly plausible to state the truth conditions for such 
spatially tensed indexicals using spatially tensed truth conditions such that it is true 
that 'Elizabeth is two metres to my right' just in case Elizabeth is two metres to my 
right! Clearly such a statement of the truth conditions for spatially tensed tokens 
. supervenes upon the nature of space - which is obviously tenseless - and supervenes 
. . 20 
upon, rather than reflecting, the nature of realIty. 
If one suppose that time is B theoretic, how is it that one is supposed to garner 
motivation for a tenseless account of the truth conditions for tensed sentences? The 
only reason that I can foresee would be due to sufficient semantic analysis that shows 
tenseless statements of truth conditions to be the "correct" way of stating truth 
20 By supervene upon reality I mean simply to say that the tensed component of th~ s.entence is para~itic 
upon our mode of thinking about space - and hence, time - rather ~an. descnbmg It as we nught 
suppose it to be. After all, we would not suppose that spac~ is dynanuc SImply because we ought to 
give a spatially tensed account of the truth conditions for spatIally tensed sentences. 
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conditions. But if the only reason to adopt a tenseless account of truth conditions 
(even once we have already accepted a B theoretic ontology, as we do in the spatial 
case) is semantic, then it is clear that there is no necessary relationship between 
ontology and tense. Rather we must find metaphysical reasons for adopting 
metaphysical positions, and semantic reasons for endorsing a particular semantic 
account. 
Of course the other option would be to show beyond reproach that the truth 
conditions must reflect the nature of reality, rather than supervene upon it. But it is far 
from clear to me how one embarks upon such an argument given that all one is 
supposed to be doing in stating the truth conditions is stating the conditions under 
which a token is true and plainly those conditions may be described in both tensed 
and tenseless metalanguages. 
2.4.3.2 Tensed language and ontology 
What, then, if we adopt tensed semantics? Is a tensed ontology on the cards? 
Are tensed semantics incompatible with a B theoretic ontology? Certainly it would 
again be prima facie reasonable to suppose so. I fear, once again, that the issue is not 
really so clear. The key to the tensed token reflexive view is that the truth conditions 
are to be stated in tensed terms. Such tensed semantic views are taken to imply, or 
perhaps only suggest, that reality is A theoretic in much the same way that the 
tenseless token reflexive account of tensed tokens is usually taken to imply a B 
theoretic ontology. Likewise, it may be supposed that an A theoretic, or presentist, 
ontology would obviously favour a tensed account of truth conditions. 
It is unclear precisely how the tensed theorist is to move from a semantic 
account to a claim about ontology. In arguing that such a move is to be made, the 
tensed theorist is clearly working on the assumption, like the tenseless theorist 
discussed above, that a perspicuous statement of the conditions under which a tensed 
token is true must reflect or reveal, rather than supervene upon, the nature of reality. 
Now the tenseless theorist of time is prepared to countenance the claim that tense is 
ineliminable from language, but argues that our ability to give a tenseless account of 
truth conditions in some way inclines us toward a B theoretic ontology. This 
ineliminable tense is merely a feature of our language and beliefs. In stating that the 
conditions in which a tensed token are true must be described using tensed language, 
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how is the tensed theorist to argue for the claim that what is being described in that 
tensed component is a feature of reality, and not merely some syntactic feature of how 
we talk about reality? If we are the kinds of creatures claimed by the B theorist, that is 
ones who add becoming to the world in virtue of its mind dependence, then perhaps it 
is wholly unsurprising that we have a language for which we can state the truth 
conditions in tensed terms. After all, tense is such a fundamental feature of our 
language and beliefs that our formulation of a semantics might be such to render our 
semantics inherently tensed. For example, if Lowe's tensed token reflexive account of 
truth conditions is to be believed then it is possible for a spatially tensed token 
reflexive account of truth conditions be given for spatially tensed tokens, where it is 
clear that space is not itself tensed. How then can we possibly infer from a tensed 
metalanguage to the conclusion that time is dynamic? 
Furthermore the adoption of an A theoretic or presentist ontology plainly does 
little to incline us to support a tensed account of semantics since a presentist ontology 
coupled to a tenseless account of semantics, where the tenselessness of the truth 
conditions is taken to supervene upon the dynamic nature of becoming, appears 
perfectly cogent. Again, if my arguments in chapter five as to the manner in which we 
spatialise time are apt, then we might legitimately suppose that it should be a feature 
of the semantics of such being as ourselves that the truth conditions for our languages 
be stated in such a manner to reflect that mode of thought. 
In order to argue that there is a relationship between an A theoretic or 
presentist ontology and a perspicuous statement of truth conditions one must first say 
how it is that those truth conditions are taken to reflect the nature of reality. If pressed 
upon the question of why the metalanguage of a dynamic reality should be tensed or 
tenseless the only possible answer that the dynamic theorist could give is surely that 
this is a result of a syntactic feature of our language, due itself either to some feature 
of reality or the way that we conceive of it. This being so it should be clear that the 
account we give of truth conditions, either tenseless or tensed, is dependent upon our 
syntax, or perhaps the mechanics of metalinguistic construction, and need have no 
relationship to our metaphysics. 
As a note of interest, the argument can be broadened from an analysis of truth 
conditions to an analysis of language. It is perfectly possible to maintain (e.g. Ludlow 
1999) that even an allegedly tenseless account of time - one whereby we take 
ourselves to have removed any mention of the tensed predications of the A series -
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smuggles in an implicitly tensed account. In other words, there is something so 
powerful about tense, as it appears in language, that we cannot help but include it in 
our semantics. But, again, this fails to tell us anything of metaphysical importance. 
Ludlow may be right to say that tense is essential to our understanding of time and 
even that tense gives the appearance of being an indispensable part of reality, but the 
question would remain unanswered as to whether or not the indispensable part of 
reality comprised by tense reflects some feature of reality or a feature of our own 
attitudes and beliefs. Hence, an analysis of tense seems unable to give us any 
assistance in our metaphysical deliberations. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In 2.1 I argued for the implicit existence of the TTT within the literature, such 
a position being a theoretical whole composed of four different, though related, 
theories. The New Tenseless theory of time, B theory, theories of space-time and 
etemalism were the four positions recognised as composing this group. With this in 
mind I proceeded to an analysis of the components in order to weigh up their 
collective prowess as a metaphysic of time. It was noted in 2.2 that the Old Tenseless 
theory of time could not provide a tenseless translation of tensed sentences and was 
, 
jettisoned. In section 2.3 the analysis of the New theory was initially damming, but it 
was noted that some of the major defects can be patched up, should one wish to do so, 
by making recourse to appropriate modal and semantic materials, although the move 
deemed necessary would not be palatable to all adherents of the TTT. In 2.4 it was 
suggested that semantic analysis is ultimately unrevealing when it comes to 
metaphysical considerations since it remains fundamentally unclear whether the 
tensed or tenseless component of the truth conditions stated in the metalanguage 
supervene upon, or reflects, some feature of reality. 
Obviously, if the arguments presented here are correct, then the claim that our 
tenseless semantics motivates the TTT is false. Moreover, it should be noted that any 
account of the tense evident in natural languages is compatible with the remaining 
features of the TTT, but none of these semantic accounts explicitly favour these 
features. Thus, if we are to motivate the TTT we must look elsewhere. Likewise if we 
are to show the TTT then it must be through more metaphysical arguments than those 
presented thus far. 
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Chapter Three 
In chapter three /: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Present the arguments taken to entail the second component of the timeless theory of 
time - space-time - and the truth of the special theory of relativity 
Note the dependence of such arguments upon verification ism if space-time and the 
special theory are to be thought of as logically entailed 
Argue that the special theory of relativity and any theory that takes space-time to be 
real are not entailed by the experimental findings, but should be thought of as 
inferences to the best explanation. But, upon further analysis I suggest they tum out 
not to be good explanations at all. 
Argue that the third component of the timeless theory of time, B theoretic relations, 
cannot be formulated within a space-time. Hence, that the ITT is not a coherent 
whole. I also suggest that it is not clear that the B theoretic element of the TIT can 
be meaningfully formulated at all. 
3.1 Relativity, space-time, and the Nature of Temporality 
Much analysis is necessary in order to see precisely what is being claimed and, 
more properly, what should be claimed on the basis of the special theory of relativity. 
The theory of relativity presents by far and away the largest problem for the presentist 
(see 6.3) and is commonly regarded as the most powerful ally of the TTT (c.f. Sider 
2001: pp. 42-45). In the first section of this chapter I shall detail the theory of 
relativity; the particular experiments which apparently yield the conclusion that space-
time is real, point out in the second section what is really justified by these 
experiments and, in the third, argue that theories of space-time are insufficiently good 
explanations to count as our best explanations of the phenomena. With this 
accomplished I shall turn to the task of examining temporality and the nature of B 
relations. 
What will become evident is that the space-time picture of reality presented is 
one that may prove to be metaphysically possible, but that this metaphysical picture is 
not one that fits with the TTT. Indeed, theories of space-time are, I suggest. 
incompatible with the TTT - specifically with its B theoretic component. As such, 
anyone wishing to maintain B theoretic relations will have to tum to a 3+ 1 theory, a 
theory of space and time as separate and distinct entities as opposed to a theory of 
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unified space-time. As a result, the argument that presentism is false since it entails 
scientific revisionism can be shown to apply against the B theorist and the TTT 
theorist, though it will not hold against someone who wishes to maintain a space-time 
theory and is also willing to accept that time is unreal. l 
Moreover, it will be observed that the requirement of scientific revisionism on 
behalf of either the B theorist or the presentist may not be strictly necessary, since the 
"proof' of the unifiability of space and time rests upon a principle of verification 
which can be legitimately challenged on metaphysical grounds. Since this 
metaphysical principle generates scientific views that point to the falsity of both 
presentism and B theories, all that is needed is metaphysical, rather than scientific 
revision. It becomes clear that both presentism and B theory are metaphysical 
possibilities. The more interesting question is then which of the two views do we then 
think represents, or is closest too, actuality. My conclusion to this question is that, 
since it remains unclear precisely what time and temporality are for the B theorist, 
presentism should be seen as the obvious solution. 
3.1.1 Explanatory power of space-time 
Before we proceed to an analysis of the specific examples said to favour a space-
time interpretation it should be pointed out that irrespective of whether one finds the 
space-time solution to be ultimately persuasive, within the context of considerations 
of the physical examples discussed herein, a space-time solution has a great deal of 
explanatory power. If the universe is as is suggested below then we have explanations 
of why certain phenomena occur. In what follows I argue that the special theory of 
relativity and Minkowski space-time present us with a picture of a reality where: 
i) There are no such things as space and time; rather there is space-time 
ii) There is no such thing as absolute simultaneity 
iii) There is no "moving now" 
f · 'd ation to the view that time is I As was noted in chapter one, I do not give any sort 0 senous conSl er 
unreal precisely because such avenues seem to me to be a last resort. 
3.1.2 Space-time separation 
Suppose the following: Charles is on board a rocket ship, travelling away from 
the earth at a velocity approaching that of light. Elizabeth, his twin, is on the earth. In 
this example there are two explosions. Both, from Elizabeth's perspective, are to be 
found at the same point in space, though they occur at different times. Charles 
perceives things differently. From his perspective the explosions occur at slightly 
different locations in space, although their temporal separation is slightly shorter than 
that perceived by Elizabeth. However, both agree that the space-time separation is the 
same. A distance s in space-time equal to -V(x2 + i + Z2 - ce), where x, y and z are 
simply the Galilean spatial coordinates of an event taken in any frame of reference. 
The use of ce is of little interest to us, since its only role is to describe the temporal 
interval in terms of metres.2 Obviously, the total distance s is neither a distance in 
space nor a distance in time, but a union of the two. 
Why does this make us suspect that (i) is correct, that time is a dimension of 
space-time? The telling part of the analysis is the request on the part of the physicist 
for us to explain why this expression should be one that accurately describes the 
behaviour of objects in space and time. In other words, "why should time look like a 
dimension?" Plainly it does, for the above expression looks like the kind of expression 
that would describe a separation in four dimensions and, since one of those 
dimensions is being taken to be time we must ask why this separation can be 
described in a geometric fashion. The most obvious answer to the question is that time 
is a dimension. To see this more clearly it may be salutary to consider a geometric, 
two dimensional example, see Fig 1. 
. h d th t f e is unlike space as to do so is to 2 We cannot object that this move is arbltra~ on t e groun s a 1m 
prejudge the argument against the TIT theonst. 
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What the diagram shows is that for any two points, d and e, although it is 
possible to rotate the (x,y) axis to (x' ,y'), and hence effect a co-ordinate 
transfonnation from (x,y) to (x' ,y'), it is not possible to alter the separation between 
points d and e simply be rotation of the axes. Plainly the distance between the two 
points is invariant, although the distances between the two points as defined in tenns 
of the x and y coordinates obviously vary according to the frame of reference. 
In the same way, the spatial and temporal separation of any two events might 
be variable according to one's frame of reference (e.g. whether one adopts (x,y) or 
x' ,y'), but the space-time separation is invariant. It is precisely because space and 
time are reducible to space-time that this invariance occurs. In order to explain why 
space and time appear to behave as a four-dimensional space, we simply claim that 
space-time is a four dimensional manifold. Prior to Minkowski's move we know that 
space-time relations are invariant, we simply do not know why they are invariant. 
Now we know that space and time are mere component dimensions of a space-time 
and thus (i) must be true. 
In the space-time explanation for this occurrence we explain the observation 
by saying that each inertial frame takes a different four dimensional perspective on 
the same states of affairs. 3 Thus, there is no absolute fact of the matter as to how far 
3 c.r Taylor and Wheeler (1966: pp. 39-47), Hey and Walters (1997: pp. 62-3). 
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apart the explosions are in either space or time; merely a fact of the matter as to their 
space-time separation. This points to the truth of (ii) since if there is no "fact of the 
matter" as to how long there is between the explosions then there is no "fact of the 
matter" as to what the time is at any moment in time. Likewise, if the "flow" of time. 
the motion of "the now" is to occur, in which frame does it occur? If we specify any 
one of the frames as having a now at a particular temporal coordinate, then, given the 
lack of simultaneity suggested, this will not accord with the location of "the now" in 
some other frame of reference. If there is no unified point of becoming then it is not 
clear how there can be a single and objective moving now and, thus, we see how (iii) 
is to be argued for. 
3.1.3 Twins 
Recall Charles and Elizabeth from the previous example. Instead of watching 
out for explosions, in this case Charles travels away from the earth at a velocity 
approaching that of light, and then returns to Elizabeth. During the period of his being 
away, Charles ages less than Elizabeth, an effect referred to as time dilation. The 
twins paradox can prima facie seem to be a rejection of relativity; since the special 
theory is supposed to be a reciprocal theory, hence, if the example is structurally 
isomorphic and if Charles ages slowly because he is travelling at a high velocity 
relative to Elizabeth, then Elizabeth should change slowly because she is travelling at 
a high velocity relative to Charles. 
However, the two cases are not structurally isomorphic at all, for Charles 
must, if he is to travel first away from Elizabeth and then back towards her, occupy 
two distinct, that is - verifiably distinct - frames of reference. Elizabeth occupies only 
one.4 The explanation offered by the space-time theorist is that Elizabeth travels a 
greater distance in space-time, and thus everything in her inertial frame ages more 
than entities do in Charles's two frames of reference. This experiment is taken to 
point to the plausibility of (ii) and (iii); (ii) because there appears to be a lack of a 
simultaneous present within the two frames. If we ask both Charles and Elizabeth to 
say what time it is when a certain event occurs - say Charles beginning his return trip 
_ then they will return different numerical values for that time. (iii) is plausible given 
4 Zhang (1997: pp. 177-9) gives a detailed mathematical explanation of the process. SCiama (1987: pp. 
9-16) offers a less technical explanation. 
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that Charles and Elizabeth cannot agree when this "now" l·S d·d· 
, any can 1 ate tIme that 
one of them offers will be disagreed with by the other If there l·S b· t· f: f 
. no 0 ~ec lve act 0 
the matter as to when this now is then it is unclear that there 1· s s h . uc a movmg now. 
Note once again that this solution to the apparent paradox of time dilation is, 
mathematically, very elegant and simple. Of course the other thing to note is that the 
unification of space and time into a space-time is essential to this mode of 
explanation, and thus we see yet more motivation for the acceptance of (i). 
3.1.4 The Pole in the Barn 
So far we have dealt with examples that point to our inability to form an 
agreement as to the value which ought to be given to the "correct" time coordinate. 
Indeed, our inability to attribute a correct value to this coordinate is indicating a 
rejection of the notion of absolute simultaneity. Further, the ease with which the 
space-time model can explain these phenomena is being taken as evidence for it being 
a veridical theory. Now we turn our attention to a different type of phenomenon. 
Roughly speaking, according to the special theory of relativity, any increase in 
relative velocity causes a contraction along the direction of relative motion.5 The 
reciprocal nature of this phenomenon makes it difficult to explain for it appears that 
there is no such thing as "the way that things are". Instead, there are a number of 
different sizes and shapes that entities will take on according to their relative velocity. 
Theories of space-time can explain this effect by recourse to the same claim 
that was made in 3.1.1.1. In the same way that space-time separation remains constant 
whilst spatial and temporal separation vary according to velocity, so the length of 
entities varies according to our relative velocity with respect to them. Thus, each 
velocity from which we view an entity is akin to a cross section taken from a 
particular perspective.6 We are beginning to see, here, the power of the space-time 
explanation of relativity. If we attempt to explain the contraction of various lengths as 
genuine effects outside the context of a space-time, then we are sanctioning either the 
existence of as many entities as there are frames of reference or the illusory nature of 
all observations not made at absolute rest with respect to an entity. Both seem 
5 In fact, as Sciama (1988: p.8) points out, an entity will appear. to be contracted and rot~ted .. Butwhen 
we take account of Relativistic optics we will measure the object to be shorter along Its directIOn of 
travel than we would were we stationary with respect to it. 
6 c.f. e.g. Balashov (2000), Taylor and Wheeler (1966: p. 70), Craig (2000b: p.2S) 
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puzzling. The space-time explanation, although relying upon a markedly different 
understanding of reality, appears to unify these apparently dl·sparate t·· percep IOns mto a 
single reality. But these unified descriptions of reality treat tl·me 
as a component 
dimension of a four dimensional manifold (i), deny that there is a meaningful notion 
of absolute simultaneity (ii) and rule out the notion of a moving now C···) lll. 
3.1.5 The J1 meson 
The final example that I shall give is that of the J..l meson from Sciama C 1988). 
It adds nothing new to the cases mentioned above, but it does give a sense of the 
unified nature of the solution. 
Cosmic rays, coming from outer space, generate f1 mesons as they collide with 
the particles in the upper atmosphere. Their rate of decay, of half-life ( ... ) acts 
as a clock. We know what the half life of a f1 meson at rest is; and a simple 
calculation shows that it is far less than the time it takes for a f1 meson to get 
from the upper atmosphere to our detection apparatus on the surface of the 
earth. (p.7) 
The f1 meson is of interest because it is an observable particle that is travelling at high 
velocity. Where we find a reference frame travelling at a high velocity with respect to 
our own frame we would expect to find that, from the perspective of our frame, the 
frame in motion would change only relatively slowly, though, of course, it will appear 
as if it is travelling very quickly. The case of the f1 meson serves to confirm the 
prediction since, given the laboratory conditions, the meson would have decayed well 
before it reached the detection apparatus. Thus, from our perspective, the meson has 
changed only slowly - as the theory predicted. 
For a hypothetical observer sitting on the meson as it travels into the earth's 
atmosphere, it will appear that the meson is changing at a normal rate since the 
observer is at rest with respect to the meson itself. But, the question then arises as to 
how the meson can travel into the earth's atmosphere as far as it does if its half life is, 
in fact, only sufficient to get it half way to the earth. Where we can say that the meson 
travels as far as it does from the perspective of the observer on earth because it is only 
changing slowly, from the perspective of the observer on the meson itself the meson 
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is changing at the nonnal rate. In order to explain this phenomenon w t I emus appea to 
the further relativistic effect: the contraction of bodies that are l·n t· . h mo lOn, l.e. w en a 
body moving in a certain direction will become shorter in the direction of travel. 
Thus, if a rod is travelling in direction d and is observed by an b h . o server \\l 0 IS 
stationary with respect to it then the rod will appear to be length I If h 
. , owever, our 
observer is in motion with respect to the rod, moving toward it, then the length of the 
rod will appear to be less than I for that observer. Using this we can explain how the 
meson gets farther into the earth's atmosphere than we might suppose: 
An observer travelling with the f.1. meson will thus measure the distance between 
the upper atmosphere and the surface of the earth as being much less than we 
would think of it as being, For him, then, the reason why the f.1. meson has not 
decayed before it reaches the earth's surface is simply that it does not have very 
far to go. (p. 8) 
3.1.6 No Passage 
Before we proceed to a more detailed analysis of the metaphysical foundations 
of these experiments, it remains for something to be said about the incompatibility of 
the space-time model with a coherent notion of passage. 
First, we should note that if taken as a veridical representation of reality there 
is no room for passage within the space-time model. Put another way there is nothing 
to add to this model. Passage is to be accounted for as being mind dependent. 
However, this does not rule out the possibility of passage and my claim was that this 
picture was incompatible with notions of passage. Second, then, recall the arguments 
from 1.4.2. There I argued that McCall's model of reality fails because it relies upon 
the notion that either time can change without higher time (and since change requires 
time this is obviously false) or, if we sanction the existence of a higher time, then we 
entail an infinite chain of higher times in which to explain passage. Such arguments 
are equally valid here too. If time is alteration in temporal properties etc. then we find 
ourselves back in McTaggart's paradox - since space-time is supposed to be the way 
reality is simpliciter, e.g. as a C series. If time turns out to be a topological feature of 
reality then space-time will be in the same predicament as McCall's theory. 
70 
3.2 Dependence upon positivism 
Space-time presents a powerful model, and an excellent way of representing 
reality mathematically. The question, however, is whether or not we oUght to take that 
mathematical representation as we find it: should we accept that space and time are in 
fact components of a unified four dimensional whole and that the TTT is true? 
The space-time component of the TTT might be found wanting. If it is, or if 
presentism is found to be our theory of choice to solve McTaggart's paradox, then we 
shall have to be open to the possible failure of space-time interpretations of the special 
theory. At the current stage this looks as though I am encouraging some kind of 
scientific revisionism. This is not so. What I am encouraging is an open mindedness 
to a possible metaphysical revision of certain scientific views. I wish to begin casting 
aspersions upon the claims of the space-time theorist. Thus far none of the 
interpretations given in 3.1 has been challenged; I have presented the explanations 
given as the only plausible explanations. Crucially, there are metaphysical 
assumptions that rest at the core of these explanations, and these assumptions can be 
challenged. 
3.2.1 Verification ism as the core of space-time and the special theory 
Craig (2000b: chapters 3 and 4) has argued that, central to the success of the 
space-time interpretation of the special theory, is the widespread verificationism 
dominant in physics in the early part of the twentieth century. 
the key justificatory factor in Einstein's rejection of Newton's absolute or 
metaphysical time and space and consequently his reduction of time and space to 
measured physical time and space was Machian positivism, which eschewed 
such metaphysical entities as absolute time and space as literally meaningless and 
which in Einstein's case issued in a verificationist analysis of time and space 
along operationalist lines. (p.81) 
Craig'S point in these chapters is that the metaphysics which produced theories such 
. d I . ·t . 0 longer adequate (p. 82) and that we are in need of 
as space-hme an re attvI y IS n . 
updating our metaphysics. The consequence of this is that in so doing we undermme 
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the foundations upon which space-time interpretations of relativity are based. Recall 
the example given in 3.1.2 concerning the twins, Charles and Elizabeth. The case \\'as 
set up to show that we see phenomena predicted by the special theory precisely 
because they are embedded in a space-time. One of the conclusions drawn from this 
was that there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity. This conclusion followed 
because at any point in Charles' flight it would not be possible for both Charles and 
Elizabeth to agree upon the time at which an event occurred. When the first explosion 
occurred at, say, t1 for Elizabeth, it would not be t1 according to Charles. When tl did 
occur according to Charles, it would not be t1 according to Elizabeth. In other words 
there is no way for us to verify whether or not the two events did, in fact, occur at the 
same time.7 
It cannot be emphasised strongly enough how heavily indebted the 
contemporary understanding of relativity is to positivism. Although certainly not a 
positivist, Einstein (1923) inferred from the fact that, 
to 
Observers moving .. , [relative to a] moving rod would thus find that the two 
clocks were not synchronous, while observers in the stationary system would 
declare the clocks to be synchronous. 
So we see that we cannot attach any absolute signification to the concept of 
simultaneity, but that two events which, viewed from a system of co-ordinates, 
are simultaneous, can no longer be looked upon as simultaneous events when 
envisaged from a system which is in motion relatively to that system. (pp. 42-3) 
He inferred from the fact that observers would not declare two clocks in motion to be 
synchronous, that there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity.8 Thus, we move 
from the claim that we lack an observable feature of reality to the claim that there is 
7 (1964. 104 5) for a detailed example that illustrates the verificationist core of the See Rosser . pp. -
move. . h eater detail than I the debt which space-time owes 
8 Craig (2000b: chapters 3 ~nd 4) analyse~ IllI muc grtr ersial point that the special theory is indebted 
to positivism. Since I take It to b~ a relatIve y uncon °tV the task In any case although I agree with 
to positivism I shall devote relatIvely s;ant res~~cesd ~ions the ;heory is in f~ct simplv an inference 
Craig that the theory probably was base on s~c °funth afoundations serve; more ~s a p~int of interest I t· nd as such the notIllg 0 e . I to the best exp ana Ion a, 'I th h ther or not Einstein's own arguments are genume y 
than a linchpin o~my argu.ment. Note, a ~'h a~~ge8). However, this would not effect the core of my 
verificationist rmght be dIsputed - e.g. ~ .ar th t the special theory is maintained because It IS a gnod 
argument which, ultimately, turns on the c aIm a 
explanation for the observed phenomena. 
no such feature of reality; from the claim that we cannot tell which of the two pictures 
is "really correct" to the claim that neither picture is "really correct." 
The dependence of space-time interpretations of relativity extends beyond its 
foundation to its acceptance in contemporary physics. Consider the following: 
Also, 
'Newtonian absolute simultaneity is equivalent to postulating the existence of an 
instantaneously propagating signal with an infmite velocity .... We have known 
that there is no any instantaneous signal in nature and, therefore, the absolute 
simultaneity cannot be realized in any laboratory.' (Zhang 1997: p. 10) 
Before lengths can be measured and spatially separated clocks synchronized, one 
must decide what is meant by the simultaneity of spatially separated 
events .. .Ideally, if signals could be transmitted with infinite velocity, such that 
they would reach the observer without time delay, then the observer need only 
note the time of arrival of the signals and equate it to the time of the event. 
However, there is no way of transmitting signals instantaneously. (Rosser 1964: 
p. 103) 
In all such cases the lack of a signal with instantaneous and infinite velocity is taken 
to imply that simultaneity is to be defined in tenns of the velocity of light and cannot 
be defined by an abstract concept of an absolute signa1.
9 
3.2.2 A move to space-time 
From such experimental foundations, specifically from the invariance of space-
time separation discussed in 3.1.2, Minkowski (1923) argued that 
space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, 
and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent reality. (p. 75) 
9 . -wa velocity of light it is not clear that this establishes the non-
~ven were one to establIsh the o~e Y would need to rule out the possibility of an instantaneous 
eXlstence of an absolute present smce one 
signal to achieve the task. 
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I take it that this is satisfactory evidence as to the positivism of the theory. Since 
absolute simultaneity cannot be observed it cannot be included in our ontology, and 
because the invariance of space-time separation can be observed it can be included in 
our ontology - thus there is no such thing as an absolute present. The natural 
conclusion to draw from this is that space-time theories are true, or at the least any 
theory that includes the unverifiable is false. It may be true that I am making the case 
rather bluntly here, and I hope that criticisms of this ilk can be rebuffed by the 
observation that I am not trying to implicate Einstein or Minkowski as positivists; 
rather, I am trying to point to what appear to be positivistic inferences, quite 
reasonable inferences, that lurk at the heart of their theories. This is not. obviously, 
incompatible with the further claim that both were metaphysical realists. 
What is of issue is which resources are in play when we adjudicate upon what 
constitutes evidence for a particular theory. My claim is that, at least for Einstein, the 
resources from which one infers to one's conclusion, are those that are verifiable. One 
is, then, fully entitled to postulate the existence of those things that cannot be verified 
if one so wishes, of course. But if there is no verifiable frame of absolute becoming, 
then such a frame of becoming is missing from the resources with which one is 
initially equipped. Now this is perhaps unsurprising. Physics, as a discipline, does not 
tend to deal in entities whose existence cannot be verified. But it is not that the 
Einsteinian arguments show that there is not an absolute frame - as is frequently 
supposed - they merely show that we lack the resources with which to verify such a 
frame. Of course one might suppose (particularly if one is a positivist) that the 
absence of such a frame from our verifications entails that the frame does not exist. 
3.2.3 The weakness of positivism 
Now although special relativity and its cashing out into a theory of space-time 
b d · 't' l'sm l't need not depend upon it as we shall see in 3.3.2. This appears ase In POSIIV , 
. . 11 J:: 't has been widely recognised that positivism has not sounded the IS Just as we ,lor I 
death knell for metaphysics, indeed one might argue that positivism is simply one 
. f t h 'cs However positivism is distinct from other types of partIcular type 0 me ap YSI . , 
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described, and how one believes it to be. 
The particular premise I ha . . d· hI· . ve III mIn IS t e c aim that metaphYSICS concerns 
itself with delineating the possible. Hence positivism, as a form of metaphysics, 
delineates one possible description of how we ought to consider reality to be: a reality 
where we include the existence of only those things that we can verify using physical 
means. However, if my method is satisfactory then it should be recognised that there 
are other possibilities. For example, there may be ontology's that posit the existence 
of unverifiable entities or states of affairs. One such state of affairs could, in 
principle, include sufficient materials to support the notion that there is a complete 
description of reality that includes a meaningful definition of absolute simultaneity -
albeit a definition that lacks operational significance. But the fact that this view 
disagrees with the metaphysics of the positivist who admits the existence of only 
those entities that she can verify, does not preclude this particular picture from being 
correct, or, at the very least, denoting a genuine metaphysical possibility. 
In chapters four and five I argue that we do have metaphysical reasons for 
such a reinterpretation of relativity and that we can block the move to space-time. In 
what remains of this section I wish to argue that exponents of space-time do not really 
adhere to them on positivistic grounds, far from it. My rather simple exposition of the 
theories would need to be in agreement with the space-time theorist only if they 
sought to argue that the experimental evidence actually entailed that theories of 
space-time were true. It seems to me that the best reason for adopting the theory is the 
completedness noted in 3.1, and the fact that it seems to present us with a best 
explanation of the phenomenon described and, thus, that theories of space-time are 
not logically entailed by the experimental evidence. However, I also wish to explore 
the consequences of accepting the claim that the space-time solution is a good 
explanation. It turns out that the price of accepting that claim, that the space-time 
solution is a good explanation, may be too high for a philosopher or a physicist to 
countenance seriously. 
If what I argue is correct then it should be noted that, as an attempt at an 
I . th . f space-time are open to being challenged by metaphysical exp anatlOn, eones 0 
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conclusion that space and time are to be unified into space-time and, hence, that there 
is no such thing as absolute simultaneity, I shall offer some arguments that, in 
contradistinction, attempt to point to the fallibility of space-time explanations. If 
space-time is not a good explanation for the phenomena, then it should not be 
regarded as a defect of presentism that it requires metaphysical revision to the space-
time theory. 
3.3 Space-time as an explanation 
Few philosophers, if any at all, will be persuaded by the claim that the space-
time interpretation of the special theory is true simply because positivism is true 
(indeed one wonders how many physicists would be so, when pressed). But why is it, 
then, that the space-time interpretation of the special theory receives such widespread 
acceptance in philosophical circles? The answer lies, not in the fact that all 
philosophers are closet positivists, but in the fact that the space-time interpretation of 
the special theory is reasoned to as the best explanation of the phenomena. It explains 
why it is that there are apparently different ways reality exists in different frames of 
reference. It does so by incorporating such differences as mere differences in 
perspective within a four-dimensional space-time manifold. 
Certainly, no "proof' could ever be offered for a principle of special relativity 
that, 'A frame in uniform translatory motion relative to an inertial frame cannot be 
distinguished from the inertial frame by any physical experiment whatever' (Rindler 
1969: p.8). Unless the principle is found wanting, then judging the special theory 
seems to come down to judging its heuristic value and the success of the theory based 
upon the principle (Cf. Rindler (1969: p.10) and Goldberg (1984: p. 105)). Patently 
the success of the theory is undeniable and this is the reason that so many 
philosophers find themselves under the sway of the space-time interpretation of the 
special theory. 
The space-time interpretation itself appears to run into some heuristic 
problems of it own; for, although within the context of certain aspects of physics the 
"static" nature of reality seems sensible enough it seems to run into at least three 
distinct problems. First, it appears that space-time theories are, in fact, scientifically 
revisionary with regards to every other scientific discipline (not a good explanation at 
all- we would surely rather keep some of our other theories). Second, that accepting a 
76 
representation of a genuinely passageless reality would appear to make the analysis of 
time and temporality a logically contradictory discipline and, third, if we take 
seriously the kind of argument employed by space-time theorists then we ought to 
think that time is unreal. 
3.3.1 Bad explanation? 
The first point that I should like to make about space-time then, is that it 
appears to entail that there are an enormous number of coincidences that occur in the 
three dimensional world that we believe ourselves to perceive. For example, every 
time I perceive someone kick a football, 10 and behold the ball moves away from the 
foot (assuming that the ball is inflated of course). In what we perceive to be our three 
dimensional reality we explain this, Humean concerns aside, by saying something 
like, "the foot causes the ball to move away." Whether we couch this causal relation 
in terms such as, "energy is transferred from the foot to the ball," or something 
stronger such as, "there is some causal relation between the ball and the foot," is 
beside the point here. What is important is that there is, in our every day deliberations, 
some clear way of thinking about the foot and the ball such that without the actions of 
the foot the actions of the ball would not have followed. 
But under a space-time interpretation we will have to deny that any such kind 
of relation exists at all. Agent, event and counterfactual theories of causation are all 
denied to us since each of them entails that some entity or another (an agent, an event 
etc.) brings about some state of affairs. Plainly in a reality composed out of space-
time worms, or even static stages, no such thing can be true.1O In a four dimensional 
reality such as the Minkowskian one described above, one which lacks a genuine 
feature of passage, entities do not move towards or away from one another. My foot 
does not move towards the ball. Rather, at t1 my foot is located behind the ball, at t2 
my foot is located spatio-temporally contiguously to the ball and at t3 the ball is a 
distance away from my foot. It will not do to object on counterfactual grounds, to 
argue that had my foot not been in its location at t2 then the ball would not have 
moved - thus providing an analysis of causation within the space-time - for such 
10 I think that we might even include regularity theorists in our list for even these relatively minimal 
theories of causation would surely wish to preserve the intuition that there is something distinct about 
causation as opposed to, say, the claim that two mountains in a relatively small area 'cause' a valley. 
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readings also seem to imply the highly counter intuitive notion that the existence at t1 
of two hills causes a valley, also at t1; for had the two hills not been located at tl the 
valley would not have existed either. Thus, unless one wishes to accept "spatial" 
causation, one cannot accept a counterfactual analysis of causation within a space-
time. Certainly, one is forced to admit that the concept of causation is merely a 
product of our mode of existence in this particular four-dimensional reality which 
seems very hard to comprehend. 
The obvious reply from the space-time theorist is that I have not told quite the 
right sort of story regarding a counterfactual analysis of causation, that I have not said 
anything about the logical independence of my foot and the ball in contrast to the hills 
and the valley. After all, the valley is logically dependent upon the hills for its 
existence in a way that the ball and its motion are not dependent upon the foot for 
theirs. But then we encounter a further difficulty. In 3.4 I argue that the space-time 
theorist lacks grounds for distinguishing between space and time; this being so it is 
not clear to me that the ball its motion are logically independent of my foot. After all, 
if space and time are, as Minkowski has it, reducible to space-time, then it seems that 
any truth applicable to space ought to also be applicable to time. This being the so, if 
it is the case that the valley is logically dependent upon the hills for its existence, so to 
is the ball logically dependent upon the foot for its movement. Only if we can 
distinguish time from space can we make any meaningful remarks concerning logical 
dependence. 
If this claim is true, if causation is not a genuine feature of reality, at least if 
there is not causation as we recognise it through the preservation of genuinely three 
dimensional quantities such as energy, mass and the like, then the other sciences 
appear to stand in direct contradiction to the special theory and the space-time 
interpretation; for the inferences which they use for explanatory purposes, also 
inferences to the best explanation, appear not to be viable in light of the foregoing. 
For example, the suggestion that the heating effect in a piece of wire with a current 
running through it is proportional to the current multiplied by the square of the 
resistance of the wire is meaningless because there simply are no such things as 
current and resistance - it is not immediately obvious that there is the flow of 
electricity. 
We could cite a more commonplace example. Suppose Charles fires a gun at a 
target. When the bullet from the gun strikes the target we want to say that the bullet 
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causes there to be a hole in the target. But if the space-time analysis is true then we 
cannot say such a thing. We cannot say that the best explanation for there being a hole 
in the target is the firing of a gun, for the firing of a gun cannot meaningfully be 
thought of as a cause of there being a hole in the target since we have no adequate 
conception of what it is for one thing to cause another. The fact that space-time might 
be the best explanation for how it is we come to view reality differently from each 
frame of reference is indisputable. However, what is disputable is the further claim 
that the space-time interpretation is compatible with our other "best explanations" for 
other phenomena from other scientific disciplines. If, as I have suggested, such 
explanations are not compatible with a space-time interpretation then we must ask 
whether the evidence for the space-time interpretation is sufficient to be 
metaphysically revisionary in so many disciplines. I suspect that the answer to that 
question is worthy of detailed analysis, but I shall not offer it here. I raise it merely as 
a question for any potential space-time theorist. They must say that the evidence for 
the space-time interpretation is so compelling that it is sufficient to motivate 
metaphysical revisionism in almost every other field. Although, perhaps, it might be 
plausible to do so the bulk of our intuitions concerning reality must be overturned in 
order for this to be so, and, even if the space-time theorists claims are plausible, seems 
a high price. 
In this regard, however, perhaps the space-time theorist would be quite happy 
with such claims concerning causation. After all, in endorsing something akin to a 
spatial variation as change it already appears that they are committed to a very 
particular view. I suspect, though, that whilst the space-time theorist might be quite 
happy to acquiesce to this, it should be noted that the space-time theorist appears 
inclined towards to a reality apparently lacking causation, plausibly lacking three 
dimensional intrinsic properties and also lacking change over and above spatial 
variation. The collective impact of these highly counterintuitive views might be 
sufficient to motivate some to reject theories of space-time altogether. 
3.3.2 "Kantian" concerns 
Our ability to reVIse scientific claims four-dimensionally rests upon the 
assumption that three dimensional perspectives are genuinely informative as to the 
nature of a four dimensional reality. In claiming that space and time are doomed to 
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fade away, and that the true nature of reality is four dimensional, Minkowski 
committed space-time theorists to the view that our perception of the existence of an 
objective distinction between space and time is fallacious. Whatever the nature of the 
temporality it appears to be different from the spatial dimensions in that we associate 
it with the experience of passage. But space-time, as Minkowski defined it, admits of 
no such distinction between its spatial and temporal components. As Steven Hawking 
(1988) states, '[I]n relativity, there is no real distinction between the space coordinates 
and time co-ordinates, just as there is no real difference between any two space co-
ordinates' (p. 24). There are two distinct concerns here then: first, that we are 
attempting to draw inferences from the way the world is to its precise nature in some 
way other than that which we can observe and, second, that we cannot preserve 
intrinsic three dimensional properties within a four dimensional account. 
It is unwarranted, I contend, to assume that although we are unable to perceive 
the true nature of things as four dimensional (I do after all perceive there to be a 
difference in the nature of things' spatial and temporal extension where there is no 
difference at all), the perceptions that we do have are sufficient to determine enough 
of the true nature of reality to begin to formulate scientific laws that are, at least 
approximately, true. Consider the definition of force, in terms of Newtons (N), as 
Mass (kg) multiplied by acceleration (ms- I ). Thus a force of3 Newtons, and a mass of 
1kg will be coupled to an acceleration of 3ms-I . But, in order to recognise that an 
entity is accelerated at the rate of 3ms-I, one must be able to distinguish successfully 
between space and time, a distinction that does not appear to exist, at least 
objectively, within space-time. Moreover, it is from precisely this type of observation 
that the space-time theorist wants us to draw the conclusion that the true nature of 
reality is four dimensional. Hence, although our perceptions are illusory (inasmuch as 
they are not accurate perceptions of what there is), they are sufficient for us to 
determine the true nature of reality. This seems, at the very least, to be an inference in 
need of explanation 
One might argue that although such intrinsic properties as mass cannot be 
distinguished in the co-ordinate time, the values which we assign to the temporal 
location we find ourselves in, there is an objective distinction in the proper time and 
proper space of any entity. Nerlich (2004) argues for such a distinction, suggesting 
that such a distinction can be drawn, though only on a local scale (p. 26). This seems 
obvious. We do distinguish between space and time. Even if we cannot extend that 
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distinction beyond the immediate confines of our own spatio-temporallocation, that 
does not entail that such a distinction is not grounded in reality. 
But this simply serves to highlight my second point nicely. Nerlich assumes 
that our perceptions are correct, and that the intrinsic properties of entities are 
available to our examination precisely because we do distinguish between time and 
space. But why suppose that such a distinction reflects any genuine feature of reality? 
Why suppose that entities really do have mass, acceleration and the other three 
dimensional qualities that we attribute to them? If the nature of reality really is such 
that it is four dimensional and we are four dimensional beings who merely perceive 
reality three dimensionally, then there is good reason to suppose that the objects of 
our perceptions are illusory since the reality is four, rather than three, dimensional. 
Of course, this is latter consideration will not impugn the views of B-theorists 
if they can motivate some distinction between space and time such that time is 
somehow distinct from space within space-time. If that can be achieved then the B-
theorist would be perfectly entitled to offer some kind of four-dimensional account 
whereby four-dimensional entities - e.g. perduring stages or slices - are the truth-
makers for what we commonly think of as three dimensional intrinsic properties. But 
then it remains for the B-theorist to come to some genuine account of what it is for 
time to be a dimension of space-time that can prove genuinely distinct from space, 
contra Minkowski's original view. I see no obvious means of motivating such an 
account (see 3.4 and 3.5). 
3.3.3 QM, GTR and the scientific conception of time 
Finally, before moving on to attempt to reconcile B theoretic relations to space-
time, we ought to note that although so far we have been treating the space-time 
interpretation of relativity as representative of the "scientific" view of time this is not 
necessarily the case. Craig (2000b: pp. 92) notes eight different features of time that, 
in physics, we commonly attribute to time. 
1. One dimensional: time can be thought of as a collection of instants which can 
be arranged in a one-dimensional line 
2. Metric: time intervals can be measured such that two intervals can be said to 
have equal duration 
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3. Temporally global: the real variable t which we use to denote the measure of 
time goes through every real value from -infinity to +infinity. 
4. Spatially global: the time variable can be uniquely defined at all space points 
5. External: the flow of time is independent of the specific dynamics of the 
objects moving in time 
6. Unique: there are not many times, but just time 
7. Directional: it is possible to distinguish the past from the future of the time-
line 
8. Present: there always exists an ontologically preferred instant of time, the 
Now. 
Craig goes on to note that these features are referred to by the following ways of 
thinking of time. 
The Notion a/Time Used in: 
Natural Languages 
Thermodynamics 
Newtonian mechanics 
SR 
Cosmology 
GR - proper time 
GR - coordinate time 
GR - clock times 
Quantum gravity 
(p.93) 
has properties: 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
1,2,3,4,5,6 
1,2,3,4,5 
1,2,3,4 
1,2,3,5 
1,3,4 
1,2 
none 
It is easy to suppose, as Craig himself suggests (p. 93), that if we are to read off from 
the temporal properties of the theories in order to find out about time that we should 
conclude that there is no such thing as time. Barbour (1999), for example, maintains 
that time is unreal on the basis that the time invariant Schrodinger equation makes no 
reference to the temporal variable (p. 231).11 
Whether or not one should endorse such a move is less obvious. For example, 
the Friedman solutions to the field equations of the General Theory of Relativity 
II For discussion and criticism see Healey (2002) and Ismael (2002). 
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appear to posit an absolute frame of foliation. Such a frame has been used by Craig 
(2001: pp. 208-215) and Smith (2001) to argue that physics, rather than supporting a 
standard space-time interpretation of relativity, actually favours presentism as it 
seems to delineate a single hypersurface in space-time which appears to be in a 
continual state of change. 12 My point here is simply that it is not clear that the 
absence of any reference to time in one theory need not prove decisive, particularly 
since reference to time does occur in other theories that we also take to be true. 
In any case, we need to see what it is that these different modes of reference to 
time in different theories actually means for this analysis. The different conceptions 
of time drawn from different physical theories do not necessitate the falsity of the 
space-time interpretation of relativity or the TTT, or any other theory for that matter. 
What is entailed is that the scientific arguments carry less weight in support of the 
TTT than is commonly supposed. It is less than obvious quite what time is supposed 
to be according to physical analysis - if indeed, time is to be thought of as a real thing 
at all. There are, after all, reasons from scientific theories to think that space-time is 
not necessarily "the right answer" to questions concerning the physical nature of time 
and temporality. 
Hence, what we certainly should take from this is that the space-time 
interpretation of the special theory and its attendant time concept does not entail that 
presentism is false,13 for the concept of temporality offered to us by the special theory 
and the space-time interpretation finds itself in contradiction with the time concept 
offered to us by the physical theories, such as the Friedman model of the General 
theory. Further to this, we should also note that there are a number of technical 
difficulties (which it mayor may not prove possible to solve, 3.3.1-3.3.3) that need to 
be solved if the space-time theorists are to maintain that their position is coherent. 
Finally, despite claims as to the granting of operationalist significance to time, there 
appears to be no single and unified understanding of precisely what time is. Given the 
12 More specifically, Smith (2001) has argued, that because the space-time of the special theory is 
different to the space-time of the general theory - and not only is the General theory the more 
fundamental theory it is also the theory that applies to our reality, which the special theory does not -
that the special relativistic interpretation of space-time does not go through. Thus, the special theory 
does not rule out the existence of absolute simultaneity since it is not a theory that applies to our 
reality. I do not explicitly consider this argument here since the General theory, and its implications, 
remain largely beyond the scope of this work. 
13 Especially if, as Craig (2001: pp. 214-5) argues, there are empirical reasons for preferring the 
Friedman interpretation of relativity. 
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lack of an orthodoxy it seems paradoxical for the advocate of the TTT to claim that 
their view is aligned with that of modem science. 
It is with this final point in mind that we tum to the last section of this chapter, 
concerning attempts to reconcile space-time with B theoretic relations, and hence 
preserving some semblance of the TTT. Within the context of a space-time it should 
be possible, in principle, to equate temporal relations (roughly) with such physical 
processes as, e.g. causation, because we have an underlying feature of temporality 
prior to the physical process. However, as we shall see, although space-time is 
(possibly) a coherent theory as it stands, it does not appear to be possible to conjoin it 
to a coherent account of B theoretic relations. Moreover, it is less than clear that B 
theory, as the third strand of the TTT, is coherent either. 
3.3.4 Space-time and B relations 
In order to make sense of the B theory one must have some understanding of 
either what time is, or what temporal relations are. To say that one understands neither 
is to say that the theory itself is incomprehensible. If the B theorist adopts eternalism 
then time appears simply to be variation, much like space. But if time and space are so 
similar, then what is there that makes time sufficiently different to entail the existence 
of the temporal relations of the B series? 
Space-time offers us a way out for the B theorist here, for we can label one 
dimension of space-time as temporal. If we can do this then prima facie we can make 
sense of what time is. It is one of the dimensions of space-time; a dimension 
distinguished from the others, at least on a local scale, by the experience of passage 
which we undergo in accordance with the quantity of the temporal dimension that we 
traverse. It is perfectly acceptable to distinguish between earlier and later on 
metaphysical grounds, such that it is a metaphysical, rather than physical, fact as to 
whether an event is past or future - provided one is prepared to admit that B theoretic 
relations are simple and unanalysable. 
However, in order to accommodate such simple and unanalysable relations 
within the context of a Minkowski space-time one has to take "ontologically 
seriously" a view of space-time that is ultimately incoherent, a view that, if accepted, 
seems to remove the motivation for treating time and space as component parts of the 
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same reality and hence remove the one of the key motives for endorsing the TTT.14 
The first difficulty that one may come across in imbedding temporal relations in 
space-time is that space-time is not temporal. 
As Craig (2000b) notes, 
I think it is clear that the B-theorist will look in vain to relativity theory for 
justification of his claim that the B-series is a temporal series ordered by earlier 
than/later than. SR does not teach that time is a dimension of space-time; but 
under Minkowski' s formulation one dimension is temporal only because it has 
already been decided in advance that Minkowski 4-space is to be taken as a 
representation of spacetime. (p. 162) 
Without an account of at least one of these, of either time, or of B relations, we lack a 
coherent theory. The claim above was that space-time allows us to provide an account 
of what time is and therefore to provide a coherent theory - time is a dimension of 
space-time. But the cogency of this line of reasoning can be denied. Theories of 
space-time do not claim that time is a dimension of space-time, but that space and 
time are reducible to space-time. There is no such thing within a space-time manifold 
as a "temporal dimension." If there were, then we should have some grounding for 
time, which we do not, and we should also lose any explanatory power that space-
time has for us within the context of the special theory. For that explanatory power 
was based on the claim that there is no such thing as a temporal dimension, and the 
temporality is simply a matter of perspective, albeit four dimensional perspective. If 
we are now to say that temporality is a genuine feature of reality then we explicitly 
deny that claim. 
3.4 Evidence for a temporal dimension 
There is, of course, nothing intrinsic to the nature of space-time that reveals any 
one dimension to be the temporal dimension. Were one of the dimensions the 
temporal dimension we should expect that it would behave differently from the spatial 
dimensions when treated mathematically. One would expect there to be some 
14 There remain arguments from the General Theory that purport to favour the view the space and time 
are unifiable into a space-time, see Schwinger (1986: pp. 171-187). There are also reasons to suppose 
that this is not the case, see Craig (2000b: p. 121). I shall not discuss these here. 
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difference somewhere in the mathematics if space and time are not unifiable 
metaphysically. The question is, can we find some difference and thus permit the B 
theorist to say that time just is a dimension of space-time? There is one difference 
between the dimensions of space and time, but is unclear that this is sufficient to 
ground a distinction between space and time in space-time. The following passage, 
though speculative, is suggestive. 
But even though Minkowski spacetime can be described as a four-dimensional 
manifold, its metric (and hence the topology based on it) is radically unlike that 
of a Euclidean four-space. The Lorentz signature (+++-) marks a fundamental 
difference between time like directions and timelike separations on the one hand 
and spacelike directions and spacelike separations on the other. Mathematicians 
are tempted to discount this difference between time like and spacelike 
separations - they can transform Minkowski spacetime into a simple four-space 
by setting t=i"X4. True, but that is not a transformation of no consequence; a 
transformation that converts simple exponential functions into periodic ones is 
clearly a highly significant one. If there were some fundamental periodicity 
which underlay the fundamental rhythm of the universe, some ubiquitous 
chronon, say, then we might look to some cis("X4) (short for cos ("X4) + isin("X4)) to 
explain it in terms of a manifold more fundamental than time. (Lucas 1999: p. 7) 
However, the Lorentz signature fails to provide a genuine distinction between 
time and space, however, since one has, in the formulation of the equation, already set 
one of the axes as the temporal axis (c.f. Craig 2000b: p. 161). We know this to be 
true since in a purely geometric case it is still true that the mathematical equations 
will present one of the axes as the referent of the negative sign. And we are to be able 
to perform Lorentz transformations, albeit transformations within a 4-space, rather 
than a space-time. The fact is that the resultant negativity sign is nothing more than a 
product of applying trigonometry to imaginary four dimensional spaces. 
Thus, there are no grounds for inferring from the structure of a four-space to 
the existence of temporality as a component of space-time, though we do have some 
evidence of said temporality15 and, thus, we must admit that there is time and hence 
give some description of it. 
15 Our experience of passage and its correspondence with one of the dimensions of the spatio-temporal 
manifold should be sufficient to persuade us that one of the dimensions is temporal. 
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Craig's point (2000b: pp. 161-3), that there are no grounds for thinking that 
anyone of the dimensions is temporal, can be seen here. There is nothing intrinsic to 
the space-time structure itself, which appears as temporal. There is no objective 
mathematical distinction to be drawn between the spatial and temporal dimensions. 
But Craig argues that this lack of grounds leaves us with no reason to suppose that the 
B theorist has anything more than, 'an effete C-series' (p. 166). 
This is palpably false. There is evidence to suppose that one of these 
dimensions is temporal. This evidence is our perceptual experience, and this gives us 
at least some reason to suppose that the B theorist may employ simple and unalysable 
temporal relations within a space-time. Craig prefers the A theory since it can, or so 
he claims (pp. 149-158), give a reductive account of the metaphysics of B theoretic 
relations. According to Craig, since the A theorist can give an account of temporal 
relations which is not simple and unanalysable it is incumbent upon the B theorist to 
provide some such account. 
But one should not endorse Craig's claim. Each metaphysic of time will 
delineate a different set of irreducible metaphysical components. In the B theoretic 
case such relations are clearly B theoretic relations. It will not do for Craig to object 
that such temporal relations can be shown to be reducible to their A theoretic 
counterparts and are, hence, not irreducible. The B theorist will argue that, if Craig is 
correct, that this is simply a case of the conceptual apparatus of the A series, which 
does not correspond to any feature of reality, providing us with the ability to see how 
we understand these B theoretic relations - not how these B theoretic relations really 
are. Thus, it is not that the B theoretic relations really are reducible to their A theoretic 
counterparts, but that the way that we conceive of B theoretic relations is reducible to 
the way we think about A theoretic relations. Thus tells us nothing about the nature of 
B theoretic relations at all - only how we think about them. 
But the lack of grounding for temporality is certainly a concern for the B 
theorist. If these simple and unanalysable relations are to be imbedded into the 
structure of a temporal dimension then we should like to be able to distinguish 
objectively which of these dimensions is the temporal one. Not to do so would run the 
risk of not adequately defining the B theory properly. However, if the B theorists are 
sufficiently swayed by the ability of perceptual experience to delineate one of the 
dimensions as temporal then it is unlikely that such structural complaints will concern 
them, for they will most likely move to suggest that temporality be defined, not at a 
87 
global level - not in tenns of co-ordinate time - but at a local level - in tenns of 
"proper time." But in doing so it appears that the B theorist, and the advocate of the 
TTT, loses the support of the arguments from the special theory. 
3.4.1 Loss of explanatory power in "proper" quantities 
'Proper quantities emerge if we separate time from space locally' (Nerlich 
(2004: p. 26). Nerlich's project is an attempt to refonnulate talk about relativity into 
three dimensional B theoretic language - as opposed to the four dimensional language 
to which space-time would appear to lend itself. The relevance to our current project 
is clear: if we can fonnulate a genuine three dimensional description of reality then it 
must be the case that we can differentiate between earlier and later (albeit at a local 
level) and therefore give some account of what time is, and hence, with some account 
of temporality in mind we can then go on to say that B theoretic relations are simple 
and unanalyseable and still have at least some understanding of what is at issue. On 
this account time will tum out to be a local manifestation of one of the dimensions of 
space-time. 
Essentially, then, Nerlich is prepared to ignore the complaint raised in 3.3.3 
that there is no feature of the mathematical structure which reveals to us which of the 
dimensions is temporal. For him, the grounds for labelling one of the dimensions 
temporal are the local experiences that we have of one of the dimensions of the four-
space being consistently equated with the experience of passage. Thus, there must be 
something to that particular dimension that has these B theoretic properties in order to 
differentiate it from the dimensions that we refer to as spatial. But there is a price to 
pay for this move, and the price is the original motivation for thinking of space and 
time as unified into a space-time. 
In 3.1.2 we rehearsed the arguments from space-time separation to the 
conclusion that space and time are reducible to a four dimensional space-time 
structure which admitted of no clear distinction between the temporal and the spatial. 
The move was motivated by the fact that although the spatial and temporal separation 
of any two events may vary according to one's relative velocity, the space-time 
separation between the two events does not change. The value yielded by that 
separation, and the associated mathematics, is a constant. The spatial analogy 
considered was that of a homogeneous two dimensional space in which we saw that 
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the separation of any two events within the three dimensional space can be made to 
appear to differ according to perspective. However, the total separation between the 
two events can never be changed. The different perspectives that one takes on the 
events in the two dimensional spaces merely alter the quantity of separation one 
perceives there to exist in anyone of the directions that one labels a dimension. Once 
we recognise that the space itself lacks orientation, then we recognise that this is 
merely a perspectival matter and that there is no real alteration in the separation of the 
two events. 
If we apply parity of reasoning to the spatio-temporal case (which we are 
invited to do in order to see the cogency of the view)16, we see that we cannot 
incorporate Nerlich's view. The use of a space-time manifold to explain the constancy 
of space-time separation turns on the idea that each of the four dimensions is 
qualitatively identical. If they are not, if one of the dimensions has a quality that the 
others do not, then it is difficult to see how one can incorporate the claim that the 
difference in temporal perspective held by each frame of reference is to be explained, 
for each perspective must delineate a different dimension as the temporal dimension. 
Nerlich does seem to imply that there is a locally determinable fact of the matter as to 
which of the dimensions is the temporal one. 
Returning briefly to the arguments of the previous section it should be noted 
that they appear to add strength to the claim that it is difficult to imbed B theoretic 
relations into a space-time. If each of these space-time perspectives delineates a 
different dimension of the four dimensional whole as the temporal dimension then 
there is no fact of the matter as to which of the dimensions is "the" temporal 
dimension. This is a conclusion which leads us to the fact that there can be none of the 
"imbedding" of B relations that I called for above, because where one perspective 
may perceive any two events as temporally separated, another may perceive them to 
be spatially separated. This would entail that some of our supposedly temporal 
relations are not intrinsically temporal - they are only temporal from a particular 
perspective. In such a picture it is hard to see what "temporal" relations could be. 
16 c.f. Taylor and Wheeler (1966: pp. 39-47), Hey and Walters (1997: pp. 62-3). 
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3.4.2 B theoretic relations within a 3+1 space and time 
Suppose that the four dimensional perspective suggested by Minkowski and 
the space-time interpretation of relativity can be denied and that the B theorist can 
provide some means for distinguishing one dimension as the temporal dimension. 17 In 
such a case it seems that the B theorists can imbed their temporal relations perfectly 
well. If one of the dimensions is distinctively temporal, whatever that turns out to 
mean, then the B theorist can simply label one of the directions as later, and its 
opposite as earlier. We are forced to pay attention to this possibility since, although 
this move is revisionary, so is the theory of presentism, which suggests that the space-
time interpretation of the special theory is metaphysically, if not empirically, flawed. 
It will not do for us to admit metaphysical revisions on behalf of the presentist unless 
we are also prepared to admit them on behalf of the B theorist. Such conclusions seem 
perfectly cogent, and would give the B theorist a much stronger position. Although 
the precise nature of these relations would remain hidden from us their imbedding 
within a 3+ I framework would permit us to give some account of what time is and 
thus to have at least a coherent theory. 
It is to be admitted by the B theorist though, if they are to take this line, that 
one of their chief arguments against the presentist, the argument from the space-time 
interpretation of relativity, is no longer open to them. Further to this, since we denied 
that the semantic arguments favour either the dynamic or static conception of reality it 
is unclear now as to precisely what is motivating the TTT, or any B theoretic account 
of reality. The only remaining argument for the B theorist is the alleged falsity of the 
presentist's argument (see chapter six, and chapter seven for replies). 
3.5 Physical processes as grounding for B relations 
The B theorist has two tasks here; first to say what it is about time that 
differentiates it from space and second to say something about what a B theoretic 
relation is. The first is necessary to establish that there is anything at all within a static 
ontology that will mark it out as temporal, as opposed to spatial, and the second in 
17 The motives for doing so could certainly not come from the special theory, denying, as it does, the 
existence of a genuinely temporal dimension. Indeed, it is unclear to me why one would suppose such a 
theory to be true. 
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order to say precisely what the nature of that temporality is. It may be that the B 
theorist can survive without providing one of these. For example, if the B theorist tells 
us that time is a dimension, along which change is spread out, and that temporality is, 
as Oaklander (1996: p. 209) has it, a simple, unanalysable and irreducible component 
of a space like dimension; then it does not appear to me, contra Craig (2001: p. 159), 
that the A theorist can object. 
The only grounds that the A theorist could have for doing so are that the B 
theorist cannot tell us how that temporality, the experiences we have of change and 
passage etc, arise from the static nature of time; but (provided the move is 
metaphysically possible) since the B theorist is content to say that the nature of our 
temporal experiences are akin to the experiences of a secondary quality of passage 
arising from the conjunction of ourselves and the temporal dimension, it is not 
entirely clear to me what the B theorist could be expected to say. For whilst the A 
theorist is entitled to ask the B theorist for more information concerning how the 
experience of temporality arises I suspect that the B theorist is entitled to point to the 
difficulty in giving any account of how secondary quality experiences arise be they of 
colour, smell or temporality. So, provided the temporal structure of a quasi space-time 
is available the B theorists can construct their position as we saw in 3.4. 
3.5.1 B Time 
However, it is to be noted that it is not open to the B theorist to say that time is 
composed of unanalysable B theoretic relations and that, although time is a 
dimension, we have no way of distinguishing time from space. To do so is, once 
again, to fail in giving any sort of account of what time is. The most obvious 
distinctions between time and space come from causation since a non temporal 
universe is, intuitively, a universe that lacks causality, whereas a universe without 
spatial extension may still admit of causation between non physical entities. So, 
armed with the claim that, whatever time is it is a dimension (whatever that may 
mean), what are we to say about B relations? 
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3.5.1.1 Causation 
The (intuitively) marked distinction between time and space, in terms of 
causation, makes it clear why causation should be chosen as our first candidate for 
providing temporal relations within a B theoretic ontology. Causation appears to be an 
obvious difference between time and space. Thus, a tentative first formulation of 
temporal relations in terms of causal relations would be 
(1) x is earlier than y iffx causes y, and x is later than y iff x is caused by /8 
There are, however, three distinct problems that can be raised for (1). First of all (l) 
relies upon a concept of causation in order to formulate the distinction between earlier 
and later. But what is causation on the B theoretic account? It cannot be that causation 
is any kind of "bringing about" of an event (that would imply a dynamic account of 
temporality that is incompatible with B theoretic accounts) such that we could say 
something like, 
(2) x caused y iff, without the existence of x, either: (i) y would not have 
happened, or (ii) y would have been less likely to happen 
Of course, if (2) is right, then x may not be the cause of y but instead be a part of the 
causal structure that leads to y. But this matters not for our account of temporality: 
provided we have some kind of "arrow" to causation which distinguishes earlier from 
later then all will be well. Much then turns on whether or not one is prepared to accept 
the particular account of causation that goes hand in hand with a B theoretic ontology. 
If one does not, if one believes instead that 
(3) x causes y iffx brings about a state of affairs that did not exist and that state of 
affairs includes y 
18 Here I say nothing about simultaneity. It.s~erns to ~e that any th~ory that takes physical processes as 
prior to time will have difficulty .in detemumng what IS meant by SImultaneous; certamly on the causal 
account there is no obvious candIdate for the role. 
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then one will not accept B theoretic temporal relations as being accounted for by 
causation. However, I suggest that this might be a minor problem for the B theorists 
since it does not really impugn their position. No B theorist needs to accept (3); they 
can make do with the kind of account offered in (2). It should be noted, though, that 
although the criticism of the B theory is not fatal, its incompatibility with certain 
accounts of causation is certainly a mark against it. One might also note that it is not 
entirely clear that causation is up to the task of providing an "arrow" of time at all 
given the apparent lack of asymmetry in time (c.f. Price (1994: pp. 132-161). But 
these are footnotes to the argument. 
What I do not accept are arguments of the sort given by Craig (2000b), that 
include causality under the heading of "physical process" when used in arguments 
like the following. 
Attempts to ground temporal anisotropy and/or orientation In physical 
asymmetries are unconvincing even on the level of purely physical time. Physical 
asymmetries are neither necessary nor sufficient for time's having an arrow, and 
the merely de facto asymmetries which exist in nature do not serve to distinguish 
the earlier than direction from the later than direction. (p. 163)19 
The direction of causality, though unverifiable, may be the direction of time; and a 
genuine metaphysical direction of causation would certainly serve to distinguish one 
temporal direction from another. Of course it may be that the true "direction" of 
causality remains hidden from us, that it appears that causation is reversible; but our 
inability to determine which direction really is earlier does not prevent the causal 
analysis from giving us an account of which direction really is earlier or later. In other 
words, it is a metaphysical - rather than physical - fact that causation occurs in one 
particular direction. 
However, and this is a more difficult problem for the B theorist, it does seem 
that in order to formulate (2) we need some temporal structure first in order to allow 
the propagation of the causal influences ofx. (2) is really (4) in disguise. 
19 C . d not explicitly include causality under the heading of the physical arrows \vhich he as it 
raig oes ., ld h th . 
h . t . ct but I suspect that given the forgomg arguments It wou seem t at e assumptIon suc pams 0 reJe - .... .. . 
that causation is a physical process IS ImphcIt withm hIS argument. 
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(4) x at t caused y at t* iff, without the existence of x at t, either (i) y would not 
have happened at t*, or (ii) y would have been less likely to happen at t* 
The addition of the time clauses into (4) ought to be thought of as merely making 
explicit a part of (2), for without the specification of a time at which the events are to 
occur it is impossible to formulate any kind or causal relationship. By way of 
illustration consider any account of causation and the events x - the detonation of a 
bomb - and y - the collapsing of a bridge. Event x, the detonation of a bomb, does not 
necessarily contribute to the causal factors that lead to y, the bridge collapsing. It may 
be that x is too far away to effect y, or that x occurs after y. In order for them to be 
causally related it must be the case that the events in question are appropriately 
temporally located, whereby they are arranged such that x can physically influence y 
given their temporal separation. Thus in order to specify the cause of y, we must also 
specify the temporal location at which the cause, x, and effect, y, occur.20 
But, if the temporal relations earlier and later are to be cashed out in terms of 
causation, such that "x is earlier than y" is dependent upon x's causing y, then we will 
find ourselves unable to formulate a coherent account of said temporal relations. 
Consider our example of event x - the detonation of a bomb - and y - the collapsing 
of a bridge. To say that x is earlier than y is to say that x causes y; that x has the 
quality of causing y. But, implicit in this account of causation is the notion that x is 
earlier than y. If x is not earlier than y then x cannot cause y. If we permit backwards 
causation then we cannot say that x is earlier than y if x causes y, because x can be 
later than y and yet still cause y. To cash this out in terms of our example, we can say 
that the detonating of the bomb causing the collapsing of the bridge entails that the 
detonation of the bomb is earlier than the collapsing of the bridge, only if we accept 
that the property of being earlier is somehow distinct from the property of being the 
cause otherwise we cannot determine a direction of causation. If we admit that we 
cannot determine a direction of causation then we cannot use causation to provide an 
account of temporality. It is clear, then, that according to this analysis there must be 
20 N t that although it might be possible to specify that temporal separation be distinct from temporal 
doe d thus ground temporal asymmetry in causal asymmetry, this is not enough here, for we would °t~llerl ank n account of temporal relations which would remain simple and unanlysable; the mere s 1 ac a h d" 'h 'fr h asymmetry of time as a dimension would not be enough to say w at IstmgUls es ~lme om space- t e 
desideratum mooted at the outset of 3.5, For although one would be asymmetn~ whether the other 
would not, this is not to say what differentiates them, merely to say that they are different - somethmg 
that is not in dispute, 
something that we call temporal against which we can decide which direction is 
earlier and which direction later. Thus it becomes clear that a causal analysis must be 
imbedded within some kind of temporal structure if it is to yield a distinction between 
earlier and later. 
3.5.1.2 Counterfactuals 
David Lewis (1979) maintained that it is possible to ground the temporal 
"arrow" by recourse to a counterfactual analysis of causation, apparently without 
further recourse to a temporal structure. 
We can ... bring it about that the future is the way it actually will be, rather than 
any of the other ways it would have been if we had acted differently in the 
present .... The future depends counterfactually on the present. It depends, partly, 
on what we do now .... Something we ordinarily cannot do by way of "changing 
the past" is to bring it about that the past is the way it actually was, rather than 
some other way it would have been if we had acted differently in the present .... 
The past does not at all depend on what we do now. It is counterfactually 
independent of the present (p. 38) 
On the Lewisian account we are to explain the distinction between the past 
and future in terms of the counterfactual dependence of one set of events, the later 
events, and the independence of the other set, the earlier ones, on and of 
(respectively) the present. This provides a clear and concise distinction between time 
and space since no spatial regions are counterfactually dependent upon one another. It 
also allows that there is a clear distinction between earlier and later; the distinction 
between those counterfactually independent of the present, and those that are not. 
But once again there are problems. Upon the Lewisian account there are to be 
only exceptional (thereby allowing for backwards causation) true counterfactuals of 
the type, "if e2 had not occurred el would not have occurred," where e2 is later than 
el. To deny as much is to deny the counterfactual orientation of time's "arrow." 
However, as Bennett (2003: pp. 288-91) notes there appear to be cases where exactly 
this happens. 
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A competitive runner heads the pack until near the end of the race, when she 
stumbles, falls, and comes in last. I remark: "If she had won the race she could 
hardly have climbed the steps to the podium to get her medal, she was in so much 
pain from that fall." You reply: "Not so, because if she had won the race she 
would not have fallen [or: she would have to have not fallen".] (p. 290) 
It would seem that in this case if her loss had not occurred, she would not have fallen. 
This, being an example where e2 is later than el where el depends counterfactually on 
e2, appears to undermine what Lewis has to say about the orientation of temporality 
based on a counterfactual analysis. 
Even if we can rescue the Lewisian account from these types of example, 
which it seems to me one cannot, it still appears that the problem raised in 3.5.1.1 
recurs. On the Lewisian account an event is earlier than the present iff it is 
counterfactually independent of the present. It is reasonable to suppose that, since this 
makes no explicit reference to any temporal terms, it provides us with a suitable 
grounding for the directionality of time and, hence, for the distinction between earlier 
and later. But it would make no sense to speak of the counterfactual independence of 
those events earlier than the present as being earlier than the present unless one 
already had a clear concept of what it is for an event to be earlier than the present. 
Consider Joe the machine gun scout once again. 
If Joe fails to recognise that counterfactual independence and "earlier" are one 
and the same he can fail to signal to his machine gunners. Joe may fully recognise 
that certain actions depend upon certain others, but only if he recognises the direction 
of temporality can he then decide which direction that counterfactual dependence will 
take. In other words, Joe may know that the firing of his machine gunners depends 
solely upon his actions, but he cannot signal to them to make them act unless he first 
recognises the nature of temporality and then the further fact that later actions are 
dependent upon earlier ones. 
One would expect that if counterfactual independence were to fix the direction 
of "earlier" then that would be sufficient for temporality. Plainly it is not, since Joe 
can be aware of the counterfactual dependence of the firing on his actions and be 
unsure as to whether or not to act if he does not also know that counterfactual 
dependence and temporality have the same direction. Thus, whilst the direction of 
counterfactual dependence may be sufficient to give an orientation to time there does 
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not appear to be any obvious way that this also cashes out into an account of the 
nature of temporality. Without some concept of what temporality is, it is insufficient 
to say that temporality has a direction since we do not seem to know what temporality 
is! 
3.5.2 Irreducible B relations 
It is easy to see why, according to some B theorists, temporal relations are, as 
Oaklander (1996) claims, 'primitive and unanlyzable relations, and the difference 
between spatial and temporal relations is an irreducible qualitative difference' (p. 
209). What are we to say about such claims as these? They say little more about time 
than it just is this way and offer us little, if any, explanation for the temporal 
phenomena such as passage and the appearance of change. Nor do they offer us any 
good reason why we should have tensed beliefs. They do not tell us which feature of 
reality gives rise to such beliefs, or of what use they are in a reality that is not really 
dynamic.21 Obviously, a theory such as presentism that incorporates genuine change 
can easily make sense of such tensed beliefs and attitudes and it can also provide a 
coherent account of temporality (see chapters six and seven) and as such are to be 
thought of as superior. 
If the B theorists are to formulate their position though, they cannot rest here. 
Although it might be acceptable to declare that the distinction between time and space 
may not be clearly articulated, it will not then do to say that the temporal relations 
within that theory are also mysterious and incapable of definition. To say so is simply 
to throw one's hands up in the air and say that the whole thing is just beyond 
comprehension. One of the problems we shall come across later on in chapters six 
and seven are arguments from opponents of presentism who claim the theory to be 
either unintelligible or a mere triviality. If we lack a coherent definition of both what 
time is and what temporal relations are, then I would suggest that the B theory also is 
unintelligible. It would be reasonable to suppose that a theory could give us either an 
account of what time is or what is meant by temporal terms; but a theory that tells us 
the meaning of neither, tells us nothing at all. Hence, although prima facie, it might 
21 Dyke's (2002) argument that it is evolutionarily advantageous to have such attitu~es i~ questlOnab Ie 
since this does not explain why it is evolutionarily advantageous to have such behefs If they do not 
accurately reflect the true metaphysical reality. 
97 
be sufficient for the B theorist to tell us that time is a dimension of a 3+ 1 space-time 
all that the B theorist has really told us is that time is a bit like space and is also 
somehow sufficient to account for the nature of our temporal experiences! 
3.6 Conclusions 
In 3.1 the arguments from the special theory to the existence of space-time 
were rehearsed. It was argued in 3.2 that there may be a positivistic tone to some of 
these arguments. But it was also argued that simply because we cannot verify the 
existence of absolute simultaneity does not force us to conclude that absolute 
simultaneity does not exist. In section 3.3 we saw that the reason for the widespread 
success of the special theory is not that it relies on positivism, but that it provides a 
powerful and heuristically useful inference to the best explanation for many 
relativistic phenomena. The legitimacy of these explanations was then challenged. It 
was pointed out that although the space-time explanations of the special theory 
function extremely well within the context of relativity physics, once we move 
outside these small areas of explanation the space-time explanation is a very bad 
explanation inasmuch as it cannot be reconciled to other scientific views. 
In 3.4 it was argued that theories of space-time cannot accommodate genuine 
B theoretic relations and are, hence, incompatible with the TTT. It remains possible 
for us to reconstruct the space-time interpretation into a space and time, a 3+ 1 model. 
Finally, in 3.5, it was shown that physical processes cannot provide a grounding for B 
theoretic relations and, hence, that it is not at all obvious that one can coherently 
formulate a B theoretic account of time. One certainly cannot say that the TTT has 
any motivational support at any rate. 
The current state of play then, is as follows. In order to ground B theoretic 
approaches to time we need some clear notion of either time or these B relations. We 
need some notion of what time is; B relations will have to remain "simple" within the 
context of whatever we take to be time. However, space-time has not proved able to 
give us an account of what time is because theories of space-time deny that there is 
any component dimension that is time. B theories in general may be salvaged if we 
can find some 3+ 1 interpretation of space-time, the space-time interpretation of time 
may stand itself as a separate theory of time (though this would serve to go against the 
TTT as a whole), or we may opt for presentism. The upshot of this is that B theory is 
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not supported by arguments from relativity. The TTT as laid out in chapter 2 is not a 
strong theoretical whole since theories of space-time are not compatible with B 
theories, nor are there semantic arguments that favour the TTT. In chapter two I cited 
three main strands to the arguments in favour of the TTT: cohesion, science and the 
falsity of presentism. It should be obvious now, that there is no such cohesion and that 
the arguments from science do not favour the TTT. Moreover, it seems that the B 
theorist, quite independent from their concerns in trying to preserve the TTT, have 
other difficulties in defining the time and temporality of the B series. 
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In chapter four I: 
• 
• 
• 
Chapter Four 
Detail the claim that temporal passage is mind dependent and make some critical 
observations ofGrunbaum's argument (4.1); 
Argue that the neither Grunbaum, nor Dobbs et aI., have decisive arguments on the 
issue of passage (4.2); 
Argue that the experience of temporal passage is such that although it may be 
possible to account for it with static theories, it is unclear, given the forgoing 
arguments, why one should wish to do so (4.3); 
4.1 The phenomenology of temporal experience 
Herein I provide arguments against all static theories of time. I argue that the 
nature of temporal experience, of the elusive sensation of passage, is very difficult to 
accommodate within static accounts and given the forgoing discussion as to the 
failure of the TTT it is not clear to me why one should wish to support such an 
account of temporal experience. There are a number of problems that await our 
attention in this chapter, their common feature is the cognizance of nowness and 
passage. To put it in terms borrowed from Falk (2004) (who in tum borrows them 
from Williams (1951)), how do we get to the whoosh and the whiz that is a common 
to our phenomenological experience of time? There are two distinct avenues of 
enquiry explored in this chapter. First whether or not physics operates in a B theoretic 
manner, and second the viability of B theoretic accounts of the phenomenology of 
temporal passage. 
To begin with we tum our attention to Dobbs (1969) in his reply to Grunbaum 
(1971) 1 and his claim that the secondary quality account of temporal experience is not 
viable. It might, after all, be supposed that if physics shows reality to be static that we 
could endorse a B theoretic account of the phenomenology of temporal passage. What, 
then, is entailed by the claim that temporal passage is mind dependent? 
I A reprint of a paper that first appeared in 1967. 
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4.1.1 Mind dependent passage 
AdolfGrunbaum (1971) argued that the temporal becoming that we consider to 
be so basic a facet of temporal experience is, in fact, mind dependent and not a 
genuine feature of reality. 2 In much the same way as experiences of colour, texture, 
taste and the like can be taken to be Lockean secondary qualities, so Grunbaum 
maintained that becoming is dependent upon a cognizant mind. 
It is apparent that the becoming of physical events in our temporal awareness 
does not itself guarantee that becoming has a mind-independent physical status. 
Common-sense colour attributes, for example, surely appear to be properties of 
physical objects independently of our awareness of them and are held to be such 
by common sense. And yet scientific theory tells us that they are mind-dependent 
qualitites like sweet and sour are. (p. 196) 
So passage is purely mental, there is no physical reality to which it corresponds. 
Those who reason from the tensed nature of natural language to the conclusion that 
reality is dynamic, reason fallaciously according to Grunbaum. 
we must realise that some important seemingly tenseless uses of the term 'to 
exist', 'to occur', 'to be actual', and 'to have being or reality' are in fact laden 
with the present tense. Specifically, all of these terms are often used in the sense 
of to occur NOW. And by tacitly making the nowness of an event a necessary 
condition for its occurrence, existence, or reality, philosophers have argued 
fallaciously as follows. They first assert that the universe can be held to exist 
only to the extent that there are present events. Note that this either asserts that 
only present events exist now (which is trivial) or it is false. They then invoke the 
correct premiss that the existence of the physical universe is not mind-dependent 
and conclude (from the first assertion) that being present, occurrmg now, or 
becoming is independent of mind or awareness. (p. 205) 
If we accept the thesis that becoming is mind dependent then we accept something 
like the following negative thesis: 
2 A thesis to which the TIT is committed, as are theories of space-time, since neither of the aboye 
theories incorporate genuine passage. 
'what qualifies a physical event at a time t as belonging to the present or as now 
is not some physical attribute of the event or some relation it sustains to other 
purely physical events. (p. 206) 
And the following positive thesis: 
what is necessary so to qualify the event is that at the time t at least one human or 
other mind-possessing organism M is conceptually aware of experiencing at that 
time either the event itself or another event simultaneous with it in M's reference 
frame. (pp. 206-7) 
Hence, for Grunbaum, it makes perfect sense to say that without at least one human 
or other mind-possessing organism M there would be no temporal passage.3 Said 
passage is, literally, an illusion. Although this is a surprising conclusion, indeed one 
that is difficult to take seriously (c.f. 4.2.3), there is nothing prima facie incoherent 
about temporal passage being illusory. 
4.1.2 The nature of temporal experience 
Further to this, Grunbaum also details the nature of that perceptual experience 
of temporality. He says of an agent M's temporal experience at time t: 
M's experience of the event at time t is coupled with an awareness of the 
temporal coincidence of his experience of the event with a state of knowing that 
he has that experience at all. In other words, M experiences the event at t and 
knows that he is experiencing it. Thus, presentness or nowness of an event 
requires conceptual awareness of the presentational immediacy of either the 
experience of another event or, if the event is itself unperceived, of the 
experience of another event simultaneous with it. (p. 207) 
There might be a worry as to the use of the present tense in the above formulation, but 
as Grunbaum argues this is nonviciously circular. 
3 This organism need not be human. 
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For it serves to articulate the mind-dependence of nowness, not to claim 
erroneously that nowness has been eliminated by explicit definition in favour of 
tenseless temporal attributes or relations. (p. 209) 
We should also make explicitly clear that Grunbaum is not committed to the claim 
that the experience of temporal passage is a secondary quality, but that there is an 
analogy between secondary qualities and the experience of temporal becoming, viz. 
their mind dependence. Writing in defence of Grunbaum, Baker (1979) notes: 
The disanalogies, whatever they are, do not detract from the important but 
limited way in which nowness and redness are claimed to be analogous. The 
similarity is that the grounds for holding redness to be mind-dependent are 
analogous to those for holding nowness to be mind-dependent. (pp. 345-6) 
The key similarity, the one upon which Grunbaum and Baker take the analogy to tum, 
is that scientific theories fail to find either passage or colour in the external world. 
Physicists will, after all, be able to measure the wavelength, frequency and intensity 
of a beam of light, but there is no account within any scientific theory of the nature of 
light as we perceive it, or of a qualitative analysis of the sensation of "redness." 
Likewise, although our experience of temporality may include a sensation of passage, 
this is not something that any scientific theory will take into account. Science is 
interested in quantities, not qualities. 
4.1.3 Some notes on Grunbaum's method 
Grunbaum's reasoning for supposing that the B theory of time is correct, and 
that temporal passage is mind dependent will become clear as we proceed through our 
analysis. By and large the structure of his argument is sound, contra Craig (2000b: pp. 
127-45). One aspect of his positive arguments that I do not consider until 6.1 is his 
claim that the A theory (presentism) is incoherent. 
They first assert that the universe can be held to exist only to the extent that there 
are present events. Note that this either asserts that only present events exist now 
(which is trivial) or it is false. (p. 206) 
103 
If presentism did tum out to be false then I would suggest that Grunbaum may well be 
correct, temporal passage might have to be mind dependent. Although even this is far 
from clear; certainly there might be some doubts as to the veracity of such a claim in 
light of the incompatibility of static theories of time with our experience of 
temporality laid out in 4.3. 
Grunbaum's own positive arguments are something that we shall come onto in 
greater depth in a moment. It should be pointed out that the mind dependence of 
temporal becoming is normally seen as a solution to the problem of temporal 
experience within the context of the TTT. Now, however, we are forced to see the 
experience of temporal passage within the context of either theories of space-time or 
B theories of time since it was shown above that theories of space-time are not 
compatible with a B theoretic ontology (3.4 and 3.5 above). In order to pursue 
Grunbaum's avenue of explanation, one must be suitably persuaded and motivated, by 
the arguments from physics laid out (and argued against) in chapter three, or favour a 
B theory. 
It becomes incumbent on the B theorist, then, to motivate this account of the 
mind dependence of becoming. The space-time theorist has at least some support 
from physics (though see 3.3 and 3.4). With the semantic arguments ruled out as such 
a motive in 2.4.3, and the arguments from physics shown not to favour a B theoretic 
account, the B theorist rather needs Grunbaum' s arguments to carry some weight 
otherwise, although their claims as to the mind dependence of passage may tum out to 
be plausible, there does not seem to be any good reason to support them. There would 
be no arguments to motivate the B theory in the first place - unless of course 
presentism can be shown to be false. My purpose below is two-fold. First to show that 
no such motivation is forthcoming from Grunbaum's style of arguments (4.2) and, 
second, that the mind dependence of becoming should only be accepted if one can 
find reason to endorse a B theory. With no such reason forthcoming I argue that 
arguments to the mind dependence of temporal becoming should be rejected (4.3). 
4.1.4 A critique and criticism of the method 
But before proceeding to this analysis there are some observations that might 
be made against Grunbaum's mode of argument. A particular structure of argument 
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was noted above. It was claimed that arguments from the fact that physics does not 
reveal to us a dynamic reality entitle us to claim that reality is, literally, static. This 
mode of argument has been carried one stage further by Julian Barbour in The End of 
Time. He argues from the fact that the most fundamental equation that we have, the 
time independent Schrodinger equation, does not include a temporal variable, to the 
conclusion that time is not a real quality of the universe (p. 231). We can see this as a 
natural extension of the kind of arguments employed by Grunbaum since both infer, 
from the basis that physics can be constructed without the aid of a particular facet of 
temporality, to the conclusion that the facet in question is not real. 
However, if we are to take Barbour's and Grunbaum's argument seriously 
then we should also note that belief in God should be ruled out on similar grounds. 
Ultimately I believe that these types of argument leave us with a pseudo dichotomy. 
Either we must believe him that time is unreal and so is God, or that God might be 
real and, hence, that time might be real. The dichotomy is not genuine though. Since 
the arguments presented by Barbour are insufficient to show that God is unreal it can 
be seen that the same arguments do not rule out the existence of time at least as a 
collection of metaphysical qualities and / or relations. 
This is because looking carefully at the structure of Barbour's argument 
reveals something like the following: 
B 1) Time does not reveal itself to us in the equation that gIves us a complete 
description of the most fundamental level of reality 
B2) If Time were real then it would reveal itself in a description of the most 
fundamental level of reality 
B3) Therefore, time is unreal 
It seems to me that if Barbour is going to argue along such lines then the following 
argument should also go through: 
G 1) God does not reveal Himself to us in the equation that gives us a complete 
description of the most fundamental level of reality 
G2) If God were real then He would reveal Himself in a description of the most 
fundamental level of reality 
G3) Therefore, God is unreal 
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There are several further observations that we should make. Neither argument makes 
reference to the fact that Barbour believes temporality to be mind dependent. Barbour 
argues that, although time is unreal, the perception of temporality is mind dependent. 
Without cognizant agents there would be nothing like the temporal passage that we 
believe ourselves to undergo. Hence, in order to represent the structural isomorphisms 
of Barbour's arguments concerning time accurately, one might wish to replace (G3) 
with (G3)*. 
(G3)* Therefore, God is mind dependent 
The surprising conclusion that God is unreal seems to follow from the fact that He 
does not reveal himself to us in the most fundamental equations that we have 
available to us. Since such arguments are clearly false in their quest to determine the 
existence (or otherwise) of a God, it would seem inappropriate to suppose that they 
can determine the existence (or otherwise) of time as constituted by the qualities or 
relations of either the A or B series, or of time as construed as anything other than a 
physical entity of some sort. So before we can even begin to evaluate the content of 
Grunbaum's arguments from physics to the conclusion that the "now" is not 
privileged, we should note that the type of argument being employed is unsound. 
Although I think that this line of investigation is important we shall put to one 
side the claim that this type of argument does not aid the B theorist because the 
presentist position that I think needs to be defended does not obviously include 
temporal passage as metaphysical, but temporal passage as change in the physical. 
Hence, the view of presentism that I adopt requires there to be change of the sort that 
Barbour believes himself to have ruled out. 4 
4.2 Grunbaum and Dobbs 
Moving on, then, to an analysis of the content, rather than structure, of 
Grunbaum's arguments we see that the first of Dobbs' (1969) objections is that, 
4 Although as I have already suggested in chapter three I do not think that one needs to be unduly 
concerned by Barbour's arguments. 
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contra Grunbaum, an important part of physics does pay heed to the significance of 
the "now." 
there is a very large and important body of physical theory which deals with 
prediction in which the concept of 'nowness' is basic. (p. 318) 
This, according to Dobbs, is of particular relevance to our arguments since Grunabum 
attempts to motivate the need for a tenseless account of temporal becoming on 
scientific grounds. 
This consideration must weigh against Grunbaum's approach: since he says that 
it seems to him 'of decisive significance' that 'no cognizance is taken of nowness 
(in the sense associated with becoming) in any of the extant theories of physics 
(p.319) 
Note that if Dobbs is correct, if physics does have a cognizance of "nowness," then 
this does nothing to repudiate the second theme that we are exploring, the claim that a 
tenseless account of time can give a coherent account of temporal experience (for 
Dobbs is merely arguing here that there is no motivation from physics for thinking 
that temporality is mind dependent), although it will be of note to our first theme, the 
attempt to motivate a B theoretic account of temporality. If physics does not have a 
cognizance of "nowness" then its absence from such an analysis might be taken as 
suggestive of "nowness" not being a genuine feature of reality; thus, we should have 
to give some account of temporality that does not include a "moving now." A B 
theoretic account. 
4.2.1 Physics and "nowness" 
Dobbs argues that the nature of this "nowness" in physics must be such as to 
permit the intersubjective agreement as to which moment is "now." Without such a 
"now" it would not be possible to formulate predictions as to what will happen. This 
follows from the fact that if there is no privileging of the "now" given to a particular 
moment at which we wish to make a prediction as to the nature of the future, then it is 
not at all clear that we are predicting at all, for the future is simply "out there." 
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Furthermore, if there were no intersubjective agreement as to which moment is "now" 
we would lack the capacity for making predictions since we would never agree from 
which moment it is that we are supposed to be predicting. In other words, there would 
be no "now" from which to predict the future. 
Grunbaum's (1969) reply is that, 
Dobbs' objections ... , which invoke ... temporal asymmetries, rest on his failure 
to heed my explicit caveat not to confuse the tenseless 'past-future' asymmetry 
of earlier and later than to with the tensed one associated with the 'now' of 
becoming. (p. 151) 
This is perfectly cogent.5 Grunbaum is quite right to object to Dobbs, but only if 
Dobbs' argument is read as proving that Grunbaum's thesis, that physics does not take 
cognizance of "now", is false. What Dobbs' argument should be taken to show is that 
Grunbaum does not show that physics does not take cognizance of "nowness," but 
that it is possible that physics is, in fact, constructed in such a manner as to not have a 
cognizance of "nowness." After all, if we do not agree with Grunbaum that the past-
future asymmetry or tenseless temporal relations should not be associated with the 
"now" of becoming, then it seems unlikely that we should agree with Grunbaum that 
Dobbs has committed an error. Why should we heed Grunbaum's caveat and admit 
that we have committed the apparently confused act of equating the tensed "now" of 
becoming with the tenseless earlier-later asymmetry? The only reason that I can see to 
do so is to assume that B theoretic accounts of temporality are correct and, hence, that 
we should construct physics in such a way as to pay no heed to "nowness." 
But this is a quite different claim. If Grunbaum's arguments were to show that 
physics does not take cognizance of "nowness" then we should have an argument to 
motivate the B theoretic account (provided of course we can construct a coherent 3+ 1 
temporal structure into which B theoretic relations are to be embedded). If we must 
first accept B theoretic accounts that pay no heed to "nowness" themselves, then it is 
unsurprising that we should come to an account of physics that does not have a 
5 C.f. Ferre's (1970) remark that, 
The mental events of several perclplents, if ex hypothesi caused by practically 
simultaneously by intrinsically tenseless physical events, should be expected to show 
inter-subjective agreement on matters of tense. (p. 278) 
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cognizance of "nowness." Such arguments would do nothing to motivate a B theoretic 
account of temporality, unless, of course, it can be shown that physics is incompatible 
with presentism or that presentism is false. But that is a quite separate matter and it 
should be clear that Dobbs' objection, whilst insufficient to repudiate the B theoretic 
approach, is sufficient to remove one of the points of motivation for the B theorist. 
There is nothing on this evidence that is incoherent about a physics that does treat the 
now as ontologically privileged. Such a physics is merely one that takes onto logically 
seriously the tense built into acts such as prediction and observation. 
4.2.2 Physics treats the past as different from the future 
In a similar vein to the arguments discussed in 4.2.1, Dobbs also argued, 
contra Grunbaum, that physics does treat the past and future differently. In 4.2.1 we 
noted that in order to be able to make predictions physics must recognise the now as 
privileged in some sense, as the point from which we are to make predictions about 
the future. If we pursue this to its logical conclusion then it also becomes apparent 
that the future must be different from the past, and must be treated as such, otherwise 
physics would have no objective grounds for making predictions about the future but 
not the past. A contradiction would then ensue: we would be required to think of the 
future both as fixed, as we do of the past, and open to prediction, and of the past as 
open to prediction, as we do of the future, and fixed. Since physics does treat the past 
and future differently (after all we only make predictions about the future) it seems 
reasonable to suppose that physics does have cognizance of a distinction between the 
past and future. 
Grunbaum's (1969) response to this is the same as his response to the 
arguments discussed in 4.2.1. He argues (p. 151) that to think that physics does 
differentiate between past and future is to confuse the earlier / later distinction (the 
legitimate tenseless distinction) with a tensed distinction between past and future. 
Grunbaum's inference then continues that since no such distinction can be found in 
physics, no such distinction exists. But, as was noted above, to stipulate that physics is 
to be constructed along B theoretic lines and then to stipulate that the past / future 
distinction is not a genuine feature of reality because it does not appear in physics is 
entirely, and viciously, circular. If physics can be founded along A theoretic lines, and 
I see no reason that it may not, then it seems perfectly reasonable to suppose that 
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these differences mentioned in 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 should be taken as indications as to the 
nature of reality. The only reason that one would suppose that no such difference does 
occur in physics is if one has already decided on the veracity of a B theoretic 
construction of physics. 
But, perhaps the more pressing point here is not that physics treats the past as 
different from the future, but that those engaged in physics, e.g. the physicists 
themselves, treat the past and future as if they are distinct. After all, it is not that the 
laws of physics themselves are being used to help articulate a distinction between the 
past and the future; rather, it is being suggested that those engaged in the acts of 
physics, the acts of experimentation, prediction etc., behave in such a way as to lend 
support to either a dynamic or static approach to time. It is physics qua method that is 
at issue here, rather than physics qua content. Of course if we accept such claims then 
it is unclear that we have achieved any more than a restatement of the stalemate above 
when considering the need for an intersubjective agreement among experimenters. 
As with the arguments from semantics, then, there appears to be (certainly 
with the arguments presented thus far) nothing decisively in favour of either a 
dynamic or static model of time. In the semantic case we noted that it is unclear 
whether or not the inelimenably tensed nature of beliefs and attitudes ought to be 
taken to imply that reality is itself dynamic, or that our beliefs and attitudes are 
"tensed". In the arguments just presented there is an obvious parallel: physics (or at 
least physicists) like natural language, gives the appearance of including a distinction 
between the past and future and also appears to privilege the now. But whether this 
distinction is merely empirical or in fact ontological, does not appear to be revealed 
by the debate between Grunbaum and Dobbs. 
What Grunbaum's arguments do show is that it is possible to construct physics 
along lines that are essentially B theoretic. They do not show that physics is B 
theoretic, for all that Grunbaum does is give us a cogent account of physics that 
already presupposes a B theoretic ontology and then explains how the apparently 
ineliminably tensed statements of physics can be reduced therein. But, a neo-
Dobbsian needn't be satisfied by such arguments. Although Grunbaum' s account is 
perfectly cogent, so would be an account that accepted that the statements of physics 
are ineliminably tensed, and that the distinction between prediction of the future and 
recording of the past points to a legitimate ontological distinction between the past 
and future, and that the apparent privileging of the now is a genuine feature of physics 
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and all the sciences. As with the semantic arguments discussed in chapter two there is 
no obvious motivation for favouring either side. 
4.2.3 Grunbaum's theory is "silly" 
The third of the objections Dobbs ratses for Grunbaum is the first to be 
considered that can actually be said to actually weigh in on either side of the debate. 
Dobbs argues that Grunbaum's notion, that reality lacks an objective distinction 
between the past and future and also the quality of "nowness", is silly, in Broad's 
sense. By "silly" what we mean is a theory that is not taken seriously by non-
philosophers or, indeed, philosophers themselves outside their technical deliberations. 
Dobbs argues that Grunbaum's account of temporality is just such an account, since 
physicists themselves behave in such a manner as to make one suppose that there is an 
objectively existing property of "nowness" and a distinction between the past and 
future. 
Grunbaum's reply is interesting. He notes that Dobbs is correct, that his is not 
a theory that takes seriously our prethereotical beliefs and intuitions, but that this is 
not a problem. For, argues Grunbaum (p. 151), his task is not to describe a 
metaphysics that accords with our pretheoretical beliefs and intuitions, but to describe 
a metaphysics that has the ability to make sense of the reality of time if it turns out 
that time is a static ordering of B theoretic relations. To make sense of such an 
account one needs an account of temporal passage that does not entail genuine change 
and, hence, Grunbaum attempts to provide one. 
Although there is nothing prima facie wrong with developing this line of 
response to Dobbs, it is to be noted that this is the first point which can be seen as at 
all instructive in our attempts to construct a metaphysic of time. Dobbs' objection, 
that Grunbaum's view pretty much contradicts our pre-theoretical beliefs about time, 
is a first point from which to begin to attack the theories opposed to presentism.6 The 
notion of temporal experience arising from the nature of our existence in the world, 
rather than the world itself, is a highly counterintuitive belief that is hard to accept. 
This is not to say it is false; far from it. But to say that the view is counter intuitive in 
the extreme might sow the seeds of rejection in our minds, as might the absence of 
6 Both theories of space-time and genuine B theories are prone to this line of objection. 
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any discernible motivation for accepting the theory. Of course, it might not! A view 
that I claim to be counter intuitive may appear as clear and obvious to another. But 
there does seem to be something highly out of the ordinary about prescribing that 
temporal experience does not arise from change in what there is, but from our mode 
of being in reality. 
Equally, the analogy with secondary qualities does not hold true here, as I 
suspect that Grunbaum and Baker might admit. 7 For where in the case of colour we 
now know that "colours" do not reside in entities themselves, but in the mind, and it is 
the property of reflecting light of a certain frequency that is held by the object, there is 
no obvious parallel with the temporal case. There is no causal mechanism through 
which we can explain away our intuitions about reality and so these intuitions and pre 
theoretical beliefs remain as nagging doubts in need of some more structured 
explanation. For in the temporal case there is no "time signal" to impart the properties 
of temporality into the mind, nor is there any other signal or mechanism. The 
proponent of the mind dependence of temporal becoming has to stipulate that 
somehow the experience of temporal becoming just does happen.8 
Given the lack of structural isomorphism between the secondary quality cases 
and the temporal case there is a suspicion that there is no real explanation that is being 
offered here. What we are being told is that the B theory of time is correct (although 
there appears to be no motivation for it), and, since temporal experience is a 
phenomenon in need of explanation, that temporal experience arises from our mode of 
being in that reality is simply a brute fact. Such claims serve to exacerbate the concern 
that the notion of mind dependent temporal passage is a "silly" theory. 
4.2.4 Mental becoming necessitates physical becoming 
The fourth, and final, objection that Dobbs raises for Grunbaum is the most 
problematic, though it too can be solved. 
'unless this [intersubjective] agreement is founded on some objective common 
counterpart to the mental 'now', which causes our individual brains to register 
7 Their claim is not, after all, that temporal experience is an experience of a secondary quality, but that 
the two experiences are analogous inasmuch as neither reports a genuine feature of reality. 
8 Although see Falk (2004) and 4.3 of this chapter. This line of objection should only be taken as a 
criticism of the early B theoretic accounts, e.g. those of Grunmbaum and Baker. 
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'now' with practical simultaneity, it is impossible to see why I should not be 
contrary, and hold that 'now it is twelve noon on Queen Anne's birthday in the 
year 1700'. In other words, unless the mental becoming of the experience of the 
specious present is occasioned by the physical becoming present of the 
neurophysical events underlying the consciousness, the fact of intersubjective 
practical simultaneity would be explicable only in terms of a miraculous pre-
established (spiritualist) harmony (pp. 321-2) 
In essence, Dobb's claim revolves around the notion that mental becoming 
necessitates physical becoming. As with each of the previous cases Grunbaum (1969) 
has a response; but in this case his reasoning is questionable. 
I had noted that a physical event tenselessly occurring at time t can readily 
produce effects in each of several percipients such that at practically the time t 
each percipient is first aware of its occurrence. (p. 152) 
An agent M, at t, will be aware of event E, as will another agent, N. At t*, M 
and N will not be aware of E, but of E*, because M and N will be simultaneous 
with E or E* respectively. 
But Grunbaum's pattern of explanation is faulty as was noted by Ferre 
(1970). 
At, exists (occurs tenselessly) at clock time tt, and that it is also true in my life's 
career that a different "now" - awareness event, A2, exists (occurs tenselessly) at 
clock time t2. In the universe depicted by Grunbaum both events have equal 
claim to existence; neither clock time tl nor t2 has any intrinsic claim to 
privileged status as more "really" now ( ... ) than the other. Suppose, further, that 
it is a phenomeonological fact that A2 fills my subjective field of awareness, not 
AI. Why? 
It will not do for Grunbaum to answer that I am uniquely experiencing A2 
simply because it is clock time t2. Objectively speaking, on his view, it is 
(tenselessly) no less clock time tt, and at time tl a "now" -awareness event Al no 
less genuinely exists (occurs) for me. Yet I find myself involuntarily 
discriminating against time tl and its associated event AJ with no objective 
ground whatever to account for this. (p. 279) 
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Thus, it appears that the expenences that we each have of mental becoming 
necessitate a genuine account of physical becoming.9 There is nothing in the 
Grunbaumian account to explain the apparently unique nature of each moment of my 
temporal experience. 
4.2.4.1 Mental becoming does not necessitate physical becoming 
But, in a stay of execution for static theorists, there is an important point 
missed by Ferre (and Craig) in arguments from the appearance of mental becoming to 
the reality of physical becoming. Ferre reasons as follows: 
(Fl) At time tI, X experiences Al 
(F2) At time h, X experiences A2 
(F3) At time t2, X discriminates against tl 'with no objective ground whatever' (p. 
279) 
To the conclusion that 
(F4) There must be objective physical becoming to account for this 
But the move from (F3) to (F4) is fallacious. It fails, I suggest, to take into account 
the fact that discrimination between times is reflexive, or at least would be on a B 
theoretic account. At time tl, X discriminates against h, in the same way that, at time 
t2, X discriminates against tl. But that does not entail that there is physical becoming, 
but that at each time at which a cognizant agent is located that they will discriminate 
against other times on the entirely objective basis that they are not simultaneous with 
that temporal location. 
The falsity of Ferre's argument rests upon the assumption that the perceived 
uniqueness of X's mental experience at tl or t2 represents a genuine feature of reality 
- that it really is a unique mental experience. If we allow that such experiences exist 
[tenselessly] at all times at which they are located then it is perfectly plausible that 
9 c.f. Craig (2000b: chapter 7) 
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one will be able to build up an account of the mind dependence of temporal 
becoming. 
The following consequences, then, are the relevant ones for us to take away 
from this discussion of Dobbs and Grunbaum. Dobbs' arguments do not prove the 
impossibility of the mind dependence of temporal becoming - though they do point to 
the difficulty that many will have in accepting this as a serious metaphysical 
possibility. Equally, however, none of Grunbaum's arguments should be seen as 
decisive in proving that the B theoretic mind dependent account of time is true. If we 
pause briefly in order to weigh up the pros and cons of the arguments for the space-
time, or the B theoretic approach to time, then it should be noted that there are no 
motives for accepting a B theoretic version of the TTT. We cannot move from the 
claim that semantics is tenseless to the claim reality is B theoretic. Nor can we derive 
any motivational support from science, since theories from space-time appear to be in 
opposition to the TTT. And, as we have seen here, the structure of science favours 
neither view since both the presentist and B theoretic approaches to time could be 
made to fit with the acts commonly associated with science. 
What I argue in 4.3 is that, given the state of affairs described, it seems 
unreasonable to ask that we go so far as to accept the B theoretic account of the mind 
dependence of passage. Thus, although such theories may remain as genuine 
metaphysical possibilities, the existence of an explanatory gap in the B theoretic 
account should be seen as a reason not to accept the TTT either in part or in whole. 
Further, in chapter five I show why such theories have been supposed to be viable 
when they are not so. 
4.2.5 Can physics coherently deny the reality of time? 
A question for the space-time theorist who denies the independence of time 
from space-time is that it very much appears that they are denying the reality of time. 
This inference may appear confused but does, I think, prove acceptable. If there is no 
such dimension of a space-time which is time, then there is no such thing as time. 
Rather, the time of our perceptions will tum out to be a secondary quality - as with 
the B theory accounts - but unlike the B theory accounts there is no distinct thing that 
time is. Put another way, since space-time is, presumably, not space and time, but 
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something more fundamental, i.e. a space-time, then it follows that neither space nor 
time are real. 
The question is, then, can physics coherently maintain such a position? I think 
that the answer is yes, but that one has to be more careful than some physicists and 
philosophers have been. Healey (2002) argues as follows: 
HI) There can be no reason to accept a theory that does not fit the evidence (p. 299-
300) 
H2) Part of this "evidence" is our experience of some events occurring after others 
(e.g. predictions and then tests) 
Therefore, 
H3) To deny the reality of time is 'epistemically incoherent' (p. 300)10 
Healey is right, but only in part. One cannot infer directly from experimental 
outcomes, which appear to require temporal passage, to the conclusion that time is 
unreal. But what can be done, and what I suspect that physicists take themselves to be 
doing, is to infer from the results of experimentation to the best explanation for the 
observed phenomena. Thus, the physicists can coherently deny that time is real. But it 
remains open, then, to the "tensed" theorist to argue that the so-called "timeless" 
solution is not the best explanation, and it is also open to the tensed theorist to make a 
metaphysical case against the timeless solution since an inference to the best 
explanation must take all factors into account, not merely non-metaphysical factors. 
To put the point simply, any metaphysics that takes time to be real seems preferably 
to an ontology that does otherwise - at least, that seems to me to be the most obvious 
approach. 
4.3 Temporal experience. 
Within a static theory such as the TTT there is no sense in which the year 3000 
will come into existence, or that it is marked off from us by some ontological 
10 Healey's own view seems to be that this suffices to do away with quantum mechanical cases such as 
those proposed by Barbour, but not the General relativistic case which claims time to be unreal. 
However, in order to circumvent the question Healey proposes a redefinition of motion from being a 
primary to secondary quality. Thus, in the General theory, motion (change) is real, but is a secondary, 
rather than primary, quality. 
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division; the year 3000 simply exists [tenselessly] standing in a "later than" relation to 
our current time. If we adopt any so-called static approach to time then we appear to 
have a problem of temporal experience. We do, or so it seems, have certain 
experiences of time that are suggestive of passage; thus, when I am sitting by a river it 
appears to me that the river is passing me by. It seems insufficient to say simply that I 
am located at the river in state s, at time t, and I am also located at the river in state s* , 
at time t* and I am also located at the river in state s** at time t** and so on. It is 
insufficient because I have a sensation of passage from one moment to the next. Such 
an experience is a problem for the B theorist because the B theorist claims that 
everything stands in the permanent relations of the B series. Nothing is really doing 
the moving that I believe myself to perceive on the river, nor is one time mysteriously 
slipping past only to be replaced with another. The B theorist cannot even grant the 
concession that the mind is moving from one time to another - providing that 
sensation of passage - for the B theorist claims that absolutely everything that there is 
exists tenselessly and stands in the earlier than and later than relations of the B series. 
Likewise, if our static theory is of a non B theoretic type, perhaps a theory of space-
time, then there is no room for this genuine change either, as this would contradict the 
claim that all entities exist [tenselessly] within a space-time manifold, or in some C 
series. Thus, the core thesis of static time theories is that they do not take seriously the 
notion of becoming. But how, then, are we to make sense of experience temporal 
becoming? 
The traditional, and well documented (see 4.1), view is that the perception of 
passage is purely psychological and that it can explained by simple recourse to an 
analogy between our perception of colour and our perception of change. When I see 
the table before me to be brown I know, or so it is argued, that the table itself is not 
really brown, but my neurological interpretation of the particular light waves that 
reach my eye from the table is such as to represent to me the colour brown. Browness 
inheres, not in the table, but in my mind. The static theorist argues that there is an 
analogy here, or at least the potential for one if one accepts the motivations for B or C 
theoretic understandings of temporality. In the same way that the perception of a 
particular colour inheres only within my mind, impinging in no direct fashion upon 
the nature of the object of my perception, so the phenomenology of temporal passage 
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is to be explained, not by reality of temporal passage itself, but by my perception of it 
at each time that I exist. I I Dainton (2001) puts it well when he says; 
The pain I felt on my last visit to the dentist a year ago is every bit as real as the pain 
I will feel on my next visit, six months from now. Since pain exhibits phenomenal 
passage, both of these pains, past and future, possess this characteristic as and when 
they occur. In talking of 'passage' I am referring not to any coming-into-being and 
departing-from-being that experiences undergo, but to an intrinsic feature that 
experiences possess as they occur: for example the characteristic flow internal to 
auditory sensations. The four-dimensional world-view is quite compatible with 
experience possessing these phenomenal features, provided that experiences always 
(in a timeless sense) possess them at the times when they occur. (p. 178) 
Thus our sense of temporal passage is not a genuine feature of reality, but mind 
dependent. 
As has already been noted, the static theorist purports to be able to explain the 
experience of temporal passage by the existence of secondary qualities in what is in 
fact a changeless, permanent reality. There are already criticisms of this mode of 
explanation in the literature, see e.g., Ferre (1970), Dobbs (1969), Zwart (1973: p. 
131) Capek (1961: pp. 164-5), Schuster (1986), Hestevold (1990), Craig (2000b: 
chapter 7), though none of them strike me as fatal to the TTT theorist's view. In 4.3 I 
want to draw attention to the following claims. In Grunbaum' s account, what we 
might think of as the standard B theoretic account, there is a problem. The arguments 
taken to favour B theory might be said to take the following structure. First we claim 
that reality is static, we claim that for some reason or another reality is B theoretic. 12 
Once we have accepted this claim, we are then left in the problematic position of 
explaining why it is that we perceive there to be temporal passage, if such passage is 
not a genuine feature of reality. Now, if one can motivate the B theory then it might 
be sufficient for us to simply claim that the mind dependence of passage, although 
perhaps unpalatable and counterintuitive, is a necessary consequence of a theory that 
is obviously correct. In other words, given the power of the TTT as an explanatory 
model, we should find it within ourselves to forgive it this one small deficiency; the 
II C.f. the 4.1. Here, though, I am less interested in the method employed by Grunbaum et ai., and more 
interested in the consequences of developing their line of thought. 
12 Once again I ignore the possibility of a C theoretic account. 
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counter intuitiveness of the mind dependence of passage. But, as I have shown above, 
the TTT is not the explanatory model that it was supposed to be when it was laid out 
in chapter two. Instead of forming a coherent and powerful whole, the various 
components of the TTT now appear unrelated at best and, at worst, to be disparate and 
contradictory. Hence, it is unclear why we should accept the problem that I will now 
outline. 
There is an explanatory gap that we should not wish to endorse right at the 
heart of B theoretic explanations of the sensation of temporal passage. It can also be 
shown that those models that purport to close the explanatory gap fail to do so, and 
that they fail is due to the shared claim that reality is B theoretic. What this then 
leaves us with is something like the following: there are no good reasons for 
supposing reality to be B theoretic, and yet we must - according to the B theorist _ 
endorse an account of temporal experience that entails an explanatory gap where, if 
we accept a dynamic theory of time, no such gap need exist. 
4.3.1 The explanatory gap13 
The explanatory gap I have in mind here is how we are to move from the static 
ontology of the B theory to the phenomenology of flux and passage. 14 The precise 
nature of said passage is notoriously difficult to pin down. Perhaps Williams (1951: p. 
299) puts it best when he says, '[W]e find passage, ... we are immediately and 
poignantly involved in the whoosh of process, the felt flow of one moment into the 
next'. The core of the concept of passage is, I think, that we experience what we 
believe to be a continual state of change, both within ourselves and without. We 
experience a succession of thoughts as well as a succession of perceptual inputs and, 
in addition, we seem to somehow experience their motion and change. It is not, for 
example, that we simply perceive there to be a number of distinct states of affairs in 
the world around us, nor is it that we come upon a number of distinct thoughts and 
impressions. We need to build into these distinct thoughts and impressions some 
notion of passage. However we are to couch this claim, that there is passage, it must 
13 The term was originally coined by Joseph Levine (1983). Most commonly the notion of an 
explanatory gap is used to argue against a physical reduction of consciousness, see McGinn 1989, 
Chalmers 1996 and Nagel 1998. I use the term here in a slightly different fashion as will become clear. 
14 As it turns out there are two explanatory gaps here, but whereas presentism is prone to only one, the 
TIT is prone to both. 
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surely be acknowledged that these distinct states of affairs, thoughts and impressions, 
are related to one another through their succession. What is at the heart of the matter 
is that these states of affairs, internal and external, give at least the appearance of 
being in a continuous state of change and that these changes occur in succession with 
change from one state of affairs to another. 
The explanatory gap in this context is the gap between the fact that reality is B 
theoretic and does not admit of passage, and the phenomenology of passage that we 
experience. On the one hand it seems that reality is static, and on the other we 
experience succession and change. In claiming that the quality of such perceptions is 
mind dependent the B theorist commits to the view that, in much the same way as red 
is to colour in the world, so the phenomenology of passage is to time. In the case of 
the perception of redness, we commonly accept that redness is not something that 
literally inheres within the object of our perceptions, but that it is the conjunction of 
various factors that gives rise to the experience of redness. Those factors may include 
the arrangement of photo reflective particles on the surface of an object, the internal 
structure of light and the firing of appropriate nerve endings within the brain. In the 
same way some objective feature of the temporal direction, whatever it is that makes 
things earlier and later than one another, must give rise to the feeling of succession 
where there are mere static relations. 
One might note that there is an immediate objection to the B theorist here. In 
the case of redness there is a clear and discernible physical mechanism that gives rise 
to this sensation of redness. Hence, even though there may be an explanatory gap 
between the physical explanation and the qualitative sensation, it is still clear that 
there is some kind of explanation in play here. Matters are not so simple however and 
as we shall see below there are creditable attempts to close the explanatory gap.I5 
4.3.2 Attempting to close the gap 
The most recent, and extensive, attempt to explain the experience of temporal 
passage comes from Falk (2004). Falk argues, contra Mellor (1998: pp. 68-9), that the 
phenomenology of temporal experience must be directly related to the sensory 
apparatus with which it is perceived as opposed to being extrinsically dependent upon 
15 C.f. the line of argument developed against Grunbaum and Baker in 4.2.3. 
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factors such as A theoretic beliefs. His argument is founded upon the claim that 
Mellor's type of explanation fallaciously imports beliefs into the account where none 
are needed. As Falk puts it, 'I for one cannot have non-A-perceptions' (p. 221). Ifit is 
not possible to have non-A-perceptions, when it seems reasonably clear that I can take 
no A belie/toward a particular perception, then Mellor's claim is false. 
Falk attempts to provide a biological explanation for the production of the 
sensation of temporal passage and, thus, attempts to provide a similar kind of 
explanation of temporal passage to that which can be given to the perception of 
colour. There are two thought experiments that Falk would have us entertain, one in 
which we think of the self as a negative feedback system, and another where we think 
are to empathise with an hypothetical scheduler. 16 The first of the two experiments 
proceeds as follows. Most, if not all, biological entities constitute what we might call 
negative feedback systems. Falk cites the example of a bacterium that has the capacity 
to activate a gene if an enzyme's concentration falls too low (p. 223). The point of 
Falk's arguments is to get us to think about the act of sensing time. It could be that we 
perceive time indications (whether the action is now, past future etc.?) as a result of 
some feature of the feedback that we observe through our perceptions, or it could be 
that our perceptions themselves convey the time indication. 
The time of the information is not conveyed in the way the rest of the 
information is, that is, by representational content. Rather, the time of the 
information, as well as the sequencing of the bits of information, is represented 
by the time of the receiving of the information. (p. 222) 
Noteworthy is the claim that such representations are objectively untensed as can be 
seen from the fact that, according to Falk, the terms'!, and 'now' function in the same 
manner. 'Calender time theorists can maintain that perceptual direct attribution 
creates nowness just as it creates I-ness (p. 224). 
If this is true, if the nature of the indexical terms is so similar, then we must 
find some way of how we perceive this "whoosh and whiz." 
The capturing of temporal information by direct attribution has the effect that 
information must be continuously flushed from the rudimentary feedback system 
16 It is the first of these experiments that will occupy our attention here. 
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and replaced by the information appropriate for the new time. For, in order for 
the perception to be true of the time it is about, it can only last as long as that 
time does. If the perceiver is not to be deceived, the information about a date can 
only be information for it when (i.e., at the same time as) the perceiver is at that 
date. (p. 225) 
This "flushing" is, apparently, what generates our sense of passage. Falk asks us to 
imagine what it would be like to be a negative feedback system and then to 
'momentarily endow it with a what-it-is-like-to-it-for-it-to-collect-and-flush-
information and then empathize' (p. 225). In Falk's opinion the only way we could 
imagine such an act of collecting and flushing is of imagining a sense of passage. I7 
However, Falk is wrong. If I go into the "inner life" of such a being then I do 
not need to imagine myself with such an experience. If I am a being whose inner life 
can be described tenselessly then what I must imagine is an act of flushing and an act 
of collection. The two acts will either have to be contemporaneous, in which case the 
existence of two said acts will merely [tenselessly] appear to occur at the same time 
and at said time some data is lodged into memory and replaced by new, or they will 
both occur within such a short interval of time of one another that both occur within 
the same specious present. But in this latter case it is no more clear that the twin acts 
of flushing and collecting will provide an experience of passage than it was above. All 
that needs to be perceived by a being undergoing such a perceptual change, if the 
tenseless theory is correct, is the acquisition of a particular set of data at the expense 
of another set of data. 
There are two things to say about Falk's account, other than to observe its 
ingenuity. First we might note that it does provide something akin to the type of 
explanation that we are able to give in the case of colour discussed above. In the same 
way that we talk about colour perception being due a range of physical features such 
as the photo reflective qualities of the surface particles of entities, the structure of 
light radiation and appropriate neurological activity, talk of the mind dependence of 
temporal passage can now be described in terms of the nature of biological negative 
feedback systems. However, contra Falk, there remains an explanatory gap of the sort 
noted above. The existence of this gap is due to the fact that Falk is wrong inasmuch 
17 I ignore the remainder ofFalk's elucidation of his position from pp. 226-237, since, although it is 
essential to his position, it is not obviously relevant to my argument. 
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as the being described above does not need to undergo the experience of temporal 
passage. The biological description that he offers, although more advanced than a 
mere statement of fact concerning the mind dependence of temporal passage, does not 
succeed in actually giving an explanation of the nature of said experience in wholly 
biological or physical tenns because it is not clear that the being described would 
undergo the experience of temporal passage. This differentiates it from the colour 
case. In such a colour case one might ask someone to imagine the effect of realising 
the neural state in which they perceive something to be red. In imagining such a state 
one is invited to conceive of a particular neural state that produces the colour 
sensation. In being invited to carry out the experiment Falk discusses we are being 
invited to imagine a collection and a flushing. I can imagine a collection and flushing 
without conceiving of passage whereas I cannot conceive of experiencing the neural 
state that will bring about the colour perception of redness without conceiving of 
redness. 
It might be objected that the account offers begs the question, that I could be 
asked to imagine the neural state that brings about passage. In successfully conceiving 
the neural state that brings about passage I prove the point of the static theorist 
precisely because I can conceive of such a state of affairs. 
The second thing to note then is that, pre-theoretically, we would explain this 
sense of "whoosh and whiz" as being due to a genuine feature of passage in reality. If 
the negative feedback system we have been invited to empathise with exists in the 
purely tenseless fashion that Falk takes it to then, as we have seen, it is possible for 
me to empathise with the being without myself experiencing any sense of passage. 
But, if we empathise with the negative feedback system as-if-it-were-an-agent-of-the-
sort-we-are, then we reach the inescapable conclusion that the negative feedback 
system described does experience the same sense of temporal passage that we do. But 
this is entirely unsurprising. For in empathising with the negative feedback system we 
import a whole host of notions one of which is the sensation of passage. Thus, when 
Falk says that, 'infonnation must be flushed soon after it is received' (p. 225) we may 
latch onto the temporal tenns and empathise with a being that is undergoing temporal 
experience. But to then say that a negative feedback system can generate the 
experience of temporal passage is false, all that we can say is that if the system 
described is sufficient to generate the sensation of passage where passage is not a 
genuine feature of reality, then I can empathise with what that sensation would be 
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like. But we are still left without any motivation for thinking that I am such a being. 
And since, as I have argued above, it does not appear that Falk's account needs to 
give rise to temporal experience in the negative feedback system there is very little 
motivation for accepting the account at all. 
4.3.3 This very different gap 
But how fair an objection is this really? In the case of colour perception the 
explanatory gap objection, roughly stated, is that our colour terms and concepts are 
not readily reducible to our physical terms and concepts. I8 In this case the dynamic 
theorist is surely in the same position as the B theorist. For although it may be the 
case that reality is objectively tensed, these goings on and changes in what there is do 
not go any further towards giving us an account of how we/eel that whoosh and whiz 
than the tenseless accounts do. Well, not really. This is a very peculiar sort of 
explanatory gap, as was intimated above, quite different from the explanatory gap oft 
discussed in the philosophy of mind. In fact, there are two explanatory gaps. The first 
is the oft cited problem of how to realise a physical account of a particular 
phenomenology and second is the reduction of a dynamic phenomenology to static 
influences. It is not that, as in the case of colour perception, we have no terms and 
concepts that can make sense of the experience of temporal passage. For if there is 
genuine temporal passage then it is easy to see what it is that gives rise to the 
experience of passage within us - the self same passage that exists in the rest of the 
world. Now although in this latter case there is an obvious mechanism that gives rise 
to temporal passage it may be that we still have a kind of explanatory gap, because we 
still have a gap between the physical facts of passage, the motion of the relevant 
physical features, and the experience of passage. But this problem is common to any 
non-dualistic account and is not specifically a problem for the dynamic theorist, but 
nor, then, is it a problem specifically for the B theorist. I9 The real problem appears to 
be providing an account of how the sensation of transience is to arise from the static 
and that makes it quite a special kind of gap. It is this further conceptual gap that the 
static theorist must endorse. 
18 c.f. Heil (2003: pp. 235-6) 
19 Of course if the dynamic theorist is also a dualist then the problem disappears altogether. 
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In order to empathise with a being that may veridically be described 
tenselessly, it must be true that I can empathise with said being as having, amongst 
other things, the experience of temporal passage. Thus, it must be true that at a given 
time t, x exists and experiences passage p. Hence at t, x has p. Now in saying such 
what is the B theorist committed to? In the first instance let us be clear on the nature 
of the specious present. The perceptual awareness we have of the present is roughly 
equal to 30 milliseconds. So what we are really saying, then, is that at time t, x has an 
experience of p as being flow between t and t-30ms. I say -30ms, rather than + 15ms 
because, presumably, in our static reality causation is still to be regarded as a 
temporally oriented type of thing, and hence may only propagate in the forward 
direction. Thus it cannot be that the consciousness at t is aware of perceptions oft+15. 
So the specious present is a product of the perceptions, and perhaps the time taken to 
adequately process the perceptions in the lead up to t. 
But what the above does is give an account of the specious present in tenns 
that would be equally acceptable to a presentist. How do we get from here to the 
claim that the phenomenology of temporal passage is to be explicated in wholly 
tenseless tenns? So far as I can see the only thing that one can say is that as a result of 
the kind of processing that the brain is taken to carry out we do, at anyone time, feel 
as if we are moving from t-30ms to t.20 Perhaps, then, we might say that at t, the brain 
processes infonnation from t-30ms to t-lms (no less since causation is not 
instantaneous, certain quantum phenomena notwithstanding). 
Problematically, such an account does not help. For then, all that we should 
need to say is that at t, x [tenselessly] processes infonnation from t-30ms to t-lms. 
But this is a tenseless fact, with a tense1ess description. It is simply true that x, at t, 
processes [tenselessly] some infonnation. If the facts of the matter are tenseless, then 
why is it that we need to think of this as giving rise to the phenomena of the 
experience of temporal passage? What is happening in the B theoretic account, is the 
same thing that I suggested was happening with Falk's account mentioned above. The 
B theorist is taking a tenseless description of reality, and then supposing that some 
irreducibly tensed component of it, such as the experience of temporal passage can be 
explicated in tenseless tenns. But in their chosen method of execution the B theorist 
attempts to smuggle tensed experience into the example before proving the account 
20 This is, I think, a sufficiently broad definition to capture most, if not all, B theoretic accounts of the 
phenomenology of temporal passage. 
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viable. They ask us to imagine that our experience of temporality is due to a specific 
set of factors, rather than showing that the set of factors lead to the experience of 
temporality. But since I can conceive of being exactly the kind of organism that the B 
theorist says I am (either a being that flushes and collects, or processes a given set of 
information), and still not have temporal experience, it is not at all clear to me that 
their explanation is correct. 
However, all I have really done here is to introduce an explanatory gap; a 
conceptual gap between the nature of reality and the nature of experience. The gap 
may be a wide one, though whether or not one views it as such is likely to be 
dependent upon one's views about the metaphysics of time in general. If one is an 
ardent B theorist then one might suppose that the gap is bridgeable in much the same 
way that an exponent of a physicalist account of colour perceptions will believe the 
gap between the physical and the mental to be bridgeable. And to argue such would 
be all well and good. The key question that one is obliged to ask is why on earth 
should one wish to endorse such an account? It seems fairly obvious that a B theoretic 
account of the perception of temporal passage is not necessary. It could be the case 
that the perception of temporality we have is due to a genuine ontological becoming. 
The question then remains, why would one suppose that reality is B theoretic? 
Granted, if one can show theories that take such passage as described by the presentist 
to be impossible, then one might have sufficient motivation for adopting a B theoretic 
account. But unless such arguments are forthcoming we simply lack any good reason 
to suppose that temporal passage is mind dependent. And since such accounts require, 
as we have seen, that the experience of passage is roughly akin to the "springing 
forth" of some kind of flow from something that that is essentially lacking in flow, the 
case against the TTT theorist appears to be mounting. 
Before we close this discussion of the phenomenology of temporal experience, 
I should like to say a little more concerning the force of the explanatory gap objection. 
My arguments above should be read as arguments demanding a coherent explanation 
of the phenomena of temporal passage. I am not arguing that the B theoretic 
explanation is false because tenseless language lacks the tools with which to describe 
the nature of temporal experience, nor am I arguing that the fact that our tensed 
concepts cannot be reduced to their tenseless counterparts is a point against the TTT. 
What I do take myself to be doing is showing that even the most ardent advocate of a 
tenseless description of reality needs to observe that there is an explanatory gap 
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between the tenseless description of reality and the experience of temporality. In a 
discussion of the concept of colour it would be unreasonable to suppose that simply 
because our talk concerning colour perceptions cannot be analysed into talk about 
neurological states that neurological states are not the truth-makers for our talk about 
colour perceptions?l In our discussion of the phenomenology of temporal experience 
we cannot suppose that simply because tensed experience cannot be analysed into talk 
about static neurological states that static neurological states are not the truth makers 
for the phenomenology for temporal experience. However, the claim being made is 
that the current modes of explanation only function if one presupposes the viability of 
said mode. If I imagine myself as a genuinely tenseless being then I experience no 
passage, unless I presuppose that said passage somehow arises from the processing or 
the flushing. Hence, I do not attempt to show that the gap is unbridgeable, but that it is 
unclear to why one should want to bridge it. 
4.4 Conclusion. 
What has been shown over the course of chapters two, three and four, is that 
there is no discernible positive reason for adopting a B theoretic account, and that it is 
not altogether clear that one can formulate such positions coherently in light of the 
existence of an explanatory gap in our account of the phenomenology of temporal 
experience. In all, the picture painted in chapter two of the TTT as a great explanatory 
force has been destroyed. However, what remains a puzzle worthy of our exploration 
is why such a theory should hold such sway if it is as flawed as I claim it to be. Unless 
it can be explained why such pictures of reality have been so successful, both 
technically and in capturing the imagination then we are left with in the somewhat 
puzzling situation of having debunked a very powerful theory without knowing why it 
is that the theory has captured the imagination so, or why it has been so successful. 
Thus, in chapter five I offer some reasons why the TTT has been accepted so open 
heartedly, and why it has led to such great technical strides if it is, in fact, false. These 
arguments are of great importance since the advances made by the TTT might be seen 
as good reason to preserve as much of it as possible when what is needed is a 
wholesale change of direction. If we can understand the success of the theory in terms 
21 (C.r. Heil 2003: p 236) 
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that point away from its accuracy or truthfulness then we have greater reason to 
suppose that such a change of direction is necessary. 
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In chapter jive /: 
• 
• 
• 
Chapter Five 
Argue that the B theory is founded on the mind dependence of the "time 
concept" that we have which is quasi spatial 
Suggest that the quasi spatial time concept arises from a collection of psycho-
linguistic influences 
Suggest that there are also mathematical influences that have developed 
alongside our time concept that has exacerbated the contemporary illusion that 
time is spatial 
5.1 Where does the illusion of the B theory come from? 
The question, then, that is in need of an answer, is why are etemalist 
ontology's so persuasive? What is it about etemalism and B theory that is so 
appealing if they are not genuine options? The answer is two-fold: on the one hand we 
lack a coherent "time concept", that is, independent from our understanding of space, 
an understanding of what time is - a time concept that etemalism seems ready suited 
to providing. In addition, various psychological influences and the predominance of 
mathematics have developed our pre-thereoretical understanding of time to a very 
particular way of thinking about time and temporality. 
In exploring these two themes, the development of the "time concept" and the 
predominance of mathematics, it will become evident that the ontology constructed by 
B theorists, space-time theorists and other etemalists is largely due to the way in 
which we commonly think about time. I suggest that we naturally make use of a quasi 
spatial time concept for which we lack an objective basis. Second I offer 
psychological/linguistic explanations for the prevalence of these models, and, third, I 
argue that the prevalence of mathematical analysis with regards to time leads, when 
coupled to the quasi spatial understanding of time, to the unjustified conclusion that 
time is a dimension. With these distinct strands in place it will become clear that the 
success of the TTT and its various components should not be seen as due to their 
accurately reflecting reality, but in their capturing the way that we commonly 
conceptualise time. 
In chapter five of Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits Russell draws a 
distinction between our perception and conception of time. He does little with this 
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distinction once it has been elucidated, at least in so far as to how we should think of 
it infonning our thoughts on time and temporality. 1 I think that such a distinction is 
both important and infonnative. Our 'perception of time' is not a perception of time at 
all; I do not perceive things as past, or as future, and, unless presentness is a property, 
I do not perceive entities or times as having presentness either. What I do perceive is 
entities undergoing change. For example, I may perceive movement in the hands on a 
clock. Now, it may be that, ultimately, the correct explanation for this rests upon 
successive states of affairs having the property of presentness (though see 1.3), but, 
pre theoretically, there is nothing about the nature of the experience that gives rise to 
such a supposition. Intuitively, what happens is that the hands on the clock move 
about the face. Let us suppose for a moment that this is correct. If it is then our 
'perception of time' is not a perception of time at all; it is a perception of change. 
Nothing more than change is being perceived. 
Our conception of time seems to be markedly different if, in fact, we have a 
coherent concept of time at all. For, (with a nod to St Augustine) although I believe 
myself to know perfectly clearly what time is, if asked, I find that I do not know. 
Although it may be that an individual, when pressed, will find it difficult to express 
exactly what it is they refer to when the talk of time, there are, or so I claim, certain 
features of our contemporary time concept that can be brought out, even though we 
may be said to lack a complete and detailed understanding of what time actually is. 
The central, if not only, component of the contemporary time concept is times 
dimensionality or its extension, which is not so much a concept of time qua time, as a 
conception of time qua space. 
Although we think of time as being fundamentally different from space we 
assume that time can be thought of as a dimension because it is a dimension. But, as I 
show in 5.1.1- 5.1.3, the idea of time as a quasi spatial thing, as the sort of thing that 
might be attributed with spatial properties, is not new. In fact such a notion is 
prevalent across a large and varied cross section of societies. What has drawn out this 
feature in contemporary analysis is the prevalence of mathematics and mathematical 
analysis. For, as I show in 5.3, the geometric description of time as a component of a 
space-time rests, already, upon the assumption that time is the kind of thing that could 
be a dimension. As I have shown in chapters two through four, there appear not to be 
I Russell's own aim seems to have been to detennine what we know, or take ourselves to know, about 
time, see, esp., p. 246. 
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any philosophical reasons to suppose that this is the case, and, hence, I suggest that 
we spatialise time as a result of factors discussed in 5.2. In light of such claims the 
mathematical analysis detailed in 5.3 should be seen as exposing and bringing to light 
our limited and incorrect way of thinking about time, and showing that we place it at 
the heart of our metaphysics of time. 
5.1.1 The History of the Time Concept: Greece 
First of all then, to the Greeks. As the forebears of our own civilization it 
would perhaps be unsurprising to find that the Greeks share a quasi spatial conception 
of time. However, what is striking is the extent to which we can draw parallels 
between our own view of time and the Hellenistic conception. We must be careful not 
to misrepresent the varied nature of the Greek concept of time (c.f. Lloyd 1976: 
p.117), but there are two features that can, broadly speaking, be said to unite Greek 
thought on time. The features I have in mind are the cyclical nature of time (though 
we must be careful to acknowledge that this meant different things to different 
authors), and the notion that time (as an entity) can be thought of in a similar way to 
eternity, such, that when we speak of "the thing time" for the Greeks, we are thinking 
of "the thing eternity." 
Largely, the spatial nature of time in Greek thought is implicit in the 
metaphors used. Whitrow (1975) quotes Nemesius, the fourth century bishop of 
Emesa, 
... Socrates and Plato and each individual man will live again, with the same friends 
and fellow citizens. They will go through the same experiences and activities. Every 
city and village and field will be restored, just as it was. And this restoration of the 
universe takes place not once, but over and over again - indeed to all eternity without 
end. Those of the gods who are not subject to destruction, having observed the course 
of one period, know from this everything which is going to happen in all subsequent 
periods. For there will never be any new thing other than that which has been before 
down to the minutest detail. (p. 17) 
There is nothing explicitly spatial about the metaphor, but it is at least plausible that 
time, as a cycle, lends itself to being thought of as a thing. There is a cycle of events 
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which the gods perceive, and that cycle is time. To the gods looking in at the cycle it 
is merely there. Consider also the Aristotelian understanding of time as like a line. 
For the line to be divided by the point, the rest of the line either side of the 
point must exist - must be real. If time is to be thought of both as cyclical and like a 
line, then the easiest way to think of time is as extended, as a quasi spatial entity. 
None of this is to say that the Greeks thought of time as being like space, but that the 
way in which they thought about time makes use of spatially loaded concepts. A point 
that can be further illustrated by a brief delve into Greek literature. As Romily (1968) 
has argued the role of the song in Greek tragedy is of importance - especially for our 
understanding of time in Greek tragedy (pp. 25-27). There is a sense in which the 
concept of past and future is manifestly different from our modem concept,2 
what is not modem is that past actions or dead persons not only provide a clue for 
understanding what rancours or obligations weigh upon the present time: these past 
actions or dead persons, for Aeschylus, are still alive and active; and one can 
acknowledge their presence in what is actually going on. In other words, the past is 
not wholly past. (op. cit) 
But there is also some sense, then, that past events are not gone, they are still 
important and still part of reality. Firstly, time can be seen as the personification of 
fate, as playing some role in the way reality unfolds.3 However, time may also be 
thought of as, 'holding all events in stock, known and unknown' (p. 50). Time, on this 
latter view is that which reveals to us the events of the future - events that are already , 
there awaiting our discovery. For example, 
Even if things are supposed to exist through all eternity and to have been decided 
regardless of time, it is with time and in time that they come to be. He uncovers them. 
As Sophocles' Ajax says, "he makes them grow up when they were invisible and 
covers them once they have appeared". (p.SO) 
Compare this with, 
2 Though see Baars (1997) for some observations regarding the personification in our modem concept 
(p. 286) .. . 6) h . 
3 This is a little different to the concept of fate in the Middle Ages whIch IS, as GureVIch (197 as It, 
'irrevocable since, in a certain sense, what is come to pass is already a fact' (p.232). In the Greek 
concept fate appears to be active, capable of altering the way things will be. 
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Sophocles 'in fragment 832 N, 918 P, uses the verb ekkaiuptein, to uncover: "Time, 
uncovering all things, brings them to light. '" (p.5!) 
It is not difficult to see that there is some sense in which events are out there waiting 
to be revealed by time. However, although this notion is not of itself explicitly spatial 
there is a sense in which the spatial enters into the mode of consideration. Given that 
these events are just there, there is a sense in which they could, at least in principle, be 
seen. To put it another way, if time is revealing these events to us then time is, 
apparently, doing something that sounds, from a natural language point of view, to be 
something inherently physical. Time makes them grow up, covers them, brings them 
to light. These metaphors are all suggestive of a sense in which the Greeks thought of 
time as in some sense being like a mode of extension - a mode of extension for which 
the paradigm is space. And this is my point. It is not that all societies think that time is 
spatial, but that the understanding of temporality in cultures is suggestive of, and 
implicitly entails, a spatial metaphor. 
5.1.2 The History of the Time Concept: Maya and India 
Although of relatively little interest to the history of the development of the 
western time concept, a dimensional time concept, it is interesting to note that time 
concepts other than our own appear to be underpinned by spatial metaphor. Mayan 
time, much like its Greek counterpart, was cyclical. Further, the Mayans also viewed 
time as 'magical and polytheistic' (Whitrow 1975: p. 12). Rather than give time the 
role of discovering, or uncovering events, the Mayans saw time as a road and as 
qualitative. 
Although the road along which the divine bearers marched in relays had neither 
beginning nor end, events moved in a circle represented by the recurring spells of 
duty for each god in the succession of bearers. (p.12). 
For the Mayans, the Aristotelian distinction between past, present and future, as 
essentially linear would have been problematic. Given their religious view that the 
world instantiated the same type of events every 269 years, a major part of their belief 
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centred around the notion that there was no distinction between past, present and 
future. Given the lack of any such distinction, the apparent thereness of events in 
time, and the use of the metaphor of time as a road, or a path, upon which the gods 
marched, it is not difficult to see the spatial underpinning of such a metaphor. 4 
Similarly suggestive are various tracts of Indian philosophy. As Dasgupta 
(1932) notes, there is a suggestion that there is no distinction to be drawn between the 
different regions of time (p.266); further, that the self is free to roam those different 
regions being, as the self is, eternal, and time being capable of reversal in thought. 5 
I am at pains here not to argue that such cultures think that time is spatial (the 
post 19th century western time concept seems to be individual in this respect), but that 
there is a quasi spatial understanding of what time is. Thus, the use of spatial 
metaphor is prevalent in nearly all societies because we lack an understanding of what 
time is - St Augustine's now infamous point. We use analysis of spatial metaphors to 
begin to understand more about time, but in doing so we may, in fact, be simply 
revealing more about how we think about time. There is nothing in the nature of time, 
qua change, that is even remotely spatial, unless one presupposes that time is spatial. 
5.1.3 The History of the Time Concept: Medieval Philosophy 
Much like the Greeks, the philosophers of the Middle ages lacked a single, 
unified, concept of what time might be. However, the increase in speculation as to 
how reality might appear to God throws some light on the issue. As Boethius (1999) 
had it: 
But if it is appropriate to compare the divine present with the human, then just as 
you men see certain things in this temporal present of yours, so God sees all 
things in his eternal present. Hence this divine foreknowledge does not change 
the nature and character of things; God sees them as present before his eyes as 
they will emerge at some time in the future. (p. 112) 
4 Furthermore it is difficult to conceive how qualitative distinctions could be drawn between regions of 
time unless the different regions of time existed in something akin to a spatial sense, at the very least 
the understanding is suggestive of a spatial metaphor. .. 
5 For an alternative account of temporality in Indian philosophy see Hmyana (1967) or .Potter (1977). 
In both of these texts, as in Indian philosophy in general, the challenge is to ~xtract a .smgle coherent 
view of time as opposed to a mass of contradictory views. In any case all VIews of tIme that I have 
found are compatible with a spatial metaphor. 
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For any human agent the perceptual field is equivalent to a spatial field, thus, for God, 
it seems, his "seeing" of all things at the very least implies a spatial character oftime.6 
If these entities are to be before the eyes of God, then they must, at least in some 
sense, be presented to Him as entities in space are presented to us. Since God 
perceives things as they truly are it follows that time is the sort of thing that admits of 
a comparison with physical space.7 
5.2 The mind dependence of spatialised time 
The time concepts discussed, in brief, all share the common feature of being 
quasi spatial. They also share another common feature; that of not being justified. In 
all of the literature on the various time concepts there is never any justification given 
for thinking time to be quasi spatial. 8 Why should this be? Why should it never be the 
case that such moves are justified - at least not until the 19th century? My belief is that 
we think of time as being spatial as a result of three independent factors: linguistic, 
psychological and mathematical.9 It will be argued that it is a natural tendency, 
explicable through psychological and linguistic factors, to think of time as spatial. 10 
When physicists suppose that space and time are unifiable into a space-time whole 
they are mistaken. Instead, they are surmising from the fact that their natural concepts 
of space and time are similar (and that the two may be mathematically described in 
6 Consider also: 
When you observe at the one time a man walking on the earth and the sun rising in the 
sky, even though you see them simultaneously, you distinguish them, and you judge the 
fIrst movement to be voluntary and the second to be necessary. So it is the same with the 
divine vision, as it looks out on the whole world; it certainly does not dislocate the nature 
of those things which for God are in the present, but which in their temporal aspect are in 
the future. (op. cit) 
See Barrendon and Lunscombe (2003) for an analysis of Boethius' understanding of the relationship 
between time and eternity. Though they do not explicitly consider the spatial language and metaphor 
underpinning Boethius' time concept, much of what they have to say is enlightening on how time and 
reality are related. . . . . 
7 For arguments to the effect that all such time concepts are essentIally spatlahsed see Whitrow (1980) 
where the ideas are explored more fully. 
8 For example, Aristotle offers no justifIcation for comparing time to a line. There is simply an implicit 
assumption that such a comparison is meaningful. 
9 Since my arguments to the latter are less bound up with the issues concerning the other two, I shall 
detail these in a separate section (5.3). 
10 My own view is that the linguistic factors are probably reducible to psychological factors but this is 
not a claim that I pursue here. 
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the same sort of fashion) to the conclusion that space and time are the same inasmuch 
as they can both be correctly thought of as dimensions. 
5.2.1 Linguistic factors 
I shall restrict myself to an analysis of English here, and, although the point itself 
is quite brief, the argument is worth making. The language that we employ to speak 
about time and space is surprisingly similar given the different experiences that we 
have of the two. I take it to be relatively uncontroversial that there are such 
differences. For example, I perceive time, or at least temporal passage, to be 
associated with change in the physical, whereas there are no such associations to be 
made with space. 
But despite this a variety of what we would naturally think of as spatial terms are 
applicable to time. In each of the cases cited below I have underlined the part of the 
statement that is "spatially suggestive." My suggestion is not that these terms are 
spatial and hence that we think of time as spatial. All that I want to suggest is that the 
duality of uses given to these terms might be suggestive of the conceptual similarity 
afforded to time and space. 
(1) In the middle of the night 
(2) How long do we have to wait? 
(3) At seven o'clock the bell will chime 
It might also be added that the permanency of B theoretic locutions is suggestive of a 
space-like representation of reality since our paradigm of variation, as opposed to 
change, is intrinsically spatial. Talk of "variation" implies, conceptually, a spatial 
arena over which some quantity or other is arranged - as was noted in chapter one 
and organised into a pre theoretical objection to the B theory. 
What I am suggesting is that the reason for this similarity is that we 
conceptualise space and time in similar ways; we think of both as being spatial in 
some sense. I do not mean to suggest that philosophers move from the natural 
language similarities between time and space to the erroneous conclusion that time 
and space are similar; rather, that the surface similarities in the grammatical structure 
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of sentences concerning time and space are puzzling given their distinct appearance to 
us. One possible explanation for this is that we conceptualise the two in similar ways. 
5.2.2 Psychological factors 
There are two points to be made here: first I will show that memory, 
observation and anticipation (MOA) play an important part in covering up the 
existence of any potential ontological distinction that may lie between the past, 
present and future; and, second, I will show that the natural tendency, once this 
distinction has been removed, is to treat what is left as spatial. This is no "proof' that 
we spatialise time; such a proof is already evident in theories like space-time and the 
manifest spatial metaphors used to describe time. What I am doing here is providing 
an explanation for why we spatialise time if it is not, in fact, spatial. It should be 
noted, then, that in stating that the dimensionality of time is mind dependent this 
explanation is the mirror of Grunbaum's account of how temporal passage is alleged 
to be mind dependent. The distinction being made is that the account I offer is 
complete whereas Grunbaum's was shown to entail undesirable explanatory gaps. 
This is, then, an underdeveloped counterpart to Falk's explanation of how 
temporal passage might arise phenomenologically without necessitating genuine 
passage. Sadly the account I offer falls short of offering a complete causal mechanism 
as biologically complete as Falk's. However, I do not believe that this distracts from 
either the plausibility or comprehensibility of the view since it remains clear how the 
illusion of the extension of time can arise for beings who occupy a reality where such 
extension is not a genuine feature. 
5.2.2.1 MOA 
The crux of the MOA account is that our concept of self leads us to erode any 
potential distinction between past, present and future; this, coupled to the 
predominance of the visual mode of perception, leads to the natural tendency to 
spatialise (hence dimensionalise) time. Memory provides a means of linking between 
our understanding of the past and the present and our anticipation of the future - of 
those things that are still to come. As Cohen (1989) puts it: 
137 
In the real world, memory acts as a bridge between the past, the present, and the 
future. It stores retrospective information, monitors current input and output, and 
constructs and stores future plans. This integration of past, present, and future in a 
unified personal history is achieved by interactive processing. New memories are 
stored within pre-existing knowledge structures; old memories are modified by new 
ones; prospective plans out of elements of past experience. This intricate interaction 
of past, present, and future allows us to maintain a coherent identity and to develop 
flexibly and adaptively in knowledge and experience. (p. 156) 
Now there is no obvious use of a spatial metaphor here. But what there is, crucially, is 
an erosion of any objective distinction (that mayor may not exist) between those 
things that have been, those things that are, and those things that will be; for, in the 
interaction of past, present and future beliefs, desires, memories (of the past) and 
anticipations (of the future), one can easily see that any ontological distinction 
between the past and the future, and indeed the present, could be lost. The act of 
integration takes anticipations of the future, awareness of the present and memories of 
the past and lends "existence" to all three. Hence all three distinct times which the 
thoughts are about are brought before the mind and each of the times are presented as 
being ontologically equal. 
It has also been suggested in the literature on the psychology of the self, that 
the conception of the past, present and future as forming part of an existential whole is 
essential to the self (see e.g. (King 2000: esp. p. 2), (Cottle 1976: pp. 85-87) (Baars 
1997: esp pp. 290-293)). The particular feature of such accounts that is of interest to us 
here is of the self existing in time. Plainly, this idea of being in time, not merely being 
subject to the experience of change, entails that the concept which we have of time 
differs radically from our experience of temporality - e.g. change. There is an extent 
then to which we conceive of ourselves as changeless, as opposed to the way in which 
we perceive the world around us to change. This kind of changelessness must surely 
lead to the quasi spatialisation of time since we must, in our somehow unchanging 
state, navigate our way through this time. 
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5.2.2.2 Visual Predominance 
It would seem reasonable to suppose, then, that the conjunction of memory, 
awareness and anticipation will tend to blur any objective distinction between past, 
present and future, and that there seems to be a sense in which we view ourselves as 
"in" time in a changeless sense. I assume here, for the purpose of discussion, that 
there are no objective features of reality which give rise to these conceptions. 
Certainly there are no obvious reasons for them to arise in this way given our 
experience of time as closely related to change. First, then, I show that vision is the 
dominant sense, and then say how this leads to a spatial concept of time. 
My arguments on this first point will not need to make use of psychological 
case studies or points of logic. It is the simplest that I will have to make. It is surely 
obvious that the sense made use of most frequently, emphasised the most, in society -
indeed in all societies - is the sense of vision. I am not sure how to argue for this point 
any further, though perhaps a smattering of remarks made by philosophers concerning 
memory will serve to further my point. In section 1.1.1 of A Treatise of Human 
Nature, the majority of Hume's remarks concerning memory are of visual memory 
(indeed there is only one other sort mentioned - that of taste - and that is given a 
minor role). Furlong (1951) considers only vision. In the Leviathan, Hobbes (1881) 
too deluges us with a primarily visual notion of memory. Perhaps the exception to 
prove the rule is Mill (1967), who provides us with a much more rounded 
understanding of memory as encapsulated by all the senses. But consider, too, the 
philosophy of universals and tropes; how many of the examples therein are presented 
as universals of hearing, smell, taste or touch? By far and away the majority of cases 
presented are of visual examples of apparent similarity. The only reason that I can 
think of for this trend is that sight is indeed the most dominant of the five senses. 
But why move from a supposition that sight is the most dominant of the sense 
to the conclusion that we unwarrantedly spatialise time? The answer lies, partly, in an 
analysis of memory. When discussing multi channel testing (psychological analysis of 
inputs via different types of data streams, e.g. audio, visual etc.) Murdoch notes, 
The general point is that space and time are two separable dimensions of stimulus 
presentation. Also, they have a natural correspondence with visual and auditory 
presentation. That is, in a very general sense audition is a temporal-distributed 
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modality and vision is a spatially distributed modality, and these dimensions are 
surely represented in memorial processing. (Murdoch 1974: p.l94) 
Thus, as a result of the alleged predominance of vision over the other four senses, 
especially in regard to our ways of thinking about the past and the future, it seems 
only natural that we should automatically spatialise time. First we have memories of 
times and a concept of time. As naturally visual creatures, such memories and 
concepts tend toward the visual, and with a visual concept of time (as an entity) we 
come to the idea of it being spatial, and hence dimensional. It is unsurprising that 
beings who operate primarily in the visual mode will conceptualise something such as 
time visually. Of course in doing so the notion that time is quasi spatial is implicitly 
smuggled in because the only types of entities that can be visualised are spatial 
entities. 
In the next section I will chart the development of the time concept in line with 
the prevailing mathematical paradigm with the intention of showing that the two 
develop hand in hand; further, that the supposition that time is spatial is never fully 
explored. I argue that there is no reason to suppose that time is spatial therefore, since 
we can show how easily our conceptual apparatus lends itself to a spatialised 
representation of time and temporality. We should not suppose that time is spatial, but 
that the success of space-time theories, as well as other etemalist approaches to time, 
lies in their ability to give us some conceptual means by which to analyse time and 
that some conceptual means are better than none, even if they are not entirely accurate 
in this case. 
5.3 Time and mathematical analysis11 
In any case our attention now shifts to four-dimensional mathematics and the 
structure of our own time concept. The mathematics of the nineteenth century was 
rich and diverse, containing many disparate views. The move that is of particular 
interest to us is the advance made in geometry, particularly the work of Gauss and 
Riemann. Gauss's primary contribution was to recognise the role of Cartesian 
II The first author to offer an implicitly mathematical graphical analysis is widely thought to be 
Nicholas Oresme, see Clagget (1959). However, it is not until the nineteenth century that it can really 
be said that the mathematical analysis of time began to have serious implications for our thinking of 
time as spatial. 
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coordinates when applied to curved surfaces. In a Euclidean space one would think of 
the Cartesian coordinates as giving us the detenninate location of any given entity. 
However, in Gaussian (curved) space things are a little different. The most obvious 
example to be given is that of longitude. If, at the equator, one travels one degree of 
longitude then the distance that one will travel is equal to approximately 110km. 
However, if one travels the same distance (in longitude) at, say, the latitude of New 
York (41 '), then one will travel only about 83km. Further still, at the North pole one 
degree of longitude is a mere 1.9km (c.f. Schwinger 1986: p. 172). 12 Following on 
from Gauss came Riemann, who developed Gauss's work on intrinsic geometry of 
two dimensions, into a potentially infinite number of dimensions: 
He extended Gauss's intrinsic geometry of two dimensions, reqmnng two 
coordinates, to spaces any number n of dimensions, and coordinates: n=2,3,4 ... The 
metric of these spaces, which is specified by three quantities for n=2, requires six for 
n=3, ten for n=4, and so on. To see this for n=3, add a third coordinate to a two-
dimensional space. The square of the distance between nearby points now contains the 
square of the change in the third coordinate, with a multiplicative coefficient, along 
with the products of the change in the third coordinate by the changes of each of the 
first two coordinates. That is three additions to the initial three coefficients, giving six 
quantities for n=3. Proceeding to n=4, we must similarly add one plus three, or four 
coefficients, to the six of the n=3, giving ten in all (p.176) 
Thus, at the dawn of the twentieth century four dimensional mathematics was 
in its heyday. However, although the 'time concept' of those such as Lagrange and 
Lavoisier was making use of the dimensionality of time (Whitrow 1980: p.3), this was 
still based partly in the Newtonian notion of time as a dimension. That is, although 
time was viewed by Lagrange as spatial in character, its precise nature was vastly 
different from that of space. The homogeneity of the mathematical structures of 
12 Schwinger defmes the role of coordinates in a Gaussian space thus: 
The surface as a whole can be described by some kind of Gaussian coordinates, which we call u 
and v. Within the small area we can also adopt a pair of Cartesian coordinates, x and y. Now let 
us move from one point to another within the small area. The displacement can be expressed 
either by a small change of x and y or by a small change in u and v. The small changes of x and y 
are related by certain multiplicative factors to the small changes of u and \' ... The square length 
of the straight line that connects the initial point to the displaced point is the sum of the squares 
of the changes in x and y. And that sum in turn can be written as the sum of three contributions: 
a multiple of the square of the small change in u; a multiple of twice the product of the small 
changes in u and v; a multiple of the square of the small change in v. (p.172) 
141 
Riemann is reproduced in its entirety in the bold, if rather vague and mysterious, 
infamous statement of Minkowski's (1923) in which he introduced the notion of 
space-time claiming, 'space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade away into 
mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent 
reality' (p.75). This is, of course, an entirely natural supposition to make if one 
accepts that the structure of the mathematics of four dimensions is an accurate 
representation of our own reality. 
It is easy to see, then, how it is that these mathematical developments fuelled 
our implicitly spatial conception of time. With a psychology that is naturally 
predisposed to spatialising time, an analysis that fits with that conception is likely to 
prove popular and successful as a heuristic. And note, once one has a conception of 
the sort of thing time might be it becomes far easier to subject it to mathematical 
analysis. Hence, even though the time concept given to us by the mathematicians is 
not necessarily correct, it is of heuristic use. But there is no reason given, at any 
stage, by any philosopher, that mathematics, more specifically geometry, reveals the 
nature of time. Instead, we find texts like Nerlich's What space-time explains, giving 
an excellent explanation of how we may read geometric patterns into the nature of 
events and occurrences in what we believe to be space-time; but we are not presented 
with good reason to make the conceptual link between time as we perceive it - time as 
change - and time as we conceive it - time as studied by geometers. It is not enough 
to be told by mathematicians that the geometric model of space-time explains a great 
deal, since, or so it appears, thinking of time in spatial terms is a natural thing to do 
but one that lacks an obj ective basis. What needs to be explained, then, is not why a 
geometric explanation of time works - that has been explained above as psychological 
- but why we think of time geometrically at all. For, given the above discussions of 
the forgoing chapters it does not appear apposite to adopt a spatialised account of 
time. 
Even if the forgoing seems like a large conceptual leap, that it is possible that 
space and time could admit of space-time analysis without being such, this is not 
sufficient to begin to motivate a B theoretic account. There is a sizeable gap between 
admitting that the mathematics that describes space and spatial relations also describes 
time and temporal relations, and admitting that the two are the same sort of thing, 
such as modes of extension. This important point is often missed in analysis where we 
suppose that since we may represent the two in the same way that it follows that they 
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are the same. Of course we only make such suppositions in the case of space and time. 
Obviously we would make no such conclusions in the case of other mathematically 
similar quantities, such as temperature and pressure. I suggest that, just as we do not 
believe that simply due to the similarity of mathematical analysis we should condense 
temperature and pressure into temp-pressure, so we should not unify space and time 
into space-time. 
5.4 Conclusion 
At the start of chapter five it was suggested that, in reflection of Grunbaum' s 
suggestion that the experience of becoming was mind dependent, the extension of 
time into a quasi spatial sort of thing is mind dependent. Even if one were 
unpersauded by the arguments in chapter four then much of what is said here in 
chapter five serves to further erode the foundations upon which static theories are 
founded since an alternative explanation is offered as to why theories which spatialise 
time are successful, even if they are not true. They are successful because they make 
use of a latent time concept that we already have. And given that the mathematical 
descriptions of the two are so similar it is hardly surprising that we should suppose the 
two to be the same. 
The existence of a quasi spatial time concept was explored in section 5.1 and it 
was argued that there does seem to be a shared feature of time concepts across many 
cultures. The feature in question is that all regions of temporality are onto logically on 
a par. It was also argued that, conceptually, the best handle we have of things that are 
devoid of ontological distinction, is that of space. Thus, it was suggested that we can 
explain our natural tendency to spatialise time through our natural tendency to think 
of time in the way we do. It was also argued that the history of this time concept 
suggests that theories of space-time are not so powerful as we may have thought. 
In section 5.2 the apparatus that explains our conceiving of time as a 
dimension was explored. It was argued that the MOA account, in which we treat 
memory observation and anticipation (and the times at which the events in question 
will occur) as a part of our concept of self, is plausible and that this would explain 
why it is we conceive of time as spatial if it is not. It was also argued that linguistic 
factors, such as the implicitly spatial nature of much temporal language may have an 
influence on such concepts, though it was recognised that such claims would be 
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limited to languages In which the phenomena occurred - English was the only 
language explored. 
In 5.3 we explored a different tack and suggested that it is the coupling of this 
latent time concept to the rigours of mathematical, particularly geometric (in other 
words spatial), analysis that renders the arguments for space-time with the appearance 
of being all the more persuasive. But this is a mere illusion. Given that we have no 
reasons to suppose that time is quasi spatial, from chapters two through four, and we 
now have an explanation of how it might be that we come to think so successfully of 
time in such a fashion, it seems only reasonable to bring to an end the analysis of the 
TTT. Hence, in chapter six we must see what it is about presentism that seems so 
problematic to its opponents. 
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Chapter Six 
In chapter six 1: 
• Argue that presentism fails to give a sufficiently good answer to the problems of 
tensed reference and tensed quantification (6.1); 
• Note the difficulties in adequately formulating presentism (6.2); 
• Note the problems from the special theory of relativity (6.3),· 
• Argue that Craig's and Smith's versions of presentism are unworkable (6. -I) and 
(6.5),· 
6.1 Presentism 
In light of the problems faced by eternalism and B theory, presentism presents 
itself as the natural solution to McTaggart's paradox. However, as with any 
philosophical theory there are a number of problems that beset it. In chapter six I 
detail these problems and reject some of the contemporary solutions to these 
problems, not necessarily because I believe the solutions mentioned to be faulty, but 
because the type of solutions examined do not meet the objections raised in the 
manner sought by opponents of presentism. With this achieved it is incumbent upon 
me to provide technical solutions to these problems, the beginnings of which I sketch 
in chapter seven. I also detail two of the more prominent presentist positions, those of 
Craig (6.4) and Smith (6.5), both of which are found to be wanting. 
6.1.1 Tense: Language 
It was argued in 2.4 that the applicability of a tenseless semantics does not 
motivate a B theoretic ontology. Normal arguments taken to favour presentism infer 
from the fact that tense is irreducible to the conclusion that it represents some feature 
of reality.l Suppose, then, that we accept a tensed semantics, does it follow that reality 
itself is dynamic? Well in 2.4.3 I argued that the tensed (or otherwise) nature of 
language, or the account that we give of truth conditions, does not reveal to us the 
nature of reality unless there is some further way to show that the perspicuity of the 
I Those contemporary philosophers who have used inferred from presentism to tense include Ludlow 
(1999), Smith (1993) and Craig (2000a). 
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tense in such constructions reflects a feature of reality as opposed to a feature of 
thought. Hence, it is not necessary that a tensed semantics/language entails a dynamic 
reality. Now, such arguments might be considered somewhat problematic since 
presentism is generally motivated on semantic grounds, hence my raising it here 
under the list of potential problems for the presentist. 
However, we saw in chapter one that McTaggart's arguments gIves us a 
choice between presentism and a C theoretic ontology. Throughout the intervening 
chapters I have attempted to give an account of why a B theoretic ontology (the C 
series with temporality somehow infused) cannot be motivated and attempted to point 
out some of the inconsistencies of the TTT. This, then, proves the new motivation for 
adopting some form of presentism. If we have a choice between presentism and C 
theory and C theory is false then we must explore presentism. Of course, one of the 
motives for accepting the TTT itself was the accusation that presentism is not itself a 
coherent theory and since we have not yet done so it is to proving this last thesis false 
that we must set our minds. 
6.1.2 Tense: Quantification 
There is a very real technical problem for presentism, that of quantifying over 
those things that are non-present. It seems, drawing a modal analogy, that the 
presentist can make some sense of quantification over singular times in the same way 
that we can quantify over merely possible entities if we are not modal realists. The 
problems set in when trying to quantify over a plurality of times.2 Provided one can 
accept a tense quantifier of the form, "it was the case that (there is x)" and, "it will be 
the case that (there is x)," there will be no problems in quantifying over singular 
times. 
But things become rather more complicated in cases where we have more than 
one time over which we need to quantify. Consider cases such as, "there have been 
three kings called Charles." Assuming that these three kings have not existed 
simultaneous with one another we cannot use (1) 
(1) It was the case that (there exist three kings called Charles) 
2 See Lewis (2004: esp. pp . .t-6), Adams (1986: p. 321). 
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At no point has the assertion, "there exist three kings called Charles" been true, so the 
quantifier phrase fails to capture all of the relevant entities within its scope since the 
present tense operator can range only over those things that exist at one time. 
Lewis (2003) explores three possible solutions to this problem, each of which 
he finds unsatisfactory. 
The first strategy Lewis suggests is brute translation (pp. 6-7), such that "there 
have been three kings called Charles" entails 
(2) It was the case that (there exists a king called Charles) and, it was the case 
that (there exists a king called Charles) and, it was the case that (there exists a 
king called Charles) 
The main problem with this strategy, according to Lewis, is that it implies a 
potentially infinite number of nested quantifiers. If, for example, one were to consider 
the assertion, "there have been an infinite number of seconds" (supposing time not to 
have a beginning), then we would require an infinite number of nested operators to 
quantify successfully over all of these seconds. Adams (1986: p. 321) suggests that 
such complications might be acceptable if the metaphysical arguments are strong 
enough. 
I think that the metaphysical arguments are strong enough, at least insomuch 
as B theories are not a genuine option. Indeed it might be questioned whether or not it 
is entirely inappropriate that an infinite number of nested quantifiers are needed to 
quantify over an infinite number of times. But, problems from reference (see below) 
suggest that in order to construct a viable theory we need more than simply nested 
quantifiers to explain quantification over many times. To say that we can quantify 
over times that do not exist, simply in virtue of nesting present tense quantifiers 
within the scope of a past tense operator does little, if anything, to assuage the 
concern that our quantifiers are ranging over non existent entities. Furthermore, it is 
less than clear how (2) allows us to quantify over three different kings. Nor is it clear 
how we are to do so within the confines of a Presentist metaphysic since the problem 
turns on the fact that the kings do not exist at the same time. 
Hence, such options might be endorsed if we have absolutely no other option, 
but they are at best unpalatable in the extreme. 
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The second strategy suggested by Lewis is to make use of the shado\\"s of 
existent entities to make sense of non-existent things such that, 'the nonexistent 
golden mountain has as its shadow the existent property-bundle of goldenness and 
mountainhood' (p. 7). Thus, there might exist, in the present, three surrogates. one for 
each King Charles. Lewis considers various options and comes to the conclusion that 
there are no sensible candidates for such surrogates. 
By and large I think I agree with Lewis on this matter. Further, the mechanism 
by which past entities cast their shadows will be very different from the way in which 
non existent entities cast their shadows through their property-bundles and it seems 
incumbent on the presentist to offer a more detailed account of how such a 
mechanism might function in the temporal case. I also fail to see how, in the case of 
temporal quantifiers, this really helps us. In the case of the Kings Charles, I might 
quantify over the property of being a king, and being Charles, but how does this help 
us to quantify over different kings called Charles at different times? At the very least a 
fuller account of this strategy is required. 
The third strategy that Lewis suggests IS that the presentist could take 
quantification to be primitive and unanalysable. The presentist could claim that tensed 
quantifiers cannot be understood to be quantifiers because there are no past and future 
things over which to quantify. The presentist might argue that this should satisfy the 
opponent of the B theorist because this move renders such quantifier phrases 
unanalysable. Tensed quantifier phrases give the appearance of being real quantifiers 
because they behave in the same way, semantically, as genuine quantifier phrases. But 
they do so without being quantifiers in any metaphysical sense. This would explain 
why tensed quantifiers do not need to have entities within their scope. 
Lewis gives this latter option some serious consideration. I do not. This 
account does not give us a good account of why certain types of quantifier phrases are 
not really quantifiers where others are. What is it about temporality that requires of us 
that we use quantifier phrases but without ontological entailment? Perhaps we might 
be able to get away with such a position if we have no other options, but, as I shall 
make clear in chapter seven we do have another option. In many ways it seems that 
the presentist might get away with any of these options if we are so restricted in our 
metaphysical account of time that these are our only choices. Perhaps it is the last 
ditch nature of these explanations that explains the reluctance that there seems to be to 
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endorse them. Certainly I do not find them persuasive as accounts of tensed 
quantification and I do not see why they should be thought of as such. 
One could compound the difficulty for the Presentist by raising a further 
technical problem. It seems that from the principle of existential generalisation (Fa ----+ 
3xFx), the obvious tensed version, (P(Fa) ----+ P(3xFx)) is without a logical connection 
to relate it to the general principle. This would, of itself, be a problem for the 
Presentist though, once again, whether the Presentist would forced to give up their 
position is less clear. After all, they might be able to say that the general principle is, 
itself, tensed disjunctive. Hence, where A = Pa or P or F or true where there is no 
time3, A(Fa) ~ A(3xFx) is the actual principle of existential generalisation and this 
clearly is related to (P(Fa) ~ P(3xFx)), because P falls within the scope of A. 
Depending on what metaphysical commitment should be read into the conjunction of 
the quantifiers into A would determine the plausibility of the view. 
6.1.3 Tense: Reference 
In a similar vein to the problems of quantification we have the problem of truthful 
reference. What is it that makes past and future tensed propositions true if the entities 
to which they refer do not exist? An assertion of "Elizabeth is tired" is true, iff 
Elizabeth is tired. Hence if Elizabeth does not exist then an assertion of "Elizabeth is 
tired" is false. There are three options in the literature that suggests themselves (the 
suggestions of Smith and Craig will not be considered here since I entertain 
independent problems with their specific ontology's later on). 
I) That past and future tensed sentences are true in virtue of some presently 
existing state of (physical) affairs 
2) That past and future tensed sentences are "true" in virtue, not of propositions 
successfully referring, but in virtue of the fact that they are "quasi true" 
3) That past and future tense sentences are true in virtue of the fact that they have 
"grabby" truth conditions-l 
3 This is clearly desirable since we would presumable want the principle to stand even if time were 
unreal 
4 (2) is due to Sider (1999) and (3) to Markosian (2003). It is ~o be recognised that (3) ent.,ails a 
variation of truth, and quasi truth, closely related to (2) (c.r Markoslan (2003: p. 69, see footnote )6). 
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Each of these VIews has received some attention III the literature, but none is. 
ultimately, of any use to the presentist. According to (1) a past tense sentence (4) is 
true if there is some existing state of affairs in the present upon which we can ground 
the proposition. 
4) Dinosaurs roamed the earth 
Thus, (4) will be true if there are fossils that exist in the present to make the 
proposition true. But this seems implausible. It is possible that there existed some 
state of affairs that has left no causal trace in the present. Although unlikely and 
difficult to conceive of, such a state of affairs could have obtained. We would want to 
be able to say that statements about such states of affairs would be true; but on this 
account they cannot be so. 
Further to this it is not clear that presently existing physical entities can be 
truth makers for past tense propositions at all. Consider again the case of the 
dinosaurs. Ludlow's suggestion is that what makes it true that Dinosaurs roamed the 
earth is the existence of fossils. But this is not so. The existence of fossils makes it 
true that fossils exist and, to be sure, the fossils got there somehow. But without the 
truth of the claim that dinosaurs existed and left behind fossils it is impossible to 
claim that the fossils are a result of the existence of dinosaurs. Hence, to say that the 
fossils are the truth makers for past tensed sentences seems inappropriate. To put it 
another way: the truth conditions for "The Dinosaurs roamed the earth," are that, the 
Dinosaurs roamed the earth, and the truth conditions for the existence of fossils are 
the existence of fossils. But the conditions under which the Dinosaurs did roam the 
earth are not necessarily coextensive with those under which fossils were created. It is 
quite possible that fossils exist without the past existence of Dinosaurs, or that 
Dinosaurs existed without the creation of fossils. 
What, then, of the suggestion that past and future tense claims can only be 
quasi true? Sider (1999) argues that there is a sense in which past and future tense 
propositions may not really be true in the same way as Elizabeth being tired (now) is 
true. There is a distinction to be drawn between truth as we normally think of it and 
truth about the past and future. To see this some background is necessary. \\'e would 
normally say that sentences are true if they pick out true propositions about some 
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relevant state of affairs. Now, clearly in the present tense mode there will be sentences 
that pick out propositions that are about some presently existing state of affairs. 
However, in the case of the past- and future-tensed sentences, it is not so clear that 
there are existent propositions since there are no non-present entities for the 
propositions to be about. This obviously causes substantial problems for the Presentist 
because, as we have seen, it seems that there are truths about the past and future and if 
there are no propositions about the past and future then it is less than clear how there 
can be truths about the past and future. 
Instead of claiming that past or future tense statements are true, on Sider's 
view, we claim that they are (metaphysically) false for they do not refer to a singular 
proposition because past (and future) propositions do not exist. But what we can say 
is that such sentences have linguistic meaning, they clearly still mean something even 
if the proposition to which they formerly referred no longer exists (or does not yet 
exist). In such a case, rather than demand that the sentence pick out a singular 
proposition (which it cannot do), we ask merely that it be quasi true, that the meaning 
of the sentence is such that it is satisfied by the way that things were. Even the 
presentist will agree that it is true that things were some way or another. They merely 
dispute the existence of any past thing to make it true. Denying the need for past- or 
future tensed propositions, and adopting the notion of quasi truth for such sentences 
can apparently, circumvent the problem of reference. 
The first thing to question is whether or not the presentist is, or perhaps should 
be, satisfied by this significantly watered down conception of truth, since when we 
say of a tensed sentence that "it is true," we signify quasi truth, when surely what we 
mean is simply that the tensed sentence is true. I do not, after all, suppose that my 
sentences about the past are somehow different in their truth from sentences about the 
present. Where a sentence is true, it is, quite simply, true. I do not suppose that it is 
"differently true," or that it is true in virtue of some mechanics other than those that 
are sufficient for other true sentences. Such a notion seems nonsensical. 
Furthermore, if any sentence is to be said to be true, then paradigmatically, it 
must be a past tense sentence. We cannot dispute that a sentence about the battle of 
Hastings, such as "Harold was slain at the battle of Hastings,' is either true or false. 
Certainly, we may never know whether the sentence is true or false. It might be the 
case for instance that Harold had a body double at the battle of Hastings, and that it 
was he who was shot in the eye with an arrow, or that the very tale of Harold being 
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slain in such a manner is a fiction. But such matters are epistemic and revolve around 
our ability to verify them. Metaphysically it is either true or false that Harold was 
slain at the Battle of Hastings. 
Our third option is to change how we think about truth conditions. Markosian 
(2003) has developed and extended the notion of quasi truth through the addition of 
"searchy" and "grabby" truth conditions. When we are analysing past tensed 
sentences Markosian suggests that we often conflate 
(TC 1 g) 'Socrates was a philosopher' IS true iff (3x) [x IS the referent of 
'Socrates' and P(x is a philosopher)]. 
With 
(TC 1 s) 'Socrates was a philosopher' is true iff P(3x)(x IS the referent of 
'Socrates' and x is a philosopher). (Markosian 2003: p. 70) 
The difference between (TC 1 g) and (TC 1 s) lies in the scope of the formally expressed 
past tense operator. As Markosian has it (TC 1 g) is "grabby"; it wants to "grab" some 
presently existing entity and to give the conditions under which 'Socrates was a 
philosopher' is true in terms of such presently existing entities. Obviously then, if we 
assume presentism to be true, then any past (or future) tensed sentence will be false 
because there are no presently existing entities which can serve as a truth maker for 
the past tense sentence' Socrates was a philosopher. ' 
However, (TC 1 s) is a "searchy" truth condition. It, 'tells us, in effect, to go 
back to past times, and to search for a thing that is the referent of 'Socrates' and that 
is a philosopher' (p. 70). Markosian's position does not fall foul of my objection that 
there should be no difference in how sentences are true, since present tense sentences 
are also true in virtue of "searchy" truth conditions. In the case of past tense reference 
we have to go back to the past time, but in the case of the present tense we have, in 
effect, already sought ought the time that is being referred to. For example in, 
(TC2s) 'Tony Blair is Prime Minister' is true iff Pr(3x) (x is the referent of 
'Tony Blair' and is Prime Minister 
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we are invited to "search around" the present time for the referent of 'Tony Blair', 
grab onto it, and see if it is Prime Minister. If it is, then 'Tony Blair is Prime Minister~ 
is true, and if not, then 'Tony Blair is Prime Minister' is false. 
Markosian's "searchy" and "grabby" account of truth conditions is promising. 
It is intuitive, as he notes, because a past tense sentence is true, not in virtue of 
something that exists now, but in virtue of something which has been the case - which 
seems to fit our intuitions well. However, there remains one problem for his account. 
The "truth maker" thesis which seems to be prominent in contemporary philosophy 
requires of us that any account that we give of reference, at least true reference, must 
include some entity which exists. As Markosian notes, his thesis is not one that entails 
truth in such a fashion. Hence, for Markosian, there will be singular propositions 
about presently existing entities - in addition to which we can give an account of their 
"searchy" truth conditions - but there are no such singular propositions about either 
past or future entities. Without the existence of such propositions, and without the 
existence of the entities themselves, it seems unlikely that the foe of the presentist will 
be persuaded of the need for this distinction in truth conditions, or by the claim that 
entities need not exist in order to have true sentences about them. 5 
And this is the root of my discomfort with contemporary presentism. As it 
stands it simply lacks the metaphysical resources to make sense of reference to, and 
quantification over, times other than the present. Perhaps such criticisms are wrong 
headed. Perhaps we should be enquiring as to how past and future tense sentences are 
true rather than detailing how present tense sentences are true and then trying to make 
the rules for present tense reference apply to past and future tense reference. As I 
suggested in the introduction to this section, my objection is not that such 
formulations of presentism are impossible, but that they will fail to persuade those 
who think that we need non-present entities to act as truth makers for trans temporal 
reference and quantification. What I want to try and offer is a theory that 
accommodates the presentist intuitions with the metaphysical resources to meet these 
problems head-on rather than trying to circumvent them. 
5 Assuming of course that we want to maintain a distinction between tensed sentences and fictions. 
which seems reasonable, since there is a distinction in reality between that which a fiction refers to and 
that which a tensed sentence refers to. The difficulty for the presentist is cashing this out. 
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6.2 Formulation and the problem of change 
However, the problems raised in 6.1 may tum out to be academic for the 
presentist, since it has been argued that there is no intelligible way to formulate the 
presentist thesis in the first place. In fact there are three distinct problems raised with 
the formulation of presentism. The allegations against presentism are that it cannot be 
coherently formulated in any such a way as to avoid either triviality or a 
contradiction, that it cannot be meaningfully distinguished from etemalism and that in 
order to define presentism one must begin with existent entities at times other than the 
present. 
As we shall see the solutions that can be given by the presentist move us from 
one objection to the next, solving one problem, but only at the cost of inviting the 
next. Hence there appears to be a substantial problem for the presentist. 
6.2.1 How to read 'exists' 
The problem is quite hard to see for it does seem that nothing could be more 
easily understood than the claim that nothing exists other than the present. Much of 
the difficulty for the presentist depends on how we read tensed statements (e.g. 
Grunbaum (1971: p. 205), Schuster (1968: p. 459)). Ifwe read "exists" as tensed, then 
all that we say is that: 
a) Existtensed = Only Present things exist now6 
which is nothing more than a triviality. Obviously if something is now, then it is now. 
and, more importantly, both the eternalist and the presentist would agree on (a), thus 
(a) does not distinguish presentism from eternalism and hence cannot serve to define 
presentism. Formulation (a), then, though true, is devoid of metaphysical interest for 
us. 
If on the other hand we read "exists" as a tensed disjunctive - such that we , 
mean that for any entity x, x either has existed, does exist or will exist - then we 
commit ourselves to a contradiction since 
6 My (a), (b) and (c) are identical to those offered, and considered, in Crisp (2004a, 2004b) and Ludlow 
(2004) 
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(b) Exist disjunctive = Only present things existed, exist or will exist 
is obviously false. For example, Crisp (2004a: p. 18) gives the example of the Roman 
Empire, which plainly has existed, but does not exist now and thus is not a present 
thing. Various readings of (b) commit us to one of the three following options, all of 
which are problematic. First, the presentist might choose to accept the existence of x 
as a past entity, such that there is an entity x that is past, and is present in the past. But 
this contradicts the core thesis of presentism, the claim that only the present exists. 
Second, the presentist might choose to deny that the Roman Empire existed, which 
again seems to be, at best, foolish, since the Roman Empire did exist. Failing either of 
these options the presentist might choose to say something like, "The Roman Empire 
did exist, now". The advantage of such a move being that it seems to preserve the 
notion that only present things exist by claiming that whenever an entity exists, it does 
so now. 
However, such a formulation is inadequate as a formulation of presentism as it 
fails to distinguish between presentism and etemalism. As Callender (2000)7 has 
noted, to say that whenever an entity exists, it does so now, does not serve to 
distinguish between eternalism and presentism because even the etemalist will agree 
that if an event is past, then it is "now" at whatever point in time it exists; this is 
simply a thesis upon which both sides would agree. And, on this reading, it does seem 
that (b) borders upon being a truism since (b) would be true even if one assumed that 
times other than the present existed. In order for the Roman Empire to exist it must be 
present on one of the disjunctive counts; that is, it was present, is present or will be 
present. Thus, this particular definition invites Callender's (2000) objection that there 
is nothing in their definitions to separate etemalism from presentism since both agree 
that only those things that are present, exist (p. S589). 
The third reading of the existential quantifier that one might offer, one 
supported by Ludlow (2004), though for different reasons, is that one might read exist 
as tenseless such that 
7 See 7.2 
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c) Existtenseless = Only present things (tenselessly) exist8 
The thesis that the presentist is driving at is obviously something like (c). since the 
desired claim is that our most liberal quantifiers range over all things and only those 
things that are present exist. In other words the presentist claims that the terms 
'present' and 'exist' - whether tensed or untensed - are co extensional. 
However, (c) runs into problems too. The presentist, in defining presentism as 
the thesis that the past and future are not real, appears to be defining those things that 
are real, i.e. the present, by referring to those things that are not real, i.e. the past and 
future. There appears to be a move to say something like the following from Prior: .... 
the present simply is the real considered in relation to two particular species of 
unreality, namely the past and the future' (Quoted in Smith 2002: p. 123). But then 
the question due to Smith (2002: p. 123) arises, namely how is it that reality can be 
defined as standing in relation to that which is unreal 79 
This problem can be cashed out in two ways. The first is to say that the 
presentist is giving a definition of the present in terms of the non existent past and 
future, and the second is to say that the presentist requires there to be a metaphysical 
relation between the past and future in order to formulate their position. The second of 
the problems is fallacious, since it is possible to give an account of temporal relations 
that does not require the actual existence of the past and future. Such a reductive 
analysis is proposed by Craig (2000b: pp. 149-58). However, the first problem, the 
problem of definition, remains with us. 
Here is the problem. Time is real. Things are past, present and future. We 
know what these terms mean and we know that there are things that are past and 
future. However, we must then commit to the claim that the present is to be compared 
to the past and future in order to see what kind of thing that it is. But if the past and 
future are not real then how are we to gain any further understanding of what is meant 
by present? 
8 Provided one does not read the tense less quantifier as a tensed disjunctive. . 
9 This is just as much a problem for the proponent of (b), e.g. Crisp, as it is for (~~. The (b) presentlst 
claims that the most unrestricted temporal quantifier ranges only over those entities that are pre.sen.t. 
and that those things that are not present are not real. In doing so it does seem that the present 1st IS 
giving a definition of the present in terms of the non existent past and future. 
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6.2.2 Unreal Change 
Oaklander (2002) has urged that presentism be rejected on the grounds that it 
appears to entail that change is unreal. Oaklander's concerns stem from the fact that 
any account of temporal relations (i.e. being earlier than or later than) appears to 
imply the existence of times other than the present and that an account of presentism 
that restricts the existential quantifier to the present moment appears to represent to us 
a static conception of reality. Oaklander argues (p. 75), that in the absence of 
persistence through time (time not being a thing at all according to the Presentist), the 
Presentist is in difficulty for they lack any thing that is changing. They must, 
Oaklander argues, look elsewhere for their account of change - though this too proves 
problematic. 
'But if only the present moment exists without qualification, then in order to 
generate change the presentist must introduce tensed propositions that change 
their truth value at different times depending on what exists simpliciter at those 
times as time passes. Of course, if a tensed proposition changes its truth-value at 
different times, then there must be those times at which the proposition changes, 
and in order to be the genuine times they must be members of a temporal series 
whose generating relation is earlier/later than. But if there exists only one time, 
the present time, then how can any time be earlier or later than another and how 
can a proposition or anything else change from one time to another? (Oaklander 
(2002: p. 75) 
The problem being that in order to account for propositions about change, the 
Presentist needs existent times to which the propositions refer, to exist. Without times 
to refer to, it seems that the can be no such propositions and, hence, we cannot 
formulate an account of change. For example, if I were to say that an oar did have the 
property of being bent but has changed, then it seems that in order to describe this 
change the oar must exist both straight and bent in order for there to be propositions 
about the oar in both conditions. This problem can be met and in chapter seven I 
show how. 
The final problem that faces the presentist. happily one that the classical 
presentist can rebut - though none has done so as far as I am aware - is due to 
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Schuster (1968). In constructing the presentist ontology, the claim that only the 
present exists, the presentist has argued that there are all of these distinct times, the 
past, present and future, but that only one of them - the present - is real. On what 
grounds can the presentist justify the rejection of the existence of these times when it 
appears that they have been included in the initial formulation? 
Our point is just that temporally prior events have ceased to be. All existence is 
thus confined to the present moment, and it is this truth which is communicated 
by coupling the present tense with the expression, 'the sum total of existence,' 
in the statement 'The sum total of existence at t2 does not include E' .. .In other 
words, the [presentist] grants - he must grant - that things and events existed at 
prior times; and having posited such existents, he cannot then disregard them. 
He must find some way to deny their existence before he has any right to claim 
that nothing exists outside of the present moment, or before be can legitimately 
link the present tense to the expression, "the sum total of existence." (p. 459) 
Fortunately, the presentist can show metaphysical reasons to make the claim 
that the sum total of existence is to be limited to the present. It was suggested in 
chapter one that McTaggart's argument forces us to choose between presentist and C 
theoretic (with temporality somehow infused) ontology's. Since the latter have been 
rejected on the grounds that they are found wanting for the reasons detailed in 
chapters two through five, it follows that the presentist metaphysic is the only one 
remaining to us if we are to explain this time and temporality. Thus, the presentist has 
good reasons to suppose that the past and future are not to be included in an account 
of temporality, since theirs is the only solution which can solve the paradox. 
There are two presentists in particular who have done a great deal to clarify 
issues concerning these problems, Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. However, 
I shall not explore their proposals since these hinge on their ontological commitments 
and it is these commitments that are found wanting in 6.4 and 6.5 respectively. 
Obviously, what the presentist wants to do is to find some way of restricting the 
tenseless existential quantifier to the present without defining the present negatively 
in terms of the non-existent past and future. But what is unclear is how this is tu be 
achieved since time is taken to be that to which the temporal locutions of the A series , 
apply. 
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6.3 SR 
The third and final problem for presentism that will be considered here arises 
from the special theory of relativity. This is, arguably, the greatest problem for the 
presentist to overcome. As Saunders (2002) has it, 
If presentism is a thesis about ontology, and says that existence consists of a 
three-dimensional spatial reality; if in elaboration of this thesis, it opposes the 
tenseless view of time, and denies that talk of events as past, present or future is 
elliptical talk about the relation of events to our momentary selves: then it 
contradicts special relativity. It contradicts it in the sense that it implies that 
special relativity is badly deficient as a fundamental theory of the world. (p.279) 
The VIew that presentism IS contradicted by the special theory of relativity is 
commonplace. lo To begin with, note that the special theory is standardly imbedded 
into a space-time. If such a metaphysical construction is accurate then presentism is 
ruled out tout court since all times exist. However, since we have found the means, in 
previous chapters, for denying that space-time is the correct means for conceiving of 
time, such considerations can be put on one side for a moment. 
The more pressing issue for the presentist is the claim that there is no such 
thing as the absolute present, for although the imbedding of the special theory into the 
context of a space-time can be resisted, it seems rather harder to resist the claim that 
there is no such thing as an absolute relation of simultaneity across great distances and 
at high velocities. I I If there is no such thing as a global hyperplane of simultaneity 
then it is hard to conceive of what the presentist means when she claims that only the 
present exists. At any point in time there cannot be a set of points that is to be called 
"the present." Which events are present will depend upon the frame of reference that 
one inhabits. But that means that events that are present in one frame of reference will 
not be present in another frame of reference, which appears to imply the existence of 
times other than the present. 
10 See variously, though not exclusively, Weingard (1969), Putnam (1979), Savitt (2000), Callender 
(2000) Sider (2001: pp. 42-52) and Saunders (2002). . 
II See section 3.1 and the presentation of the special theory therem. 
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Sider (2001: pp. 42-52) has done more than most in an attempt to explore the 
options for the presentist. He explores 5 hybrids of presentism that might each make a 
claim to be solutions to the problem for the presentist. Although, there is, he claims, 
no plane of absolute simultaneity, there are several features of the special theory that 
are of interest. 
(1) the absolute future of p: the set of points that could be reached from p by a 
signal travelling at or below the speed of light; (2) the absolute past of p: the set 
of points from which p may be reached by a signal travelling at or below the 
speed of light; and (3) the set of points space like separated from p: those points 
that cannot be connected to p by any signal travelling at or below the speed of 
light. (Sider 2001: p.43) 
From these three features Sider derives five hybrids. 
Hybrid 1: Here-now-ism: only a single point in space-time is real. 
Hybrid 2: Retain an arbitrary hyperplane and declare that those events are 
simultaneous with one another 
Hybrid 3: The existence of a "point" p present, and the absolute past of that 
point: the set of points from which p may be reached by a signal travelling at 
or below the speed of light 
Hybrid 4: The existence of a "point" p present, and the absolute future of that 
point: the set of points which may be reached by a signal leaving from p 
travelling at or below the speed of light 
Hybrid 5: The existence of a point p present, and the set of points that are space-
like separated from p 
Sider then discusses the defects of each position.1 2 Hybrids 3 and 4 can be ruled out 
since they are incompatible with presentism - they include the existence of the past 
and future respectively - and, in doing so, fail to provide us with a solution to 
McTaggart's paradox. Hybrid 2 is, according to Sider, scientifically re\'isionary (p. 
47) and so is to be tentatively rejected (p. 52).13 
11 I will return to hybrid 1 later since it is defended and explored rather more thoroughly by Hinchliff 
(1996,2000) . 
IJ In actual fact Hybrid 2 is metaphysically revisionary. The argument there tu~ns o~ the ~lal.m th~t th~ 
metaphysical claim that rules out the existence of an "arbitrary" hyperplane IS venficatlOntst - If we 
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Hybrid 5 is interesting, though it too is to be rejected. Rather than supposing 
the existence of an absolute present we include the existence of all things that are 
merely space-like separated from a point p and those entities that exist at p. Sider's 
point against Hybrid 5 is that it, 'implies the existence of an implausibly 
distinguished point' (p.52). Surely the existence of just one such point in all reality is 
too aribitrary an addition to our scientific theories to countenance seriously? Perhaps, 
though, it might still be the case that Hybrid 5 offers us a genuine metaphysical 
possibility. 
The greater problem for Hybrid 5 is that it is not presentism at all. Hybrid 5 is 
not presentism because it admits those things that might be earlier than or later than 
the point p. All that we are saying when we say that an event is space-like separated 
from p is that it is not possible for causal influences to propagate to p from the event 
in question, or from p to the event in question. This being so it should be clear that 
such a view is akin to an eternalist ontology, admitting as it does the existence of 
more than one time. Given the forgoing arguments in previous chapters concerning 
eternalist ontologies it should be clear why I do not favour such an interpretation of 
the special theory. 
6.3.1 Here-Dow-ism 
So far as I am aware no one has seriously entertained any of Sider's Hybrid's 
with the exception of Hybrids 1 and 2. Hinchliff (1996, 2000) has proposed and 
defended a variation of Here-now-ism. Hinchliff s account of presentism is motivated 
by a particular handling of the problem of temporary intrinsics and will not be 
discussed here. I will suppose that the arguments which he presents are sufficient to 
cannot verify the existence of absolute simultaneity then it cannot exist. Arguments are presented 
therein to show verificationism to represent one metaphysical possibility. Since verificationism is 
incompatible with presentism - the only solution to McTagg~rt's paradox - veri?cationism does not 
represent a genuine metaphysical possibility. Since Sider's claim turns on the notion. th~t, 'the pres~nt 
discussion will assume that consistency with something fairly close to current phYSICS IS a constraInt 
that must be met by any adequate theory of time' (pA2), it follows. that i~ metaphysics. ~ules out 
verificationism then the scientific picture presented by Sider, and noted In 3.2, .IS open to revIsIOn. fro~ 
metaphysics since the metaphysics propounded herein rules out ~he metaphysIcs. that supports SIder s 
contemporary science. Of course if science is about best explanatIons then th~re IS .no re~son at all ~hat 
the empirical implications of the special theory cannot be reworked to fall Into lIne with presentlsm 
which is, I suggest, our best metaphysical explanation. 
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motivate presentism; even if they are not, then we have ample arguments here to do 
so. 
The obvious advantage of here-now-ism over other theories which may 
require (apparently) arbitrary revision to our scientific theories is that fewer revisions 
are necessary. In arguing that only a single point in space-time exists - is real - the 
here-now presentist is still committed to thinking of space-time as little more than a 
. fi' 14 H convenIent IctlOn. owever, the here-now presentist does not have to revise 
scientific claims as to the lack of absolute simultaneity since all that exists. or at least 
all that we can talk about, is the here-now. Since here-now-ism is compatible with the 
claims made in chapter four concerning the nature of temporal experience and does 
not require scientific revision, here-now-ism is, prima jacie, by far the most appealing 
of Sider's Hybrids. 
However, here-now-ism will not do. There are three, related, problems that 
can be raised with the view: first, it is unclear how the here-now-ist will make sense 
of quantification - notwithstanding the problems raised for quantification mentioned 
above - second, truth appears to be denied to us and third, the view is so solipsistic I 
am unsure as to its actual coherence. The first charge, then, is that the here-now-ist 
cannot make sense of tensed quantification. 
It is to be admitted by the presentist (supposing that they can make sense of 
trans temporal quantification) that a time, whatever that may turn out to be, will be 
something over which a tensed quantifier will range. Let us also suppose that 
quantifiers range over all times. Since according to here-now-ism only one point in 
space can exist, let us call this SI, quantification over spaces other than SI, say S2. can 
be shown to be impossible. Suppose that the point in space that exists, SI, is located in 
Hastings. This would allow us to claim that we can quantify over the Battle of 
Hastings in 1066, because we can define what the time is at Hastings. 15 But suppose. 
then, that we want to be able to quantify over events in Durham in 1066; if here-now-
ism specifies that "the present" exists only at the "here" of Hastings, then we cannot 
determine what the time is in Durham when it is 1066 in Hastings. Indeed, there is no 
fact of the matter as to what the time is in Durham when it is 1066 in Hastings. This 
I-t It may seem inappropriate to think of here-now presentism in con~unction with space-time at ~IL 
since such a conjunction seems to imply that certain regions of space-time - the nO,n-her~-no\~ ~ eX,lst, 
as space-time, but are not real. Unless the presentist wants to. mak,e use of so~e Memonglan dlstmctlon 
between existence and reality (c.f. Sider 2001: p. 46) the conjUnctiOn appears III founded. , l~ I am assuming that in order to quantify over something we must, at the very least, know either what 
time it is, or where it is. 
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would appear to rule out trans temporal and trans locational quantification completely 
since there is no here, nor any time, other than there here-now. 
Second, it was claimed that here-now-ism denies us truth. It certainly denies 
us truth-makers for sentences about anything not located both at the here and the now, 
and supposing that we want to retain any version of, or variation upon. a 
correspondence theory of truth - truth as corresponding to some feature or other of 
reality - then we need existent entities to which propositions can refer. Here-now-ism, 
by denying the existence of everything other than a single point, denies itself the 
resources with which to say that any singular proposition about the most everyday 
occurrences can exist. 
Finally, and on a related matter, here-now-ism is absurdly solipsistic. Savitt 
(2000) is too kind when he asks, 'is it not at least a little discomforting to the 
presentist to restrict reality to just one point of space-time?' (p. S568). It is not just 
discomforting, the view is bordering on the ridiculous. A theory which restricts itself 
to only a single point of existence can make little sense of reality, it lacks almost all of 
the resources to explain perceptions (of all kinds) and a technical account of truth or 
any other philosophical concept will be impossible. It is, to use the term as it was 
discussed in 4.2.3, a "silly" theory. 
If the presentist is to find a theory that is compatible with the special theory, 
then the special theory must be reinterpreted so as to include the existence of absolute 
simultaneity. If the presentist cannot make this move then, as the discussions here 
have shown, the special theory does rule out presentism as a viable metaphysic. 
6.4 Craig's Ontology 
In order to make sense of some of the problems mentioned above William 
Lane Craig has developed a particular strand of presentism. His solution to 
McTaggart's paradox is ontological. He argues that the past and future are to be 
thought of as possible worlds, existing in the present. Obviously, if Craig'S arguments 
go through then we can refer to the past and future in the same way that we refer to 
possibilities and we can quantify in the same way that \ve quantify o\'er possibilities. 
However, Craig's view succumbs to a number of problems and his modal solution 
does not provide us with a genuine metaphysical possibility. 
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Craig has in mind a very particular view of possible worlds. He eschews the 
Lewisian notion, opting instead for Plantinga's (1974) account. 
Following Plantinga, we may conceive of a possible world as a maximal possible 
state of affairs, where a state of affairs s is maximal if for every state of affairs s', s 
includes s' or s precludes s'. (Craig (2003: p. 397) 
In order to have temporal passage Craig notes that one must understand possible 
worlds tenselessly; to do otherwise would be to invoke McTaggart's paradox. As 
Craig has it, 
So conceived, possible worlds and the states of affairs that constitute them are 
normally understood to be tenseless states of affairs; otherwise, \\ e could never speak 
of events' occurring at different times in a possible world, since, as McTaggart's 
paradox discloses, there is no maximal or complete description of a temporal world 
over time owing to tensed facts. (p. 397) 
Although there is nothing obviously problematic thus far a simple note on facts may 
be worth making: we might, perhaps, be wary of including tensed facts into our 
ontology. Indeed, it is not clear to me that we need to include facts into our ontology 
at all, let alone tensed facts. What we might say instead is that there are tensed 
sentences (propositions?), the truth of which may vary over time. 16 
It is to be noted that Craig's position does prima facie avoid the paradox as it 
does, in principle, deny the existence of the C series. However, as well as these 
tenseless states of affairs, Craig needs something else - something in virtue of which 
we may be justified in including tense. In order to achieve this Craig admits the 
existence of tensed states of affairs; the distinction between tensed and tense less states 
of affairs lying in the fact that 
A tensed possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs at some time t of 
arbitrarily stipulated duration, whether an instant, an arbitrarily brief moment, an hour 
a day, and so forth. (p. 397-8) 
16 At any rate we should have to have good reasons for including such entities into our ontology. 
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At this point, then, it seems that we ought to raise a problem. What is the distinction 
between a tensed and tenseless possible world? Craig's clarification on this matter is 
less than illuminating. 
To say that a temporal entity x exists in a tenseless possible world w is to say that if 11' 
were actual, x would exist (tenselessly) at some time t; or again, x exists in H' if it is 
impossible that w obtain and x fail to exist (tenselessly) at some time t. Analogously, 
to say that x exists in a tensed possible world wt is to say that if w t were actual, then x 
would exist (present-tensed). To say that x exists in a tensed actual world at is to say 
that when at becomes actual, then x exists (present-tense); it is impossible when at 
obtains that x not exist (present tense). (p. 398) 
Recall our discussion of how to read tense in 6.1.1. Obviously we cannot read 
"exists" as a disjunction of tensed locutions or tenselessly, since to do so would fail to 
distinguish between a tensed and a tenseless possible world. However, to read "exists" 
as present tensed would fail to distinguish between tensed possible worlds and 
tenseless possible worlds that include only a single time. 
If, for example, world w exists and is such that it includes only a single 
[tenseless] time t, then, it would be true both that it is impossible for w to obtain and x 
fail to exist [tenselessly] and for at to obtain and x not exist. Since such a possible world 
would be tenseless it is not clear that Craig's account of possible worlds is sufficient for him 
to proceed with a clear notion of what distinguishes tensed and tenseless possible worlds. 
Further, it is not clear what makes these possible worlds tensed possible 
worlds. Craig's claim that to have been is just that - to have been - is insufficient 
here, for in order to be able to distinguish, in order for there to be any difference, 
between tensed and tense less possible worlds, there must be some difference between 
the two. In other words, if some worlds are tensed and others tenseless, in virtue of 
what feature is this true? It is this that Craig owes us an explanation of. Without some 
account of the "tensing" feature of a possible world I fail to see how we can proceed. 
Although I agree with Craig that all there is to saying that a past event is past 
is simply to say that it has existed - that there is something irreducible about the 
notion (something I shall return to shortly) - if we are to distinguish between possible 
worlds those that are tensed and those that are tenseless, then there must be some , 
feature in virtue of which a tensed possible world is just that - "tensed". But the only 
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other candidates for this role, for "tensing" a possible world, are temporal relations or 
properties. Neither of these are available to Craig. Thus, at the very least, Craig O\\Oes 
us some account of what is meant by tense and whatever this is must then provide us 
with an account of temporality that is not prone to McTaggart's arguments. 
However, there is a further problem. Craig makes the following claim. 
The actual world a is the maximal state of affairs that obtains (tenselessly). Were 
some other world actual a would not obtain, but would still exist as a possible state 
of affairs. Since only a is in fact actual, none of the other tenseless possible worlds is 
actual, but each one is actual in or at itself. Each world w has the property of actuality 
in wand in w alone. That also goes for a. But a is not merely actual in a; in fact it is 
actual simpliciter. Thus, a is uniquely distinguished as the actual world, the one 
tenseless possible world that obtains. Analogously, each tensed possible world exists 
in each such world. The tensed actual world v is the maximal state of affairs that 
obtains (present-tense). Were some other tensed possible world actual, then v would 
not obtain, but it would still exist as a tensed possible state of affairs. Since valone is 
(present-tense) actual, none of the other tensed actual worlds (not to speak of tensed 
merely possible worlds) is (present-tense) actual, though they either were or will be 
actual. Still, each tensed world, including v, is actual in itself. But v is not merely 
actual in v, but also actual simpliciter. Thus v is uniquely distinguished as the tensed 
actual world, the one tensed world that obtains (present-tense). (pp. 398-9) 
I suggest that this is either inconsistent, paradoxical or leads to the collapse of Craig's 
brand of presentism into etemalism. 
If, at each tensed possible world that world is actual, then it is true to say at 
world y, irrespective of whether or not y is actual simpliciter, y is actual at y.17 
However, at world y it is also true to say that world v is actual, supposing that v is 
present - actual simpliciter. If it is not true to say that world v is actual simpliciter at 
world y, then I fail to see what Craig is driving at, for to be actual simpliciter is to be 
actual irrespective of the perspective taken. But now consider the following: if worlds 
v and y are co-actual, that is, at world y both worlds are actual, then we have a 
17 N t that even if Craig's solution to McTaggart's paradox is viable it still leaves us with the problem 
oed" . h b d * * raised by Bourne (2002), discussed in 1.4.-+, namely how to. l~tll1~UIS etween present an present ,. 
One would simply recast the problem as one of how to distIngUish between when one was actual at 
one's own world and actual simpliciter. 
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problem. If world y is taken to be a tensed future possible world and v the present 
actual world, then we have a case whereby both v and yare actual. 
But such a position is not a presentist position, for on this reading where both 
and yare actual, the past, present and the future are actual. Further. given the above 
claim that both worlds are actual it would appear that we are going to encounter 
McTaggart's paradox as those things that are past, present and future will all be co-
actual. 
It may be objected that although world v is actual simpliciter and hence actual 
at world y, the fact that world y is only actual at world y precludes there from being a 
problem. It is only possible to generate an infinite series of hyper times (or 
McTaggart's paradox) if those things that are past, present and future co-exist in some 
manner. Since Craig's take on possible worlds denies that y is actual simpliciter, there 
is no sense in which v and y co-exist, at least not in such a fashion as to entail 
McTaggart's paradox. This 'solution' to the problem is intriguing. It means that for 
any occupant of the tensed world y, v is actual simpliciter, but only y is actual at y. 
Although this reading does not entail McTaggart's paradox it does entail a rather 
peculiar consequence; namely, that the present is actual in the future even though the 
future does not exist (at least not according to presentism)! For y may be actual at y 
whilst v is actual simpliciter and thus we can see that the future is actual at itself, at 
world y, and v is actual simpliciter for it is present. Hence y is actual at itself even 
though it does not exist according to presentist mantra. 
Although I do not think that Craig's version of presentism is ultimately viable 
I do think that it is suggestive of the way forward. In Craig's presentism only the 
present is real - only those things that exist now exist at all. Craig's view is, then. a 
Hybrid view - it unites genuine becoming and possible worlds. But in light of the 
problems raised above I remain unconvinced by Craig's view. 
The final problem I raise centres on the suspicion that Craig's view collapses 
back into eternalism - that the definition that he gives is inadequate. In any world u 
only u has the property of being actual, though in some other world <p, <p has the 
property of being actual. However, it might also be the case that as well as having the 
property of being actual at <p, <p is actual simpliciter. Thus, at u, although <p is not 
actual at u, <p is actual simpliciter. But this is just to say that at some time t a 
particular state of affairs is actuaL but that it is actual in such a \\'ay as to distinguish t 
to itself. but that times other than t, e.g. t*, also c:\ist. So far as I can make out this is 
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simply etemalism dressed up in presentist language. Craig can object that times other 
than the present do not have the property of being actual simpliciter and, hence, are 
not concrete entities, and that at a we can distinguish q> from a (where q> is present -
actual simpliciter) on the basis that q> is concrete where a is not. But I fail to see how 
this will work since at a, a will be concrete (otherwise it will not be actual at a) and q> 
will be actual simpliciter and so both will be concrete and actual. 
6.5 Quentin Smith - Degree Presentism 
Quentin Smith has argued, in various papers (e.g. 2002, 2003), for a position 
which he refers to as Maximalism, or Degree presentism. His claim is that although 
everything that exists does so presently, both abstract and concrete objects also exist 
exemplifying the monadic properties pastness, presentness and futurity (e.g. Smith 
(2002: p.126), thus distinguishing his view from the more familiar presentism as 
proposed by, e.g. Hinchliff (1996, 2000), Craig (2000a, 2004) Bigelow (1996) and 
Zimmerman (1998). In this section I wish to raise three problems for the view 
espoused by Smith; two metaphysical and one phenomenological. Considered as a 
critical whole these views should be sufficient to motivate a rejection of Maximalism. 
To further this analysis a brief explication of Smith's work is befitting and I shall 
concentrate my efforts on his most recent development of Maximalism in Reference 
to the Past and Future and Degree Presentism. 
Being presently present is the highest degree of existence. Being presently past 
and being presently future by a merely infinitesimal amount is the second highest 
degree of existence ... The degree to which an item exists is proportional to its 
temporal distance from the present (2003: p. 381) 
Hence, for Smith, although only the present exists, there are clearly two senses 
of the term present: the sense in which the present is used to indicate the possession of 
a monadic temporal property and a second sense which is rather unclear. This second 
sense is worthy of explication since both metaphysical problems turn on how we 
might interpret this second order presentness. It appears to me that Smith means 
something along the lines of it being possible for the property of being present to be 
presently attributed to a particular entity. 
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I shall use a temporal term with a 'one' in subscript to denote first order 
temporality - time as denoted by first order monadic properties. e.g. Past). and a 
temporal term with a 'two' in subscript to denote second order temporality. e.g. 
Presenh. As I said above, although the precise nature of this present2 needs to be 
elucidated further it seems possible to see what it is that Smith is driying at. Where I 
wish to use a temporal term as we might in common parlance I shall simply use the 
term, e.g. 'present'. In the quotation above, note that it is possible for an entity to be 
"presently present", that is, for the entity to somehow exist in the now. in the 11011', We 
may explicate this notion more clearly by noting that on Smith' s view an entity may 
be PresentlY2 Past), PresentlY2 Present) and PresentlY2 Future). An entity may for 
example exist in the Present2 with the monadic property of Pastness). In common 
parlance we might say that an entity would presently have the property of being 
present. 
To further explicate Smith's view we might note the following. Given Smith's 
claim that an object is Present) precisely if it possesses the monadic temporal property 
of Presentness) this will surely lead to a contradiction since the temporal properties of 
Pastness), Presentness) and Futurity) are incompatible; for an entity may be presentlY2 
past) if it currently has the property of being past. If this is true, that an object is 
required by Maximalism to bear the properties of pastness, presentness and futurity, 
then Maximalism is clearly false. 
However, Smith may reply that although the first sense in which the term 
'present' is used in the above is to denote a monadic property, the second sense serves 
to indicate a form of 'present' which is not denoted by a monadic property; that this 
second use of the term 'present' - Present2 - serves to indicate the state of affairs 
when an event e is Present). Such that when e is Present), e* may be Past) and e** 
Future), reality admits of the existence of only the Present2 (as opposed to Past2 and 
Future2) which, at e, is defined as the time when e has the property of being Present), 
e* the property of being Past) and e* * the property of being future). Thus e is Present) 
only when e is Present2 and vice versa. Thus it appears that Smith can circumvent 
Craig's criticism that his explanation of Presentness is vacuous (2003: p. 404). 
Hence when Craig asks, . How can a substance that existed, but no longer 
exists, now possess properties?' (Op. Cit) the answer is, clearly, that although, say, 
Plato does not exist,. he does exist2. where exist2 is understood as the totality of 
existence (including those things that possess the temporal properties of Past, and 
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Future)) at the point in time when e is Present2. There just is another sense that can be 
attributed to the term 'present' i.e. Present2. It is certainly a little unclear as to 
precisely what Smith means by Present2, and I think that we might ultimately raise 
serious problems for Maximalism as the only way of cashing out second order 
temporality, e.g. time2, appears to lead us into contradiction. 
There are two metaphysical problems that I wish to raise with this view of 
time. The first is that it is unclear what precisely is intended by Presenh and that the 
only plausible analysis that I can think of appears to entail an infinite regress of hyper 
times. The second problem is that quantification over times2 appears to also entail a 
contradiction. Our first complaint, then, is that it is not clear what distinguishes 
second order temporality from its first order counterpart? If something is temporall 
only in virtue of bearing an appropriate monadic property, then it is difficult to make 
the case for Maximalism. Although second order temporal properties would not 
necessarily entail a contradiction since it is not clear that, for example, the first order 
property of Pastness) is incompatible with the second order property of Presentness2, 
it appears unclear precisely how we may refer to this second series as temporal. 
If, in order to be Present), an entity must bear a temporal property of 
Presentnessl, then surely in order for an entity to be Present2 it must also possess the 
temporal property of Presentness2. However, if we are to refer to this second order 
notion as temporal, if Present2 is to be a temporal term, then it must do something 
temporal. Smith remarks of the ontological commitments of Craig (2001) and 
Plantinga (1974) that the states of affairs which they make use of, 'must include some 
temporal component that makes it [a past tensed state of affairs] a past tensed state of 
affairs' (Smith (2003: p. 371). Likewise, then, for e to be Present2, there must be some 
feature of reality in virtue of which e is Present2. If we were to declare Presentness2 a 
temporal property then this would appear to imply the existence of other temporah 
properties. If Smith denies this then it is not clear to me what the addition of 
Presentness2 adds to a state of affairs. 
However, the Maximalist will only able to incorporate passage through the 
continual acquisition and loss of temporall properties, in virtue of a change in that 
which was Present2. Hence, e is Present2 when e has the property of Presentness., e* 
has the property of Pastnessl and e** has the property FuturitYl and what exists -
what is Present2 will change as entities change their temporal) properties. Thus there 
will come a time2 when e* * is Present2. The only way that I see open is to invoke a 
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further notion of Present - Present3 - in which e is Present3 if e is Present} and, hence, 
Present2. But then we shall run into the same problem with defining what is meant by 
Present3 as we did with Present2 and so on ad infinitum. If there is no feature of 
reality, in virtue of which we may declare e to be Presenh then it is unclear to me 
how, following Smith's schema we are to attribute Presentness2 to reality. 
This leads us onto the second problem: how we are to read the existential 
quantifier in second order presentness? The most likely move for Smith is simply to 
say that Presenh is designed to act as a placeholder for what exists when e is Present}, 
thus circumventing the problems raised for Maximalism above. I say that this route 
offers a solution, for if the Maximalist can use Present2 as a placeholder for 'exists' 
then we have found the feature of reality in virtue of which we may attribute 
Presentness2 which was lacking above, i.e. existence. However, the move to render 
Present2 as a placeholder for what 'exists' when e is Present} will not do on the 
grounds that the various readings we may make of 'exists' are such as to imply a 
further contradiction. Smith himself distinguishes three different ways in which we 
may read the existential quantifier, two tensed and one tenseless reading (p. 377). 
(1) In one sense, it [the term 'exists'] is logically equivalent to 'has the property of 
presentness' (op. cit) 
This reading will not help the Maximalist, for Present2 then becomes a 
temporal property. If it is correct to treat second order temporality as a property, then, 
as we saw above, it would appear apt to include in one's ontology the second order 
temporal properties of Past2 and Future2 otherwise it is manifestly unclear what the 
property Present2 is, since Smith argues that to have a temporal property is to add 
something to a state of affairs. Surely presentness may only be a temporal property of 
any order if it distinguishes those entities which bear it from those that do not, in other 
words if it attributes something different to an entity than "past" or "future". 
Of course, as we saw above, once we acknowledge the existence of a complete 
hyper time2 (e.g. past2, present2 and future2) in which the change of the lower series 
timel is to be accounted for, we arrive back at the infinite regress of temporal series 
since we will need a further higher series to account for change in every lower series. 
Thus, the first reading of . exists' does not appear to favour the Maximalist. 
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(2) it [exists] can also be equivalent to 'presently possesses some property' ... If 
Jones now has the property of having been born 500 years ago, Jones 
presently possesses the property of having been born 500 years ago. Jones 
'exists' in this second sense of 'exists', but he does not exist in the first 
present tensed-sense of 'exists' (op. cit) 
Hence, if Presenh itself means 'presently possess some property', then this must in 
turn entail the existence of a sense in which Present2 is 'present' in some higher time 
series, i.e. is Present3. This follows since the claim being made is that Present2 means, 
'presently possess some property of present2'. If temporality is to be considered in 
terms of monadic properties then the first 'present' in that quotation must also be a 
bearer of monadic properties, i.e. Present3. 
Of course if Present3 is also to be declared Present in the sense that the 
existential quantifier is read in (2), then Present3 must also entail a higher time series. 
Again this can be shown to be an infinite regress thus making temporal passage 
incompatible with Maximalism. Reading (3) fairs little better. 
(3) If 'exists' is tenseless it is in effect, disjunctively tensed; that is, it is 
equivalent to 'has existed, exists, or will exist' where the middle 'exists' is 
equivalent to 'has the property of presentness'. If we say, 'Socrates exists', 
we mean that Socrates either has existed, or exists (presently), or will exist 
(op. cit) 
The tenseless reading of the existential quantifier over temporalitY2 implies the 
existence of all times2. If all times2 exist, simpliciter, then, again, one is committed to 
temporal passage occurring in some further time series - time3. But once again, unless 
one can find some way of cashing out what is meant by a temporal predicate within a 
higher time series it is unclear how Maximalism will function. We simply return to 
the question of what kind of things Smith entails the existence of when he uses tensed 
temporal predicates. Of course all of these readings have been based on the 
assumption that Present2 is merely a placeholder for 'exists' and it may be that 
Present2 can, in fact, be cashed out in some other way which does not entail an infinite 
regress of temporal series, but Smith certainly owes us an explanation of how this is 
to function, for as it currently stands he appears to be prone to contradiction. 
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In each of the objections above it has been noted that a contradiction only 
arises only if one insists that temporal passage be incorporated. It would be perfectly 
plausible for one to construct a second order time series in conjunction with a lower 
order time series and not entail temporal passage. However, such a VIew seems 
difficult to motivate since it will satisfy neither the A nor B theorist. 
The third problem that I should raise for the Maximalist IS one from 
phenomenology. Smith claims, '[t]hat existence is degreed explains our 
phenomenological experience' (p. 381). Smith's argument turns on the claim that 
'[t]here is a difference of degree and not of kind between the Present} and what is no 
longer Present} or not yet Present}' (op. cit) [I have substituted Smith's 'present' with 
my 'Present}' in the interests of clarity.] Smith argues that our inability to 
differentiate, precisely, the moment which is Present} from that which IS 
infinitesimally Past} and Future} can be explained by Maximalism since there is only 
a slight difference of degree between that which is infinitesimally Past} or Future}, 
and that which is Present}. However, this phenomenological claim implies that we are 
unable to recognise the distinction between that which is significantly Past} and that 
which is Present}. 
But is this true? On Smith's account my experience of an event which is 
twenty minutes Past} should be qualitatively distinct from my experience of an event 
that is Present} (or at least only infinitesimally Past} or Future}). But plainly this is not 
true. I may remember the event of twenty minutes ago, remembering being a polyadic 
relation (p. 378) for Smith, but that is also a Present} act. My objection is not that 
there are Past} events to which I do not have epistemic access to [e.g. the dinosaurs 
roaming the earth] despite the fact that they share the property of pastness with me, 
since the possession of a property is plausibly sufficient to render an entity 
unobservable. One might suppose that pastness is relevantly like spatial distance, if 
one becomes sufficiently past it cannot be seen. My objection, rather, is that there are 
events to which I have had epistemic access, such as my drinking a cup of coffee, that 
I do not appear to be experiencing nOW2. 
Of course, Smith will object that I am not experiencing the drinking of the 
coffee as a Present} experience, but as a Past}, Present2 experience (a presently past 
experience in common parlance). But in as much as Maximalism does explain our 
inability to distinguish between the infinitesimally Past}, Present} and Future!, it does 
not explain why I never have the experience of PresentlY2, Pastly} drinking a cup of 
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coffee; all that I do have are memories of having drunk the cup of coffee in the past. If 
all entities exist with these gradations in temporal properties, in existence, then it 
should be the case that I have experiences of PresentlY2, Pastly! or Futurely) doing 
things. Since I do not, it seems inappropriate to suggest that temporality is merely a 
composition of temporal properties for the view does not conform to our experience 
of reality. A similar line of objection is raised by Bourne (2002) to Tooley (1997) and 
McCall's (1994) Hybrid theories of time, as was noted in 1.4. Bourne's point is that 
we lack the ability to distinguish between times as *present* (metaphysically present) 
and present (present to the experience). He argues that it is a deficiency of 
explanatory power of both Tooley's and McCall's models that they fail to provide any 
way of distinguishing between the two uses of the term 'present'. One could raise this 
line against Smith too, since one's experiences will be Past), Present! and Future) 
within the same Present2. The more pressing line seems to be the lack of Past! and 
Future! experiences, despite the existence of the Past) and Future! in the Present2, 
particularly given Smith's claim that we do have such experiences which we 
assimilate into our specious present. Why do we not have other such experiences of 
events that are just a little more Past! or Future!? 
6.6 Conclusion 
What we have seen, then, is that a theory of presentism must expand upon the 
rather meagre slogan "everything that exists does so now." However, it must do so in 
such a manner that does not engender any of the problems with formulation that were 
discussed in 6.1. The main problem seems to be that our definition of presentism 
tends toward the trivial or unravels into eternalism, or is absurd; either it claims that at 
every moment at which an entity is present, it is present, or it claims that past tense 
entities have never existed, which is false. Further, we have seen that the presentist 
faces problems in how exactly she is to construct true reference to other times and 
quantification over times past and future. If there are no entities that are past and 
future - which the presentist claims - then how is it that any reference can 
"correspond" to some state of affairs that will make it true? Similarly, quantification 
over times that do not exist should be seen, at best, as a peculiar exercise. 
Possibly the most pressing problem for the presentist comes from the special 
theory of relativity. Each of the solutions put forward by the presentist was shown to 
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be in conflict with some feature of either our philosophical theory or scientific theory. 
Since McTaggart's paradox appears to require of us that we accept a presentist 
ontology we shall have to make sense of Hybrid 2 despite Sider's misgivings about 
accepting a theory that may be scientifically revisionary 
At the current time we should note that presentism is not yet a coherent theory. 
Since it is not we have no coherent theory. What we need is some account of 
temporality that can make sense of these problems, both those with presentism and 
those raised by McTaggart. In the following chapter my goal is as follows. In Chapter 
7 I will layout an ontology which I believe is capable of meeting each of the 
philosophical problems mentioned in chapter six. I will not explicitly argue for the 
ontology. Since presentism is the only solution to McTaggart's paradox that accords 
with our experience of temporality, and each of the solutions surveyed (in brief) has 
been found wanting, any theory that solves these problems should be seen not only as 
a metaphysical possibility, but also as a good candidate for our best metaphysical 
solution to the problems raised. 
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Cha pter Seven 
In chapter seven 1: 
• Lay out the metaphysical commitments of temporal minimalism (7.1); 
• Argue that temporal minimalism can deal with the problems of quantification and 
reference raised in chapter six (7.2); 
• Argue that temporal minimalism can be defined adequately and note the implications 
of this definition for accounts of persistence (7.3),· 
• Argue that the physics necessary for temporal minimalism to be true are compatible 
with current scientific findings (7.4); 
7.1 Temporal Minimalism 
In what follows I layout the ontology behind temporal minimalism and show 
how this deals with the problems mentioned above in chapter six. Key to this 
approach is the fact that there are two distinct ways in which we may think of time: as 
conventional and epistemic (the values that we attribute to physical states of change) 
or we may think of time as divided into the incompatible categories of past, present 
and future (for reasons given in earlier chapters I do not consider spatial 
understandings of time). Temporal minimalism denies the cogency of the latter view. 
It denies that temporality should be thought of in terms of distinct metaphysical 
qualities, and, in addition, it denies that we should think of time as akin to any sort of 
entity. In doing so, it provides an obvious solution to McTaggart's "paradox" since 
the core thesis of temporal minimalism is that we lack the materials with which to 
formulate the necessary arguments. It is not possible for an entity to have pastness, 
presentness or futurity since there is no such thing as past or future - nor, for that 
matter, is there such a distinct "quality" presentness. 
The title "temporal minimalism" may seem to be overstating matters since the 
lack of what would classically be conceived of as temporal appears to render temporal 
nihilism more appropriate. However, there is temporal passage (of a sort) included in 
temporal minimalism. To be present is, according to temporal minimalism, merely to 
be simultaneous with that which exists. As the ontological commitments of temporal 
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minimalism are only to those things that can be said to exist in this "simultaneous 
with" relation, only those things that exist "now," exist.) 
Note that this differs from traditional formulations of presentism in so much as 
classical presentism claims that the past and future are unreal. Temporal minimalism 
argues that, in the sense of reality being carved into metaphysically substantive 
categories, time itself is unreal. Time in the sense of being extended or including 
distinct ontological categories is unreal, although in arguing such I should not be 
grouped with McTaggart or Parmenides, with their claims as to the illusory nature of 
temporal passage, since the temporal minimalist will admit that things change. The 
claim is merely that there is no need for this to be cashed out in a metaphysically 
substantive - or spatio-temporally extended - fashion. Change, in this case, is simply 
to be thought of as change in the composition or location in physical things. 
There are a number of points that need to be made in clarification. First of all 
temporal minimalism is appropriate as a name for the position inasmuch as the 
ontological resources committed to that are themselves temporal are just that, 
minimal. As we shall see later on, I do not hold that temporal relations need to be 
thought of in any very strong sense. In fact they turn out to merely be due to the 
conjunction of change, certain logical relations and natural laws. Thus, although it 
may be that the position is far from ontologically sparse, and may incline us away 
from certain other views (e.g. a temporal parts analysis of persistence), the view does 
not commit to the existence of temporal ontological resources, such as A- or B-
qualities or relations etc. Indeed, it is only in the sense of not being committed to the 
traditional temporal resources that the view is minimal in any sense. 
Second, it appears that that I have already committed to a gross assumption in 
stipulating an extremely close relation between time and change - a relation so close, 
in fact, that I am prepared to reduce time to change. The justification, if it can be 
called such, for the move lies in my arguments in chapter 5. Therein I argued that 
there is an unjustified assumption lurking at the core of what I called quasi-spatial 
understandings of time, that time is anything over and above mere change - that is, 
after all, the sum total of what we perceive. Since I was unable to locate any 
justification for time being anything more than change it seems sensible, at least at the 
outset, to see if we can get by with an account that does not stipulate time to be 
I It should be noted at this time that I am referring here only to physical entities. The nature of 
propositions and other abstract entities is something that I discuss in detail below. 
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anything over and above mere change. This, then, provides my motivation for leaning 
away from substantival views of time. 
Of course, there are strong arguments to the effect that time is something 
more than change - e.g. Shomaker (1969) - and these views do need to be thought 
through. Indeed, it may tum out that such arguments are ultimately fatal to Temporal 
Minimalism. But for now these will have to remain unconsidered. I shall beg the 
reader's patience and hope that Ockhamistic considerations are sufficient for me to 
define and defend the position without thinking of time as anything over and above 
mere change. 
Third, and finally, I assume throughout the chapter that the motivation for the 
view is clear. Having shown why I do not think etemalist theories, of any ilk, are to be 
rejected, and having shown why presentism in its traditional guise is flawed, the view 
that I put forward is motivated inasmuch as it can provide answers to the questions 
that the other views cannot. It is an account that is both possible and, in light of its 
ability to answer the questions laid out, desirable. 
7.1.1 Simultaneity 
What I have said appears to imply that there is some other way in which things 
could have been, that it is possible for one entity to stand in a non-simultaneity 
relation to another. There are a number of points to be made. The existence of more 
than one time must be ruled out since, as has been argued previously, the TTT is 
inadequate, and we wish to avoid a B theoretic account for the reasons given in earlier 
chapters. What is being argued in Temporal Minimalism, then, is that there exists 
[tenselessly] a state of affairs or, in less loaded terminology, a set of physical entities 
s. However, this single [tenseless] set of entities s may change. It may undergo a 
change in composition or position. If s does change, then it must be that s gains some 
property not previously possessed by s, such that s is replaced by s*. Since sand s* 
are mutually exclusive, s* having some property not possessed by s, only one of the 
two may exist. To make the point a little clearer, consider set s as the sum total of all 
entities where a rod R is straight. and the property * the property of being bent. If s 
exists then s* does not, for Rand R * are mutually exclusive. Hence, R is not included 
in the set s*. Let us suppose then, that set s is arranged such that R has a force exerted 
upon it instantaneously such that R gains the property *. This would mean that s does 
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not exist - for if s exists then sand s* both exist, which they cannot, for R cannot both 
have the property * and also lack it. 
To see what time is let us also suppose that there exists another concrete entity 
in s. Our additional entity is a clock. If s exists our clock reads 5:00pm. For the sake 
of argument let us suppose that when R becomes bent, in other words if s* and R * 
exist, our clock reads 5: 0 1 pm - it too is prone to instantaneous changes of state! -
then we are correct in saying both's exists at 5:00pm' and 's* exists at 5:01pm'. But 
in this case to say that it is 5:01pm is to say nothing more than a particular physical 
arrangement has been realised - the arrangement where a clock is in the state of 
showing 5:01pm. Hence we begin to have some understanding of what time is in 
temporal minimalism. 
One might suppose that if such a theory as temporal minimalism were true 
then existence and simultaneity would be coextensive. And such a supposition would 
be true. Those things that exist, do so now. However, this is not to say that existence 
and simultaneity are one and the same thing. Clearly the conditions under which one 
can say that an entity exists are not the same as the conditions under which one can 
say that an entity is simultaneous with an observation. To draw an analogy with 
mereology, although it is the case that a lump of bronze and a statue made from the 
bronze share the same composite parts, it is not clear that the two have the same 
identity conditions. After all, the lump of bronze can survive the destruction of the 
statue, whereas the statue clearly cannot survive its own destruction. In a similar 
fashion those entities in set s can survive the acquisition of some property *, but it 
does not follow that those entities in set s can remain simultaneous with s since the 
acquisition of * creates a new set s*, which constitutes the destruction of set s. Thus, 
the conditions for existence and simultaneity - although extensionally equivalent -
are not the same. Hence, the objection made, that it is possible that there could have 
been things that are non-simultaneous, is quite right. This could have been the case. 
But, I suggest, it is not the case and this does not preclude us from being able to make 
sense of the simultaneity relation. 
7.1.2 Timee and Timet 
In what follows I want to argue for a two-fold distinction in how \\"e should 
think about time. We are, as was intimated above, going to proceed on the assumption 
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that time is just change. However, there is a certain type of entity that we do not 
normally consider to be the object of change. I have in mind, here. abstract, possibilia, 
laws etc. We normally restrict change to the physical realm and, if it is plausible to 
proceed with time as nothing over and above change, then there is an obvious sense in 
which there may be a change in what there is in the physical - what I call the timee -
where there is no change in such non-physical entities. However, there is a clear sense 
in which, even though the non-physical types of entity do not change. what exists 
simpliciter does change. Hence, we might reasonable speak of existing at a certain 
timee and at a certain timet - where timet is what exists simpliciter. However, more 
needs to be done to explain both concepts. 
It appears from the account just given that the temporal minimalist's account 
will reduce all temporal discourse to tautology, which would be problematic. For 
example, it is possible for me to know that it is now 10:30, but for me not to know 
about some state of affairs that is included in the set s which is 10:30. I may not know. 
for example, that 10:30 includes Tony Blair having coffee. This point brings us on to 
an important distinction: temporal minimalism does not import any ontological 
importance to empirical time. In other words, the change that we perceive around us is 
not further characterised using metaphysical properties such as pastness etc. On the 
temporal minimalist account, empirical time, what I call timee, is merely a particular 
arrangement of a physical state and is, by and large, conventional, whereas timet 
should be seen as constituting the sum total of existence. 
In order for it to be correct that it is 10:30 it should be the case that a variety of 
physical states exist. The majority of clocks should report the numerical value 10:30, 
the sun should have risen. Further, we might expect the sun to occupy a particular 
position in the sky, the earth should be in some definite position with reference to the 
other planets. We might even communicate with people on the other side of the world 
to check that it was dark where they were and that the stars were in the position that 
we understand that they should be at 10:30 our timee. But this is simply to equate 
"time" with a particular physical state and temporal passage with a number of changes 
which apparently stand in a regular relation to one another. 
Hence, it is possible for me to know that the timee IS 10:30 by making 
reference to my surroundings. And whilst I may know. locally. that it is 10:30 this 
merely means that I am aware of the physical state 10:30 in my immediate 
surroundings. As I suggested above, it would be a tautology to state lvhen a clock 
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would have the property of showing 10:30, provided the clock was accurate of 
course.
2 Thus we may explain temporal discourse about the unknown by recourse to 
the further fact that not all of the physical state of 10:30 is known. For example, in a 
case where I ask what the time is, although I am aware of certain changes in myself 
and in my surroundings I am not aware of the sum totality of all changes in the 
universe. Nor, presumably, am I aware of the changes that have occurred in all 
accurate clocks, and it is this latter piece of information that I am asking for when I 
ask what the time is. 
This distinction also leads to the potential bifurcation between timee on the 
local scale, so the arrangement of physical states within my vicinity, and timee on the 
global scale. In the latter case we might include entities in far-flung galaxies, the 
movement and change of which are not observable by ourselves. To complete the 
definition temporal minimalism also makes use of one further notion of time, timet. 
To give a slogan, timet includes everything that exists, so set s of all physical entities 
and all non-physical entities as well. Most importantly there are still grounds for 
thinking of timet in terms of "the time". For if time is nothing over and above change, 
then what exists will serve to determine what time it is, and although it is only entities 
that are in timee that change, it is still clear that entities that exist only in timet exist, 
and as such, serve to determine what time it is. 
Timet is a difficult concept and is one worth pursuing further since its role is 
of central importance to temporal minimalism. Timee, as I am calling it, is all that the 
temporal minimalist admits as assisting in the composition of temporality. There is no 
further sense to which we should consider things as temporal; not as past, present or 
future. In the perception of a hypothetical observer who can either see everything that 
exists (a God's eye view perhaps), or one who can make use of arbitrarily fast signals, 
there will be one state of affairs, one timee on the global scale, and one set of abstracta 
exists. Thus we rule out any further characterisation of temporality. Now it may be 
that within that timet there exists a disagreement as to what the timee is. That is, any 
two clocks or physical processes can register different values and entities can change 
at different rates even though they are the sort of thing that normally change regularly 
with respect to one another. But, bearing in mind the conclusions entailed by chapter 
four, to the effect that the existence of the same entity at more than one time must be 
2 By an accurate clock all that is meant is that it is a clock that changes at the rate that one would expect 
with reference to other changes in timee. 
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ruled out, such a timet will be composed of only a single set of physical entities. 
Perhaps we might elucidate the notion further by defining any timee as state of 
change, and timet as the state of affairs that exists. 3 
In summary, then, if I were to be asked, "what timee is it (on the local scale)?" 
I would be being asked for a detailed account of the various states of entities in my 
locale - such as clocks etc. If I were to be asked, "what timee is it (on the global 
scale )?" I would be being asked for a complete account of the state of all physical 
entities. Finally, if I were to be asked, "what timet is it?" I would be being asked to 
give a complete account of the state of all of the physical entities and the abstract ones 
too. As I have noted above, the distinction seems motivated precisely because the 
state of change determines the time and abstracta too are entities and thus in some , , 
sense at least should be thought of as determining what time it is - even if they 
themselves do not change. 
7.1.3 Temporal passage 
Above it was claimed that temporal passage was change in what there is in the 
physical. However, this appears to make temporal passage a very puzzling type of 
thing, most unlike the temporal passage of our perceptions. If, for example, there were 
to be no change other than some distant particle moving slightly to the left of its 
original position, we would not want to say that there had been temporal passage, for 
none of those things that exist around me have changed. And if none of those things 
have changed why would we suppose that the time has changed? As I see it, we have 
two disparate claims to reconcile here. On the one hand there has been a change in the 
universe, there has been sufficient change that traditional A theories would be 
required to say that what is present has changed. And this does seem reasonable, for 
presumably the state of affairs where the particle was to the right of where it is now is 
in the past. On the other hand we have our natural intuition about time which says that 
this is a rather puzzling state of affairs. The motion of some particle on the other side 
of the universe lacks the necessary influence to render a change in what time it is for 
us. 
3 We know that there is no agreement as to what the timee is on a global scale, due to problems of 
relativity the numerical values attributed to the states of change in physical entities wi 11 never be the 
same it ~e take to frames of reference with an appropriately high difference in velocity. 
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One of the strengths of temporal minimalism is that it has the resources with 
which to deal with this problem. Although the timet has changed, what exists has 
changed, to all intents and purposes the timee (on a local scale) has not changed. On 
the temporal minimalist account there has been no change in the timee on a local scale 
- all of our empirical reports as to what the time is will lead us to the conclusion that 
it is, indeed, still 10:30, unless we should somehow acquire access to this far flung 
region of the galaxy. Indeed, we might reasonably suppose that we should be entitled 
to say that it is still 10:30. But we can also add to this claim that what there is, timet, 
has changed. Thus, what exists at that momentt is not the same as that which existed 
before for what exists at that timee on the global scale has changed. 
Further, if there were to exist a physical universe that was non-spatially 
separated from this one, then we should also be able to provide intelligible responses 
to similar questions to the ones raised above. It very much appears that were such a 
state of affairs to exist, that the presentist is committed to saying that a change of state 
in one universe changes the state of affairs in the other, non-spatially separated 
universe - a conclusion that would be most perplexing. But, according to temporal 
minimal ism we are required to admit that what there is, has changed - that it is no 
longer the same timet (again "time" seems to be the wrong term here) - but that there 
has been a change in the global timee in one of the worlds. Thus, if we consider world 
wand world v then we might have the following: world 11' is composed of three 
particles, as is world v. Suppose, then, that a fourth particle were created 
instantaneously in world w. We would want to say that there has been a change in 
what there is in timet. Indeed, were the hypothetical observer to be able to observe 
both worlds somehow simultaneously then we appear committed to this thesis. 
However. we do not want to say that there has been any change in the non-spatially 
connected world v. According to temporal minimalism we can do just this. The timee 
in world v has not changed at all, though the timee in world w has. However, what 
exists before the perceptions of the hypothetical observer has changed. The state that 
includes two worlds and six particles, state s, ceases to exist at the point in timet 
{world H'} when the seventh particle comes into existence, the state in which there 
exist two worlds and seven particles. 
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7.1.4 Everything exists at timet 
It was noted in the formulation of temporal minimalism that a change from 
state s to state s* required a change in what there was. In order to be counted as timee 
this needs must be a change in concrete objects. However, I have also said that a timet 
is all that exists tenselessly. Lowe (1998; pp. 96-98) rules out tenseless accounts of 
time, since, on his view, tenseless discourse serves to differentiate between physical 
and abstract objects, abstract objects being those things that we may refer to 
tenselessly. It would appear, then, that I am in something of a difficulty since the 
temporal minimalist has already used tenseless expressions to cover what exists and 
acknowledged the fact that this will change. How is the temporal mimimalist to 
distinguish between abstract and concrete entities? 
The answer lies, again, in the distinction between timee and timet. 
Propositions, numbers, universals and the like are, if they are to be admitted into our 
ontology, said to exist outside timee, but in timet (bearing in mind that timet is 
composed by everything that exists [tenselessly]). Abstract entities form part of the 
set of s and thus must exist in timet. However, because (all?) abstract entities are 
unchanging it will turn out that every set of s will exemplify these unchanging 
abstracta such that any timet will include them. But this has the consequence of 
entailing that abstracta exist at timest and thus that they may be referred to using 
tensed or tenseless terms. 
There is nothing obviously contradictory about declaring that abstracta exist at 
timest. Since the only temporal feature of the universe is the change in the set of s, and 
those changes consist in the changes in composition and location of physical entities, 
abstracta can clearly be defined as those things that are not prone to changes. Thus 
they are outside timee and are distinct from physical entities. However, were timee not 
to exist, thus were there to be no alteration in what exists (e.g. timet), abstract entities 
would still exist. Indeed, abstracta could be all that exists. Even without timee 2+2=4. 
Admittedly, the temporal minimalist is committed to the claim that it 1t'Cl5 true that 
2+2=4 and that it will be true that 2+2=4; but there is nothing obviously wrong with 
such claims. Granted, Lowe will want to say that the above claims are true in virtue of 
the fact that 2+2=4 is tenselessly true, but there seems no reason that temporal 
minimalism need accept this, though the temporal minimalist "ltl'ill accept that 2+2=4 
H'il! be true iff it turns out that 2+2=4 when the designated future timet comes to pass. 
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However, 2+2=4 is true, it has been true, it will be true and it would be true even if 
timee did not exist. Of course, if timet did not exist - if nothing at all existed within 
the set of existing things, s; then it might not be true that 2+2=4: but that this is so is 
merely dependent upon the existence of the necessary abstracta. 
7.1.5 Possibilia 
The temporal minimalist endorses an account of "configurations of 
possibilities,,;4 to be specific, timeless configurations of possiblities. Earlier on we 
defined timee as the physical state of affairs and timet as that which exists. Included in 
timet was timee (on a global scale) and all abstract entities. Thus, at timet, we find all 
configurations of possibilities precisely because I take possibilities to be abstracta. 
Should it come to pass that what exists change then we would find the same set of 
possibilia in existence (for what is metaphysically possible is not contingent upon 
what time it is). The immediate problem to be raised for the temporal minimalist is 
whether or not this account makes use of some kind of ontological notion of passage 
of the kind imputed to Craig in 6.4. I argue that it does not, for on the temporal 
minimalist account, all that exists with regard to possibilia is the sum total of timeless 
configurations of possiblities. None of these configurations are to be distinguished 
from any other by any qualitative feature whatsoever, they are not, for example, 
"tensed". In other words, there is no ontological feature of these possible worlds that 
either is, or accounts for, temporal passage. 
Temporal passage is nothing more than a change in the timee, so a change in 
the location or composition or location of material entities. Temporal minimalism is 
the view that passage is the continual change in timee, and, thus, passage is the 
continual actualisation of these configurations of the possible. So the arrangement of a 
lump of bronze into a statue might be one actualised configuration at one timee, and 
the dissolution of that statue into a lump might be another actualised configuration at 
another timee. There is, then, no sense in which a change in timee relegates certain 
configurations of possiblities to a category of pastness, whereby they acquire a 
temporal property or relation. By including the existence of past and future abstracta, 
oj My reasons for referring to configurations of possibilities rather than possible worlds will become 
evident shortly in 7.2. 
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along with all other possibilia, but not ascribing to them temporal properties, one 
avoids McTaggart's arguments. There is no such existent thing as past, present or 
future; merely configurations of the possible. 
The highly controversial core of temporal minimalism is that what 
distinguishes past possibila that were actual from past possibilia that were merely 
possible, are natural laws. Precisely, the natural laws uniquely specify a single set of 
configurations that include the whole of the way the world is, has been and will be. 
Hence, if it is true that the battle of Hastings occurred in 1066, then the configuration 
of the possible in which the battle of Hastings does occur in 1066 will be 
distinguished from a whole host of other configurations by the natural laws that 
obtain. 
As I suggested above this appears highly controversial, and although this may 
be the case I should like to say one or two things in defence of the view. Firstly, 
although in stipulating that the natural laws uniquely specify a single set of 
configurations of the possible it is certainly to be admitted that there is a strong 
ontological commitment to be made, it is not entirely clear that this is very much 
stronger than that made by the B-theorist. For on a B-theoretic account, although it 
may not be just the natural laws that serve to determine what exists at particular times, 
it is still clear that there is a uniquely determined series of times that stand in 
permanent and unchanging relations to one another. Even though the B-theorists 
commitment may not be to natural laws, they must clearly submit to some factor or 
factors that serve to uniquely determine a particular temporal series. 
Second, in light of the arguments against eternalist theories of time and those 
levelled against presentism it might be thought that the commitment to such a 
controversial thesis might be worthwhile if it can solve the problems that beset our 
current best theories of time. With this rough sketch of the position given we must 
now see whether or not we should accept the view. So far in this chapter I have given 
the reader nothing by way of motivation for accepting temporal minimalism, for I 
have not shown that it has the resources to meet any of the objections raised in chapter 
six. It is to this task that I now turn. As I indicated at the outset of the chapter, much 
of what should be thought of as the motivation for accepting such strong metaphysical 
view comes from its ability to solve the problems noted with standard presentism in 
chapter 6. 
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7.2 Reference and Quantification 
Within temporal minimalism it is perfectly possible to quantify over entities that 
one takes to be past entities as well as to make statements about the past and future 
that are true, even though the past and future do not exist. We will begin with the 
problem of reference since once this is dealt with the problem of quantification is 
readily dealt with too. 
For the temporal minimalist talk of, and quantification over, the past and future is 
constituted by reference to and quantification over presentlYt existing states of affairs. 
To explain this consider the following: it is true, or so we suppose, that the battle of 
Hastings was fought in 1066. The temporal minimalist breaks this statement down 
into three parts. 
(1) There exists [timelesslYe - i.e. independently of change in what there is at a 
timee] a configuration of possibility p such that the battle of Hastings exists as 
a timelesse possibility. 
(2) Were it to be actual it would have the physical arrangement of entities - the 
same global timee - as that to which we would refer to as 1066. 
(3) Timelesse possible configuration p stands in a "later than" relation to the 
timelesse possible configuration currently actualised. 
The existence of the possible worlds as timelesse is intended to convey two ideas as 
was noted above: firstly that tenses are not applicable to possible worlds in the sense 
of conveying any properties and second that since possibilia exist without timee, they 
are not to be conceived of as dependent upon physical states of affairs. If some state 
of affairs is a genuine metaphysical possibility then it remains such whether or not the 
timee at which it could be instantiated as a physical possibility has passed. For now, 
then, note that a particular configuration would be "later than" another configuration 
where the two configurations stand in a logical relation such that one may be realised 
out of the other where the laws of nature remain unviolated.5 
Now, note that the temporal minimalist would not accept that 
5 I explain quite how these temporal relations are to be formed below. 
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Past C:Jx) (x is the battle of Hastings) 
Since this implies the past existence of the battle of Hastings when it remains unclear 
how past existence is distinct from present existence, such a view commits us to 
eternalism. Nor would they accept that 
(:Jx) Past (x is the battle of Hastings) 
for the de re presentist it appears that we have the present existence of the past battle 
of Hastings, which again is not quite right; at least not on any presentist account that 
takes seriously both the desire to avoid McTaggart's paradox and the core thesis of 
presentism, i.e. that only the present exists. Instead, I think that the temporal 
minimalist might accept something like the following: 
(x is [timelesslYe] the battle of Hastings) - e.g. a configuration of the possible 
And that, 
(:Jx) -, (x is the actual battle of Hastings) 
But that 
(:Jx) (x is the battle of Hastings) - e.g. a configuration of the possible, and (3y) (y is 
the present - at whatever moment this is read) and x is earlier than y.6 
That this is so is an unchanging fact concermng the laws of nature and the 
configurations of possibilities that timelesslYe exist. Of course since timee, the time 
which we give numerical value to, is given in terms of the physical state instantiated 
(for example, 2pm being nothing more than the physical state realised where clocks 
agree in the location of their hands), to say that the battle of Hastings occurred in 
1066 is to say that the physical state of affairs that we take to be equivalent to 1066 
occurs [tenselessly] at the same timee as the actual battle of Hastings. Assuming that 
6 Recalling, of course, that configurations of the possible exist at timest. 
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"1066" is not taken to refer to the global timee, or that we can give some account of 
the timee at which the Battle of Hastings occurs without referring to the Battle of 
Hastings, and that it is not necessary to take the Battle of Hastings to be a necessary 
constituent of 1066 itself, questions as to the date of the Battle of Hastings are not 
tautological. Now, how does this deal any more successfully with problems of 
reference than the options discussed in 6.l.3? 
The problem of reference that was laid out claimed that there was a lack of 
propositions about non-present (hence, non-existent) entities. The sentence 
( 4) dinosaurs roamed the earth 
though undoubtedly true, does not pick out any proposition as there are no dinosaurs 
and, hence, no propositions about dinosaurs. But, of course, in temporal minimal ism 
there are dinosaurs that exist in the presentt; they exist in particular configurations of 
metaphysical possibilities, though they do so outside the realm of change, e.g. timee. 
Hence, since dinosaurs exist so do propositions about them. 
But the question remains, how is it that we can achieve trans temporal 
reference to future and past states of affairs even given this timeless set of 
possibilities? We achieve trans temporal reference by successfully referring to some 
existent possibility that stands in a relevant B theoretic relation to the possibility that 
is instantiated. Hence, if the configuration of physical entities that exists now is 
identical to the possible set of entities a, then the configuration a is earlier than some 
other, say b, if the possible set of abstracta, a, stands in an earlier than relation to set 
b. 
Temporal relations of the B senes, earlier and later, can stand between 
relevant configurations of possibilities in virtue of the laws that relate the states of 
affairs in one configuration of the possible to the states of affairs in another as was 
noted above. 7 If there were no timee then it would still be the case that the various 
configurations of possibility that exist in timet would stand in logical relations to one 
another, in much the same way that McTagggart suggested that entities in the C series 
stand in the relation "more inclusive" and "less inclusive". The existence of change in 
the actual world is sufficient to entail that the relationship between the configurations 
7 My reasons for referring to configurations of possibilities rather than possible worlds will become 
evident shortly. 
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of possibilities is temporal, although this is only a contingent fact about our reality; 
were there to be no change there would be no timee and, as such, there would be no 
time at all and no temporal relations obtaining between the configurations of 
possibilities - though there would still be the logical relations mentioned above. In 
other words, rather than taking the A series to add anything to the C series to make it 
into the B series, I take the change in composition and location of physical entities to 
be sufficient to alter the essentially logical relations of the C series into B theoretic 
relations. 
Thus, one configuration of possibilities will be "later" than another, if there 
are certain types of change that are required to take place between configuration a 
and configuration b, such that b comes after a. Now, if we can relate these 
metaphysical possibilities to one another, my B theoretic relations, then we can also 
generate A theoretic statements in the actual world based on the temporality of these 
configurations. Hence, "Dinosaurs did roam the earth," is true iff the possible 
configuration currently instantiated as the actual is related to the configuration of the 
possible in which Dinosaurs did roam the earth by the relevant laws of nature. We 
may never know which of these configurations of the possible was instantiated, but 
that does not prevent one of them from having been instantiated. And thus, since there 
is genuine change in the world - precisely because change in the physical is time -
and we have B theoretic relations between configurations of the possible acting as 
truth makers for tensed sentences. It is not entirely clear whether temporal 
minimalism favours a tensed or tenseless account, but given my arguments in chapter 
two that ought not to be seen as a problem. In essence, then, temporality is achieved 
through the union of change in the physical and the ordering relations in the 
metaphysically possible. 
7.2.1 Configurations of possibilities, not possible worlds 
Now we come on to the distinction between configurations of possibilities and 
possible worlds. The distinction between the two is as follows. A possible world is a 
maximally consistent state of affairs. A configuration of the possible entails an 
ontological commitment to the existence (in the sense described by Williamson in 
chapter two) of possibilia, and the arrangement of said possibilia into a particular 
configuration. Hence, the configuration of the possible arranged in such a \\'ay as to 
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represent the actual state of affairs at this moment, would include a possible Jonathan 
Tallant, a possible computer, a possible chair and a possible desk; all arranged into a 
particular configuration within some possible space. 
We should prefer this account to the possible world account simply because it 
entails an ontological commitment to fewer entities. A possible world account is 
plausible and does represent a metaphysical possibility, but, being as parsimonious as 
possible, it seems that we ought to limit the number of entities that we postulate. To 
give an example, suppose that Charles and Elizabeth are playing a game of catch. Let 
us revert, momentarily, to a possible world account. In world w Elizabeth throws a 
ball to Charles and Charles catches it. Now, let us also suppose that in world y 
Elizabeth throws the ball, but that Charles does not catch it. There are clearly at least 
two physical possibilities if we hold Elizabeth's throwing the ball as fixed. 8 In a 
possible world account we have to suppose that there are two possible worlds, with 
the entities such as Charles, Elizabeth and the ball duplicated across both worlds. 
However, on the configuration account there is no such need. The configuration w is 
composed of the possible Elizabeth who throws the ball, the possible ball that is 
thrown, and the possible Charles who catches the ball. Unlike world y, configuration y 
is composed from the same metaphysical possibility of Elizabeth and the ball. The 
only numerically distinct entity that is required is the Charles of configuration y who 
does not catch the ball. 9 In other words, Elizabeth, who throws the ball, and the ball 
itself, only L-exist once - at least within this context. Charles, on the other hand, must 
L-exist twice, once where he catches the ball and once where he drops it. But this is 
quite simply to entertain the existence of one more entity - e.g. a second L-existing 
Charles - rather than a whole other possible world. 
Thus if we return to the account of reference to be given by the temporal 
minimalist, we might say that when Bob says that, "'Charles will drop the ball' is 
true" Bob refers to the proposition which picks out configuration of possibility y, and 
says that this stands in a later than relation to the configuration of possibility w that 
mirrors the current, actual, state of affairs. Moreover. Bob also claims that y will be 
8 Obviously, if Elizabeth's throwing the ball is held fixed then there are a huge number of physical 
rossibilities that could ensue. 
There are other reasons for holding such a view of modality, reasons given by Williamson 
(1998,1999). I find his reasons persuasive - though I lack the space to explore them here. My choice of 
the fewer entities motivation herein should be seen, in part, as a response to Loftler's (1998) claim that 
Williamson's ontology is too complex. In fact, as I see it, it is less complex than modal realism since it 
requires the existence of fewer entities. 
191 
the state of affairs that comes to pass in the actual world; this will be true iffy does 
come to pass. But this solution does not deny us the existence of propositions about 
past and future entities, because our propositions tum out to be about presently 
existing entities that stand in very peculiar logical relations. 
It might be supposed that we have a potential problem if the sentence we are 
to make sense of is 
(5) actual dinosaurs roamed the earth 
Obviously there are no propositions about presently existing actual dinosaurs, 
possible dinosaurs yes, but not actual dinosaurs. What the temporal minimalist must 
do, I suspect, is claim that (4) and (5) are committed to the ontological implications of 
(6) 
(6) dinosaurs actually roamed the earth 
which is to say nothing more than there exists at timet possible dinosaurs, and that 
these dinosaurs did roam the earth. More precisely, if it is true that dinosaurs roamed 
the earth, then the configuration of the possible in which dinosaurs do roam the earth, 
will be distinguished from a whole host of other configurations by the natural laws 
that obtain, and we are entitled to say that this relation is temporal because of the 
conjunction of change and the logical relations that obtain between these 
configurations of the possible. 
However, parts of what I have said here is largely irrelevant to my case, one 
could construct temporal minimal ism just as efficiently using a possible world 
account of modality, I simply prefer the configurations approach. Once again, I am 
assuming the motivation for accepting these strong metaphysical positions stems from 
the ability of the position to deal with problems that B-theory and presentism cannot. 
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7.3 Defining temporal minimalism lO 
Although in 7.1 I gave a brief statement of the ontology behind temporal 
minimalism I have not yet met the problems raised in 6.2, how to define temporal 
minimalism successfully (as a form of presentism) without engendering either 
triviality or falsity. I shall endeavour to deal with these problems here. I shall also 
have something to say about the problem of change due to Oaklander (2002), 
discussed in 6.2. In our discussions in 6.2 it was noted that the most obvious move for 
the presentist to make is to restrict the tenseless existential quantifier to the present 
without negatively defining the present in terms of the past and future. 
7.3.1 No temporal categories 
The first thing to remind ourselves of, then, is that temporal minimalism does 
not acknowledge the metaphysical cogency of the division of reality into 
ontologically relevant temporal modes, categories or properties. However, before we 
proceed I must say something more about the nature of the "present" within temporal 
minimalism and the nature of the simultaneity relation mentioned in 7.1. We can 
define it positively. 
1>: if x exists as a physical entity, then x is a member of s, the set of all 
physical entities, and x will stand in a simultaneity relation with all other members of 
s. 
No mention has been made of tense; indeed, in order to make this definition 
adequate we must suppose that the existential quantifier is read as tenseless in the 
above. We have not declared that the existential quantifier ranges over times other 
than the present; rather. that those entities that exist stand in a simultaneity relation. 
Nor have we declared that the existential quantifier ranges only over the present 
thereby reducing p to a tautology. Thus, p delineates only a single set of physical 
10 Some of the arguments here are drawn from my 'Formulating Temporal Minim~lism', though it 
should be noted that in the previous work I do not cash Temporal Minimalism out With the use of the 
distinction between timee and timet. 
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entities - those that stand in a simultaneity relation to one another - and thereby 
implicitly rules out the existence of those entities that are not simultaneous with p. 
However, p may appear to run into the following problem. If, as I say_ p 
delineates a single set of physical entities, and does so tenselessly, then surely we 
have one of the two following choices to make. We could read the tenseless quantifier 
disjunctively, as in (b) above, and thereby prove p false, or we can read it as (c) 
above. But if we read it as (c) then we do, as Crisp notes, appear to be saying 
something along the lines that <p is true "outside time" in some sense. 
But this is no real problem for the temporal minimalist since I would agree 
that configurations of possibilities do exist outside timee, at least inasmuch as they 
themselves are not a part of time. I I There being no "thing" that is time, it is quite 
possible that the tenseless quantification over all those things that exist include only 
one set of physical entities that stand in a simultaneity relation to one another. 
Note then that the temporal minimalist is not prone to either of Smith's (2002) 
objections. 
The main founder of solipsistic presentism, Prior, tellingly defines it in an implicitly 
self contradictory way, a way endorsed by Craig, Zimmerman and other solipsistic 
presentists. Prior writes, ' ... the present simply is the real considered in relation to 
two particular species of unreality, namely the past and the future.' (Prior, 1998: 
p.80). If the real stands in relation to the unreal, the unreal is real, since only 
something real can stand in relation to something ... 
And that, 
Further there can only be multiple species of real things; unreality cannot be 
differentiated into 'two particular species', (p.123) 
First, the temporal minimalist denies that there are any metaphysical categories of 
temporality. The real is not standing in relation to anything unreal, since we are not 
imputing reality to the 'present", only to that which exists. That which exists is then 
said to be present only in so much as it stands in a simultaneity relation. Of course one 
II The nature of the simultaneity relation at a timet must, then, be something like th.e observa~ions of a 
hypothetical observer of the sort mentioned below in 7.3.2 or as what would eXIst accordmg to an 
observer who could make use of arbitrarily fast signals. 
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of the features of temporal minimalism is that everything that does exist does stand in 
precisely that relation, but this is only a contingent fact about reality. There are 
configurations of possibility in which possible people exist located (a fa etemalism) at 
different times, but perhaps in these configurations the people will lack our 
expenence of temporality. Second, there is no obvious need for the temporal 
minimalist to include within their ontology anything other than one species of 
unreality. All that has been argued is that there is a single set of existent (physical) 
entities and that these entities stand in a simultaneity relation. The past / future 
distinction is, after all, to be grounded on the earlier / later relation. 
7.3.2 Can temporal minimalism prove distinct from eternalism? 
Callender asks us to consider the following: 
Consider a four-dimensional manifold of point events, each having a unique spatial and 
temporal position. It will be useful to imagine each event carrying a lightbulb that we 
can switch on or off. For the moment, when a lightbulb is on we will say that the event 
exists and when it is off that it doesn't exist. The existing universe' s size, duration, and 
topology will depend upon which lightbulbs are on. (p. S587) 
With this in mind Callender represents the eternalist view thus: 
The traditional tenseless view of time known as eternalism states that all the lights on 
our four-manifold are on... Temporal relations are relations among existing 
events .. . presentism pictures the four-manifold as foliated via an equivalence relation, 
simultaneity, and time as the one-dimensional linearly ordered quotient set induced by 
simultaneity. (p. S587) 
He then claims that, 
presentists about time say lightblubs that are off don't exist. If the bulb is off, it ain't. 
Only light bulbs that are on exist, which is, unfortunately, precisely what etemalists 
maintain. Both theories agree at tl1+1 that the light was on at tl, t2,···tn and that there 
was, is. and will be no time at which the light exists and is off. Where is the disputed 
fact of the matter? (p. S589) 
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Callender seems to feel that what he perceives as a lack of a genuine distinction 
between the presentist and the eternalist provides the presentist with a problem (pp. 
S587-9). Such a view seems mistaken since if there is a lack of a difference between 
the two positions and this lack of a difference is a problem for presentism then it is 
surely a problem for eternalism too. 
However, it should be noted that there is an obvious difference between 
temporal minimalism and eternalism. Eternalism is prepared to treat time as 
something substantive, perhaps as extended in space-time, a view which the temporal 
minimalist is not prepared to accept. Equally, eternalism implies that were there an 
hypothetical observer capable of somehow, "looking in" on reality that they would 
see all light bulbs existing and lit. But this is something that both the presentist and 
the temporal minimalist deny. In the closest possible world where some such observer 
exists, what that observer would perceive would be identifiable with what we would 
call t, or II etc. I2 It does not matter for our purposes whether or not the observer exists 
in the actual world since we are merely arguing over what is available for perception, 
not what is perceived. Hence, our observer would see only those light bulbs that are 
at say, t, and the light bulbs would appear to be lit. This obviously leads us on to 
question how the temporal minimalist will read the term "is" since part of Callender's 
criticism of presentism in general is that the distinction between the tensed and 
tenseless reading of the existential quantifier is one which leaves both sides 
dissatisfied since we lack any method with which to decide between the two readings. 
However, I think that we can show otherwise. The temporal minimalist reads 
'is', reads the existential quantifier, as tenseless, such that everything that exists 
[tenselessly] is ranged over (option (c) mentioned in 6.2). However, since the 
temporal minimalist denies the reality of time, of the ontological distinction between 
the past, present and future, this is perhaps unsurprising: for the temporal minimalist 
will not concede that there is anything other than that which exists at the moment at 
which the token of 'is' is coined, or the existential quantifier is employed. Thus, I 
would reject Callender's claim that, 
12 Hestevold and Carter (2002) adopt a similar strategy. They argue that presen~ism is to ~e d~fi~ed in 
terms of what exists simpliciter (pp. 498-501). However, it seems to me that their fo:mul~tlOn IS Just as 
prone as those that have gone before to questions as to when an event or state of affairs eXists. 
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The presentist relies on a tensed theory of truth and a tensed reading of the existential 
quantifier. Truth and existence at t is only assigned to state of affairs at t. Not 
surprisingly, according to the presentist, it's not true at t1 that the lights at t2 are on. By 
contrast, the eternalist relies on a tenseless theory of truth and of the existential 
quantifier, where the truth and existence at t is assigned to state of affairs 
omnitemporally. According to this rule, it is true at t1 that the lights at t2 are on. Since 
there are no convincing reasons to adopt one or another interpretation of truth and/or 
the existential quantifier (so far as I can see), there is no way to decide which rule is 
correct. Left at this, the debate seems merely over whether we ought to use our 
predicate 'is true' to describe present events or whether we ought to extend it to non-
present events too. (S589) 
I would reject it on the grounds that there are metaphysical and phenomenological 
reasons for rejecting the metaphysical core of eternalism (chapters three to five) - that 
more than one time exists simpliciter. Temporal minimalism is prepared to admit that 
more than one timee exists on a number of distinct local scales, but that only one timet 
exists. 
7.3.3 Change 
In section 6.2 we saw that 
if a tensed proposition changes its truth-value at different times, then there must 
be those times at which the proposition changes, and in order to be the genuine 
times they must be members of a temporal series whose generating relation is 
earlier/later than. But if there exists only one time, the present time, then how can 
any time be earlier or later than another and how can a proposition or anything 
else change from one time to another? (Oaklander (2002: p. 75) 
In other words, the presentist's solution fails because she lacks the ontological 
resources to give a full account of change. But the temporal minimalist can, I think. 
avoid the problem raised by Oaklander. A tensed proposition will be true at a timet in 
virtue of some particular state of affairs at a timee. Since more than one timee exists, 
in the sense that more than one configuration of the metaphysically possible exists, it 
is possible that an event be later than another, and, hence, that the truth of a 
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proposition change from one timet to another. Hence, because the temporal minimalist 
can make use of the B theoretic relations earlier than and later than, they can 
circumvent the problem. 
7.3.4 Persistence 
I do not want to say too much here about persistence through time. However, 
there are one or two remarks that are apt. Firstly, persistence "through" time does not 
literally happen. Time is not a "thing" or a number of ontological categories through 
which we pass, rather time is change. When we say that time passes, what we mean is 
that things change, that is all. There are two separate arguments that go together to 
formulate my claim that if temporal minimalism is true, entities must endure as 
opposed to perdure. First, where endurance is defined as an entity persisting through 
time iff it is wholly present at each moment at which it exists, and perdurance is the 
claim that an entity persists through time by having different temporal parts located at 
each time that it is said to exist, it appears that perdurance is in trouble from the off. 
Under a perdurance scheme identity is from "the top down". One of my temporal 
parts is identical with me and part of the same whole as another part, iff it is part of 
the same whole. But, as Oaklander (1992) has pointed out: 
if a whole is something distinct from its presently existing part and is the aggregate of 
all its parts, then it does not exist at anyone time and so cannot, in any I iteral sense, 
move from one moment to the next as, according to the tensed theory, it must. (p. 82) 
Drawing the analogy between spatial and temporal parts Oaklander argues: 
If A is the sum of a, b, and c, and only a and b exist, then A cannot exist. Simillarly. if a 
temporal whole. W, is a succession of temporal parts pI, P2 and P3, and only PI and P2 
exist, then W ( in the sense of the whole) does not exist. And if W does not exist at any 
one time, then W cannot be said to literally move from one time to another. (pp. 82-3) 
Thus, there appear to be good negative arguments to the end that temporal parts 
198 
analyses will not hold in conjunction with a temporal minimalist ontology.13 This 
conjunction between temporal minimalism and an endurance account of persistence 
seems appropriate as I claimed earlier. Theodore Sider (2001) makes, what I think, is 
a compelling case for perdurance accounts (provided, of course, one is prepared to 
deny presentism) where they are conjoined to eternalism. Indeed, where we are 
invited to think of time as "like space" in the eternalist fashion (c.f Sider 2001: p. 
224), and as standing in the permanent relations of "later-than" and "earlier-than". the 
etemalist claim that at each moment at which an entity exists it is "wholly present" 
can obviously be seen to be possible, but surely it is now to be seen as unmotivated. 
In any case, since temporal minimalism appears our best option, so too, does an 
endurance account of persistence. 
7.4 The physics necessary for Temporal Minimalism 
If temporal minimalism is to be accepted then, as it is a form of presentism, it 
must find some way to circumvent the problem raised by the special theory of 
relativity which was laid out above in 6.3. To recapitulate, briefly, the problem is that 
the special theory seems to imply that there is no preferred frame, there is no single 
frame from which we can say, at any given moment, "this is how reality really is." 
Instead, how reality is depends upon the velocity that one has with respect to other 
entities in space-time. If there is no single "right way" of viewing reality then this 
would appear to rule out presentism on the grounds that, at anyone moment, there 
really is no correct description of reality; rather, there are as many correct descriptions 
as there are frames of reference. Furthermore, each description of reality that can be 
made from each different inertial frame will imply the existence of some other 
hyperplane, such that it appears that times other than the present exist. What is present 
in one frame may be past or future in another. Only the "here-now-ism" discussed 
above (6.3) appears able to reconcile itself to this claim without further entailing that 
presentism is false. 
Since it was argued (6.3) that "here-now-ism" is an unattractive option for the 
presentist, and hence for the temporal minimalist, we must, instead, choose a different 
option. But what are the options? Really, as was noted in 6.3. we have only one 
13 It should be noted that Brogaard (2000) believes that a temporal parts analysis is compatible with a 
theory of presentism. 
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option. We must opt for something like Sider's Hybrid l. All that is needed for 
presentism, and hence temporal minimalism, to be a viable theory, is that we can 
postulate at least the possible existence of an absolute frame. Since this can be 
established through metaphysical revisionism, as was argued in 6.3, the revisions that 
follow are acceptable. 
There might remain a nagging concern that simply establishing the logical 
possibility of an absolute frame is insufficient to establish the plausibility of the view. 
One might object that simply because theories of creationism stating that the world 
was created in 4004BC are logically consistent with the evidence, does not mean that 
we should endorse creationism. Likewise, it might be objected that simply because 
temporal minimalism does not logically contradict the special theory does not entail 
that temporal minimalism is correct. 
Despite this concern I still think that temporal minimalism is motivated. After 
all, what is motivating the view is that it can deal with the various problems noted 
with B-theory and presentism. As a species of presentism, and in the absence of a 
verifiable absolute plane, it seems that the best the temporal minimalist can do is to 
show that their view does not contradict the findings of science. To be accepted 
temporal minimalism will have to rely upon metaphysical motivations found in its 
ability to deal with problems that other theories cannot. And, since what is being 
suggested is a metaphysical, rather than physical, revision to the special theory it 
seems that motivation from metaphysical considerations ought to be enough. 
7.4.1 The use of the absolute frame 
In stating that the special theory denies the existence of the absolute frame the 
foe of presentism is able to create the following worry for the presentist. If there is, 
truly, only one moment that exists, why is it that different inertial frames appear to 
report that the constituents of that moment differ according to one's velocity? The 
general picture that the presentist wants to create of there being, literally, a "God's 
eye view" on proceedings seems to be a natural, and desirable, consequence of any 
particular view. In using relativity to deny that this is so, the foe of presentism 
obviously causes some consternation. But, if the presentist can find some way of 
disputing the relativist claim - that there is no absolute frame - then \ve have no 
problem. What is needed is not a claim that there really is an identifiable absolute 
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frame, merely an argument to the effect that one cannot prove that there is no absolute 
frame. If it is possible that there is an absolute frame then temporal minimalism is 
viable, and, given the forgoing arguments against static theories of time and the 
allegedly contrived nature of the space-time explanation, there is, or so I contend, 
sufficient evidence to motivate a preference for a form of presentism over theories of 
space-time. And of course, the existence of an absolute frame, a single true picture of 
how reality really is at a moment, is all that any theory of presentism - hence 
temporal minimalism - requires. The question, then, is how does the presentist reject 
the claim that there is no absolute frame of reference? 
7.4.2 How to establish the possibility of the absolute frame 
Consider the following statement of the argument from relativity against presentism: 
SR(a): 
SR(a) (1 )The special theory is empirically verifiable and hence correct 
SR(a) (2) The special theory implies ontological commitments that contradict 
presentism 
SR(a) (3) Presentism is demonstrably false 
The fact of the matter is, as we shall see, that there are empirically equivalent theories 
to the conventional interpretation of relativity that are, of themselves, preferable to the 
conventional interpretation of relativity. This, coupled to the claim that any static 
theories of time are of dubitable worth, recommends such theories. These theories 
(C.f. Craig 2000b: chapter 5), are neo-Lorentzian theories, and if we can prove them 
viable, entail that SR(a) is incorrect. Instead we ought to replace SR(a) with, 
SR(b): 
(1) The empirical findings associated with SR(a) are verifiable and hence correct 
(2) The empirical findings associated with SR(a) are inconclusive as to whether 
Neo Lorentzian theories, or Einsteinian 14 interpretations are true 
(3) Presentism is false 
14 The Einsteinian interpretation of SR is merely the conventional interpretation that denies the 
existence of the absolute frame. 
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And, of course, SR(b) (3) clearly does not follow from the first two premises. \\' e 
should also note that given the empirical equivalence of Neo Lorentzian and 
Einsteinian interpretations of relativity the distinction between the two becomes 
metaphysical. If there tum out to be metaphysical reasons for preferring a Neo 
Lorentzian interpretation of relativity over its Einsteinian counterpart then we have 
done sufficient to supplant the Einsteinian interpretation with an interpretation that is 
supportive to presentism and hence temporal minimalism. 
7.4.3 Neo-Lorentzian theories 
A theory may be classified as Lorentzian just in case it affirms (i) the round trip 
vacuum propagation oflight is isotropic in a preferred (absolute) reference frame 
Ro (with speed c=l) and independent of the velocity of the source, and (ii) 
lengths contract and time rates dilate in the customary special relativistic way 
only for systems in motion with respect to Ro. (Craig 2000b: 108_9)15 
The difference between Einsteinian and Neo-Lorentzian interpretations of the 
relativistic effects discussed above (chapter three) is essentially a difference of 
metaphysics. Einsteinian interpretations appear positivistic.1 6 Lorentz (1913) was 
certainl y not. 
According to Einstein it has no meaning to speak of motion relative to the 
aether. He likewise denies the existence of absolute simultaneity. 
It is certainly remarkable that these relativity concepts, also those 
concerning time, have found such rapid acceptance. 
The acceptance of these concepts belongs mainly to 
epistemology ... It is certain, however, that it depends to a large extent 
on the way one is accustomed to think whether one is attracted to one 
or another interpretation. As far as this lecturer is concerned, he finds 
a certain satisfaction in the older interpretations, according to which 
the aether possesses at least some substantiality, space and time can 
15 Of course, in addition to (i) and (ii) we will also have to take into account our perception of the 
customary relativistic effects \\ithin Ro from frames other than ~o. .. ' ' 
16 Note I do not sa\' that Einstein \\'as a positivist, but that thIS partIcular mterpretatlon attrIbuted to 
, -
Einstein is positivistic. 
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be sharply separated, and simultaneity without further specification 
can be spoken of. In regard to this last point, one may perhaps appeal 
to our ability to imagine arbitrarily large velocities. In that way, one 
comes very close to the concept of absolute simultaneity. 
Finally, it should be noted that the daring assertion that one can 
never observe velocities larger than the velocity of light contains a 
hypothetical restriction of what is accessible to us, [ a restriction] 
which cannot be accepted without some reservation. (H.A. Lorentz, 
A. Einstein, H. Minkowski, Das Relativitatsprinzip, Fortschritte der 
mathematischen Wissehschaft 2, mit Anmerkungen von A. 
Sommerfeld und Vorwort von O. Blumenthal (Leipzig: B.G. Teunber, 
1913), p. 23 (Pais translation) Quoted in Craig 2000b: p. 105) 
So if the presentist is not a positivist then she may have a way out of the problem 
devised for them by the Einsteinian. 17 After all, relativity does not prove that there 
cannot be an absolute frame; rather, it claims that the existence of an absolute frame 
of reference cannot be verified - and hence is meaningless. But it should be clear that 
talk of an absolute frame is only meaningless within a positivistic context, a context 
of which metaphysics is not necessarily a part. Hence, there is no empirical reason 
that the presentists ought to give up their belief in the existence of an absolute inertial 
frame. 
7.4.4 The superiority of the Lorentzian account 
Firstly, following Craig (2000b), it appears that there are some sizeable 
advantages to be had by supporting Neo-Lorentzian rather than space-time 
interpretations of relativistic phenomena. In chapter three it was noted that the space-
time explanation of relativistic phenomena is not really an explanation. Or at least 
whilst it explains our perceptions, it does little, if anything, to explain why reality is 
the way that it is. On a space-time account a ball does not fall to the floor because it is 
a three dimensional entity attracted by a gravitational force; instead, the world line of 
17 Of course if we are merely searching for the best explanation then what I say here rna.)' n~t go 
through. But if we are searching for the best explanation then it is open t? the !emporal rv.l1n1mahst to 
deny that the Einsteinian solution is the best because it makes use of the dIscredIted space-time model. 
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a four dimensional entity is located at a number distinct space-time points. But this is 
not to state why the ball falls to the floor, merely to state that it does so. 
7.4.4.1 Causal explanation 
The advantage of any theoretical Neo Lorentzian approach is that it must 
provide some reason for the relativistic phenomena actually occurring, such that if the 
Lorentzian wishes to say that the time dilation of a reference frame travelling at a 
high velocity is only illusory, then the theory must provide some causal explanation 
as to why this occurs. Craig considers just such an option. 
'A body moving with respect to this frame [inertial frame (IF)] will drag its 
gravitational field along with it. The theory of retarded potentials applies to the 
gravitational or electromagnetic field of a body moving relative to I(F). For such 
a body energy propagation is not isotropic and its co-moving fields are no longer 
symmetric, which leads to a whole chain of interacting anisotropy effects. If the 
field of a moving electron is compressed in the direction of motion, for example, 
then its surface must be similarly compressed to maintain an equipotential 
equilibrium state, and the moving electron takes the shape of an ellipsoid. A 
system of particles would contract in the direction of motion in order to sustain 
the interparticle equilibrium of the system. No substantial aether is required for 
the production of such effects; the existence of I(F) suffices,' (pp. 111-112) 
As Craig himself is at pains to point out (p. 113), it is not essential that this particular 
explanation be correct; the point of the argument is merely that whereas the space-
time interpretation of relativity implies that the perception of contraction in a moving 
body is due to a perspective upon a four dimensional entity - but tells us nothing of 
how reality got to be how it is - the causal explanation that must be offered by the 
Neo Lorentzian gives us some genuine account, to be explored and potentially 
falsified, and hence gives us some further avenue for scientific enquiry where it is 
clear that the imbedding of relativistic phenomena within space-time is an idealism 
that cannot be falsified. 18 
18 Rindler, W (1969: p. 10), Goldberg (1984: p. 105). 
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7.4.4.2 Compatible with change 
Second, the Neo Lorentzian account, by stipulating the existence of an 
absolute frame, is compatible with dynamic expositions of time and temporality, and 
therefore is not committed to the static picture of reality that was held up for analysis 
(and rejection) in chapter four. Thus, a Neo Lorentzian account is preferable to its 
space-time counterpart on the grounds that it can provide a genuine and satisfactory 
account of passage. It should be noted that this is not restricted to presentist theories; 
the existence of the absolute frame of becoming is essential to any theory which 
attempts to incorporate a genuine account of temporal passage that is not to be some 
disjointed form of "here-now-ism". 
7.4.4.3 No need for time over and above change 
Third, and this is where I part company from Craig, the Neo Lorentzian 
solution to the problem does not necessitate that there be a metaphysical time over 
and above mere change. Where Craig wants to implement metaphysical time as the 
time that is perceived by God (2001: p. 169), I see no particularly good reason to refer 
to time as anything more than change. As was argued in chapters five and seven, it is 
not apparent that there is any compelling reason for us to think that time is, literally, 
an entity, or that it is extended as any kind of substance. Theories of space-time 
provide us with a prima facie plausible motivation for accepting that time is extended. 
But since such theories are, or so I have argued, ruled out, theories of space-time do 
not, in fact, provide us with motive to think of time as extended at all. Although Craig 
may object that my line of thought pays insufficient attention to the role of a deity in 
determining metaphysical time, inasmuch as the time of a deity is true metaphysical 
time, I think my position stronger in virtue of the fact that temporal minimalism is not 
dependent upon the existence of a deity, whose very existence is disputable. But it is 
not that temporal minimalism is incompatible with metaphysical time either; rather 
metaphysical time could be thought of as an "add on". 
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It should be clear that although temporal minimalism remains neutral with 
regards to the existence of a deity, should one wish to incorporate such a deity as 
Craig's into temporal minimalism then there would be no obvious barrier to doing so~ 
though one would, then, have a motive for introducing metaphysical time over and 
above mere change (presumably something like timee on a global scale) as the time of 
God. Such a move, were it accepted, would provide further motivation for denying 
that the Einsteinain interpretation of relativity is correct as there would be one 
metaphysical time, the time of God; that is, the one true time. Only one of the times 
of the various frames of reference could, then, turn out to be the absolute frame. 
7.4.5 Alleged disadvantages of Neo Lorentzian interpretations of relativity 
The two main disadvantages to be considered are that the Neo Lorentzian 
interpretation is more complicated than its Einsteinian counterpart since it must 
postulate that at least some of the relativistic phenomena are not, in fact, real but mere 
illusion; and second, that reality would not behave in such a way as to deny us access 
to its true nature, and thus that these illusions ought not to be a part of our description 
of reality. The Einsteinian is certainly onto something here, for in postulating the 
existence of an absolute frame it appears that the Lorentzian is committed to saying 
that although there is, really, only one way that reality exists, that reality somehow 
conspires to make it appear that there is no such absolute frame of reference. If it is 
there, why can we not see it? Certainly, then, the Einsteinian solution renders itself 
prima facie the more simple of the two options making use, as it does, of as many 
frames of reference as there are perspectives upon a particular four dimensional 
entity. It should also be added in favour of the space-time interpretation that the 
completedness of the solution is quite satisfying and that the perspectival solution to 
the problems of contraction, dilation etc., is a most simple and obvious one. 
7.4.5.1 Reply to the simplicity objection 
I suspect that the first response from the Neo Lorentzian may be to say that the 
Einsteinian is rather blinded by his own theory if he thinks the Neo Lorentzian theory 
to be more complicated that its Einsteinian counterpart. Whilst, perhaps, the 
Lorentzian picture does not have the completedness mentioned above and may necJ 
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to postulate the existence of some illusion where the Einsteinian solution has a greater 
degree of technical simplicity, the Lorentzian has the greater degree of conceptual and 
metaphysical simplicity. For, rather than denying the common sense notion that there 
exists a genuine notion of simultaneity, as the Einsteinian must, the Lorentzian 
accepts this basic concept of simultaneity. The, pre theoretically, absurd Einsteinian 
claim that there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity requires an astonishing 
revision of our conceptual apparatus and so to call it more simple than its Lorentzian 
counterpart is false. 
One can make similar claims as to the metaphysical simplicity of the two 
interpretations of relativity. In regarding space-time as fundamental, the Einsteinian 
interpretation of relativity makes the implicit claim that mathematics is sufficient a 
tool for telling us how reality really is, how space and time, in fact, reduce to space-
time. But there must surely be some complicated metaphysics at work to explain how 
four dimensional entities appear to us as three dimensional entities if, in fact, they turn 
out to be radically different four dimensional entities. If this methodology were not 
suspect enough, the Einsteinian must also rely upon a metaphysic, a metaphysic of 
four dimensional entities, that, by unifying space and time into a single entity, is 
significantly more complex than a metaphysic of space and time. I say that the 
metaphysics of space-time are more complicated than those of space and time 
precisely because, as has just been noted, the nature of space-time is hidden from us, 
and hence, as I argued in chapter three, the metaphysical picture to be constructed is 
highly complex and the nature of intrinsic properties remains hidden from us. A 
metaphysic of three dimensions is far simpler for us to construct. 
Clearly, then, the Einsteinians cannot be referring to conceptual or 
metaphysical simplicity, but empirical simplicity. And on this note, perhaps we can 
find some sympathy with their position. It does seem, that in needing to postulate 
some physical cause for why it is that relativistic phenomena refuse to reveal to us the 
true nature of the absolute frame, the Lorentzian is at a disadvantage. Since the 
Einsteinians can explain these effects without needing to postulate further laws and 
relations they have the upper hand. But it should be clear that this advantage is only 
short lived; by postulating the existence of a physical law the Lorentzians at least 
leaves their position open to experimentation and possible falsification. The 
Einsteinians, in merely stipulating the geometric solution to the problem deny 
themselves any physical means by which to test their claim and consequently this 
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leaves the Lorentzian view with the greater explanatory power. So, although the 
theory may be empirically simpler, it is so only at the cost of diminished explanatory 
power and greater metaphysical and conceptual complexity. 
7.4.5.3 Reply to the objection of malice 
According to Craig (2000b: p. 115) the single most obvious objection to the 
Lorentzian position is that there simply is no physical evidence for the existence of an 
absolute frame. Given our various analyses, should there be such a thing as an 
absolute inertial frame, then we should have found it. For it to still be the case that 
there is, genuinely, an absolute frame, nature would have to be arranged in such a 
fashion to make it appear as if it were conspiring to hide its existence from us; and 
there is simply no reason to suppose that this is the case. 
But, contra Einsteinian claims, there is evidence to suppose that there exists an 
absolute frame and that it is our own perceptual experiences of time which entail that 
there is genuine passage. Since genuine passage cannot be accommodated within a 
space-time manifold, at least not without the inclusion of an unwanted explanatory 
gap, it seems that our experience of temporal passage is, of itself, good evidence as to 
the falsity of the claim that there is no evidence for the existence of an absolute frame. 
Although this is not the sort of evidence that the Einsteinian will say is necessary 
(precisely what is necessary according to the Einsteinian being far from clear) it is 
evidence for the existence of an absolute frame. 
Further to this, the Einsteinian is working on the claim that reality is simply 
not the kind of thing to behave in such a way as to hide from us the most basic truths 
about it. Assuming that this is indeed true, which may prove a controversial 
assumption, the Einsteinians must explain why it is that, on their model and in 
rejecting the Lorentzian account, it is not possible for us to be deceived by nature; but 
in making their own case it is perfectly possible that we are deceived. For. as was 
argued in chapter three, the static theorist is committed to the claim that our every day 
perceptual experience is a mere illusion arising from the nature of our existence in 
reality. Thus, on the one hand, our potential deception by reality is ruled out by the 
Einsteinian as too extravagant even to consider when considering other interpretations 
of relativity, whereas, on the other, our potential deception is perceived to be a 
necessary part of said theory. Admittedly there is a difference in degree at stake. The 
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Einsteinian will say that our scientific observations reveal to us the true nature of 
reality precisely because they are more focused on finding how things really are. Thus 
the deception would have to be greater than in the case of our everyday observations 
of chairs and tables. But the physicist must surely also impugn all other sciences that 
do not reveal this true four dimensional nature of reality. The biologist, for example. 
although carrying out equally detailed work and paying just as much attention to the 
nature of reality as the physicist, does not perceive reality to be four dimensional in 
their work. 
This lack of consistency when considering the possible deceptions \ve may 
have indicates, surely, a not inconsiderable bias towards the Einsteinian interpretation 
of reality. 19 It might even seem reasonable, given the forgoing, to suppose that the 
argument from illusion weighs more heavily on the side of the Lorentzian than it does 
the Einsteinian. This, especially given that there is evidence for the existence of an 
absolute frame. Craig (2000b) raises two points in this vein. First he notes: 
SR is a restricted theory of relativity: it is only uniform motion relative to the 
privileged frame that fails to manifest itself. But in all other cases of motion, 
the absolute character of that motion is disclosed. This is not to say that 
acceleration or rotation proves the reality of privileged space, but it is to say 
that, given the classical concepts of time and space, nature does not at all 
conspire to conceal either absolute motion or the privileged space from us. (p. 
116) 
Thus, it appears that the classical concepts of time and space are not as concealed as 
the Einsteinian might like to think. And second Craig argues that there are variants of 
the classical aether, 
such as the microwave background radiation or the quantum mechanical 
vacuum, which serve to disclose a privileged frame. Indeed, when Einsteinians 
complain that no evidence of a privileged space and time exist, one wonders 
what it would take to convince them of the contrary. (p. 116) 
19 One that may potentially be aided and abetted by our natural tendency to think of time in spatial 
terms (Chapter five) 
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All in all then, it seems that the Einsteinian argument that the necessity of illusion to 
conspire against us to keep from us the true nature of reality in order for the 
Lorentzian view to be correct, lacks the even handedness that one might seek in an 
open minded approach to metaphysics. 
7.5 Conclusion 
I hope to have shown that this brief sketch of temporal minimalism points to a 
new way of thinking about time, one where we take time to be mere change in the 
physical - change in composition and location of entities. Although I have only been 
able to sketch the position in this final chapter, I hope to have shown the potential for 
the position to be developed and the advantages to doing so. Further, I have shown 
that temporal minimalism, at least so far as I have been able to develop it, proves 
immune to the problems raised for traditional versions of presentism which were 
considered in chapter six. It should also be noted that in arguing in the way that I have 
I would also endorse the claim that standard versions of presentism have sufficient 
resources to meet the challenges from the special theory, though they may perhaps 
lack the metaphysical resources to meet some of the problems mentioned in chapter 
six. There remain challenges for temporal minimalism. For instance, I have said 
nothing about Shoemaker style arguments that purport to show situations in which it 
would be credible to suppose that there can be time without change - a claim that I 
would deny. Nor have I said anything concerning the alleged problem raised by Le 
Poidevin (1991) where he challenges presentist theories and their construction of the 
present. Such apparent counter arguments to temporal minimalism are important and 
worthy of discussion, but I lack the space here to detail how I would set about such a 
task, and it is for a fuller exposition of temporal minimalism that such arguments will 
have to wait. 
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